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Introduction
Desmond Ball and Sheryn Lee 
Coral Mary Bell AO, one of the world’s foremost academic experts on international 
relations, crisis management and alliance diplomacy, passed away in Canberra 
on 26 September 2012, aged eighty-nine. She worked at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House) in London in the 1950s, was a Senior 
Lecturer in Government at the University of Sydney in 1961–1965, a Reader in 
International Relations at the London School of Economics (LSE) in London in 
1965–1972, a Professor in International Relations at Sussex University in 1972–
1977, a Senior Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at 
The Australian National University from 1977 to 1988, and a Visiting Fellow 
at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at ANU for the next two 
decades. 
She was a prolific author. She published eight major books, including Negotiation 
from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (1962), The Debatable Alliance: 
An Essay in Anglo-American Relations (1964), The Conventions of Crisis: A Study 
in Diplomatic Management (1971), The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger 
Era (1977), Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (1984), and 
A World Out of Balance: American Ascendancy and International Politics in 
the 21st Century (2003). She edited five other books, published some twenty 
monographs, and wrote about seventy-five chapters in edited books and articles 
in academic journals. (A full list of her publications is included at the end of this 
volume). She was still working on five different papers at the time of her death.
This volume is divided into three parts. Part One describes Coral’s personal 
constitution and provides an overview of her career. Chapter one, by her brother 
Harry Bell, recounts her early years. They were not easy. Her mother died when 
she was only seven years old, her father lost his job at the beginning of the 
Great Depression, and she was looked after by relatives during her primary 
school years. She was fifteen at the time of the Munich Crisis. She started at 
Sydney University just a few months before the Battle of the Coral Sea. She was 
worried that the presence of Japanese submarines in Sydney Harbour presaged 
a Japanese invasion, and worked with a degaussing unit at the National Physics 
Laboratory at Sydney University on techniques to protect Australian ships 
against magnetic mines. She later acknowledged that her life-long interest 
in international crises and her ‘realist’ perspective originated in this period. 
She had initially sought a career in the Australian Diplomatic Service, but as 
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Desmond Ball tells in chapter two, she ran afoul of a group in the Department 
of External Affairs who were spying for the Soviet Union and wanted her away 
from their predacity. Academia was essentially an accidental vocation.
Geoffrey Barker provides in chapter three a journalistic description of Coral. He 
describes her as ‘perhaps Australia’s most eminent and respected international 
security scholar’ who ‘was present at the creation of the post-War world of U.S.-
Soviet superpower competition’. He recalls her ‘scholarly modesty’ and notes 
that ‘she did not play the media game and seek to promote her views …. To her, 
international security issues were too profound to be reduced to the often glib 
formulas to which journalists seek to reduce complex issues’. She described her 
work as ‘a sort of meditation on history’. Meredith Thatcher worked for Coral 
as a research assistant in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre from 2002 
to 2010, and describes her, in chapter four, from a quite different perspective. 
She notes that Coral was a very rare woman in a male-dominated profession, 
at least when Coral entered it. She characterises Coral as ‘an optimistic realist’, 
who was also compassionate, gracious, and humble, with ‘a dry wit and warm 
personality’.
Robert O’Neill provides in chapter five a comprehensive overview of Coral’s 
academic career. She obtained her doctorate at LSE in the early 1950s and then 
worked at Chatham House, where she enjoyed the tutelage of Martin Wight, 
and began her association with the founders of the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London in the late 1950s, and then accepted 
a professorship at Sussex University in the 1970s. Her last three decades or 
so were spent with the Department of International Relations and the SDSC 
at ANU. O’Neill characterises her as a ‘conservative realist’, who shared the 
conservative political philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, but was opposed to 
the US (and Australian) intervention in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
critical of covert operations of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) such 
as the overthrow of Iran’s populist prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 
1953, and despaired at the simplicity of the foreign policy views of successive 
conservative Australian governments. She was a fan of Henry Kissinger in the 
1970s and applauded the way President Ronald Reagan dealt with the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s, but she later supported the basic approach to international 
affairs articulated by President Barack Obama, who she praised for recognising 
that the world had undergone a ‘profound, irreversible redistribution of power’ 
towards Asia.1
Most of Coral’s academic career was spent in Departments of International 
Relations, but she was always more interested in critiques of policy rather than 
1 Coral Bell, ‘Seven Years to Get it Right’, American Review, November 2009, http://americanreviewmag.
com/stories/Seven-years-to-get-it-right (accessed 11 November 2013).
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International Relations theory. Indeed, she disdained theoretical approaches to 
the field.2 Nevertheless, as the contributions to Part Two of this volume show, 
she inevitably possessed a theoretical framework, albeit rarely explicated and 
somewhat inchoate. In chapter six, Ian Hall argues that ‘her international 
thought’, which he calls an ‘agent-centred interpretive theory of international 
relations’, was actually quite sophisticated. She accepted from Martin Wight 
that the disciplines of philosophy, literature and history could ‘capture truths 
about human societies’, and that politics was best explained in terms of ideas 
(the beliefs and perceptions of policy-makers) and institutions (including 
conventions and norms of behaviour as much as formal institutions), with events 
being determined essentially by ‘agency, contingency and contestability’. JDB 
(‘Bruce’) Miller, in chapter seven, reiterates this perspective. He notes that Coral 
‘brought a practical and sophisticated analysis to the study of the international 
system’, in which the beliefs of policy-makers, mediated through decision-
making processes, are paramount. In chapter eight, James L Richardson locates 
her in ‘classical realism, grounded in history and the humanities’, not at all 
deterministic but providing great scope for political and diplomatic choice.
Part Three moves from international relations to the realm of power politics, 
which Coral explored with respect to practical policy-making concerning such 
critical matters as crisis management, Cold War competition, alliance diplomacy, 
US and Australian foreign and defence policies, and the construction of a stable 
and sustainable international system. In chapter nine, Brendan Taylor relates 
that she was a devoted Australian, always conscious, in her own words, of 
‘her own country’s efforts to provide for its future security’, and that this laid 
ultimately in the durability of ‘the central balance’ between the great powers, 
and Australia’s alliance with a principal power in this ‘balance’.3 He is greatly 
impressed by her unremitting sense of optimism and her ‘unrelenting drive to 
look imaginatively toward the future’. He notes that as far back as the 1960s, in 
The Debatable Alliance, she was already searching for alternative power-sharing 
arrangements, developing the concept of a ‘shadow condominium’.4
In chapter ten, Michael Wesley examines Coral’s interpretation of the Cold War. 
He notes that her ‘first professional engagement with international affairs was 
as a practitioner’ in government service and that this had ‘a lasting impact on 
her work’. Moreover, this formative period coincided with the beginning of 
the Cold War, which she watched closely through to its end. He stresses her 
intuitive capacity, which allowed her, ‘without being cased in … ponderous 
methodology’, but nevertheless grounded in fecund concepts, to portray the 
2 Coral Bell, ‘The State of the Discipline: I.R.’, Quadrant, vol 12, no. 1, January-February 1968, p. 82.
3 Coral Bell, The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents, Adelphi Paper no. 44, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 1968, p. 1.
4 Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations, Chatham House Essays No. 3, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1964, pp. 108-113.
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Cold War and its outcome primarily in terms of the characters, beliefs and 
judgements of the key policy-makers involved. Over the long term, the US 
emerged victorious because it proved better able to ‘negotiate power’.
In chapter eleven, Robert Ayson reviews Coral’s work on crisis management. 
He notes at the outset that she was concerned with ‘the ideas that could be 
gleaned from the practice of international diplomacy’. This ‘made her more of a 
commentator than a theorist’, but she was ‘an exceptionally adroit commentator’. 
Crisis management for Coral was a fundamental alternative to catastrophic war. 
Wars have become potentially much more destructive, but they still flourish. 
Crises can only be managed by the parties to ‘the central balance of power’. 
Only the dominant powers can affect ‘central crises’, and only they can prevent 
local crises from turning into central ones. The quality of crisis diplomacy is 
determinate, which in practice means the policy choices of the decision-makers 
of the dominant powers. Shared conventions, or patterns of behaviour, are 
more important than formal institutions. Power, represented by armed force, 
is crucial, but it is mediated by ‘signals’ (which communicate threats or offers 
to the other party to the crisis); shared conventions ensure that the signals are 
correctly understood by the respective decision-makers.
William Tow, in chapter twelve, reviews Coral’s work on ‘alliance politics’, 
which includes her assessments of both US leadership of the Western alliance 
system and, more particularly, the functioning of the US-Australia alliance. 
Again, diplomatic history rather than international relations theory was 
her main instrument in these endeavours. With regard to US leadership, she 
appreciated by the early 2000s, following the terrorist attack on the US homeland 
in September 2011 and the ‘ineffectual US invasion and occupation of Iraq’ 
in 2003, that global power was inevitably being redistributed by ‘economic, 
demographic and technological changes’, as well as ‘Jihadist challenges’, and 
that this required new forms of alignment, but she remained persuaded that 
the US would ‘remain the paramount power of the society of states’ for the 
foreseeable future. With regard to the US-Australia alliance, she believed that 
by hosting US facilities such as Pine Gap, Australia had become less dependent 
on the US. The alliance had become ‘considerably less unequal’, transmuted into 
‘interdependence of a relatively symmetrical sort’.5 She remained convinced 
that Australia would remain ‘inextricably and beneficially tied to US power as 
the best means for ensuring its own national security and for pursuing global 
stability’; but she also believed that Australia could play a positive role in 
adjudicating US reconciliation of its Cold War bilateral alliance system with the 
burgeoning construction of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region.




Hugh White brings together and develops the key themes articulated in 
earlier chapters in his culminating essay on ‘The Concert of Power: Avoiding 
Armageddon’. He recapitulates the impact of strategic developments in Coral’s 
formative years on her subsequent career—the destructiveness of the Second 
World War, the development and use of the atomic bomb, the practitioner’s 
perspective on the workings of the international system, and the importance 
of diplomacy. She was an optimistic realist, believing that the policy-makers 
in the dominant states could reach and sustain modes of communication and 
agreements which could minimise the risks of war and hence avoid atomic 
Armageddon. Following on from Martin Wight and other members of the English 
School of International Relations and also the influence of Henry Kissinger, 
she moved from implicit support for notions of a ‘shadow condominium’ to 
being a dedicated advocate of a ‘concert of powers’. In a conflict-ridden 
world, with nuclear weapons aplenty, only a concert in which power is shared 
in the over-riding interest of preventing major wars can avoid Armageddon. 
White agrees with this analysis, but believes that Coral underestimated the 
difficulties involved in the construction of such a concert. He concludes with 
the admonition that, precisely because avoidance of catastrophic war should 
be our highest priority, we should all—academics and policy-makers alike—
devote our energies to overcoming those difficulties, especially with respect to 
achieving an accommodation between the US and China (and Asia’s other great 
powers). 
Finally, then, after hearing from more than a dozen of her friends and colleagues, 
it should be possible to say who Coral Bell was, what she was like, what she did, 
and what was her legacy. She in fact had many close friends, which attests to her 
charm, compassion, generosity and engaging personality. And she had many 
colleagues willing to write about her, which signifies that the things she did 
were both important and interesting.
Coral’s legacy is difficult to summarise; it is primarily indirect, through her ideas 
and arguments. O’Neill reckons that ‘her analytical legacy is a view of the world 
where US power and influence have been eroded through poorly thought-out 
policies and lack of understanding of the United States’ own weakness in the 
first decade of this century’. It is surely broader than that, encompassing the 
whole discourse on power politics and international relations, including crisis 
management and alliance diplomacy, as well as other periods when US power 
was ascendant rather than eroding. As Taylor notes, her impact was frequently 
second-order, through ‘the people she worked with, taught and mentored’, 
and in particular, ‘her education of a significant number of emerging scholars’, 
many of whom subsequently took up ‘senior positions in academia, government 
and the military’. An important legacy concerns gender, where she opened the 
path for women into the international politics field. For over half a century, 
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‘ever since her appointment as one of Australia’s first female diplomats, … [she 
served] as a mentor and role model for female scholars and practitioners’ in this 
field. Internationally, she lifted Australia’s ‘diplomatic profile’. 
Unusually for academics, she attracted the respect of policy-makers from around 
the globe. Denis Healey, a founder of the IISS and the Secretary of State for 
Defence from 1964 to 1970 and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1974 to 1979, 
observed, with her in mind, that ‘from the middle fifties Australia has contributed 
more to international understanding of defence problems than any country of 
similar size’.6 Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary 
of State under President Richard Nixon, invoked her ideas in his own writings.7 
Sir Keith Waller, Australia’s first career ambassador to the United States (1964-
70) and Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra (1970-74) 
said that ‘her work has brought a new lustre to the reputation of Australia in all 
countries where people follow the serious study of foreign affairs’.8 Kim Beazley, 
former Minister for Defence and leader of the Australian Labor Party, said in 
2008 that Coral ‘stood out’ as one of the two scholars (the other being Hedley 
Bull) who had ‘captured the attentions of policy practitioners’.9 Her funeral 
was attended by former heads of the Australian Department of Defence and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Defence Intelligence Organisation 
(DIO) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA).
She was clearly a realist, for whom power, relational and broadly defined, was 
the central concept in the functioning of the international system. But her 
realism was unique; she could be characterised not only as a ‘conservative 
realist’ or a ‘classical realist’, but also, a much rarer breed, an ‘optimistic realist’. 
Indeed, she could be called a ‘constructivist realist’. It has been said (by Ayson) 
that she was a commentator, not a theorist, but she was never content to be 
merely descriptive. Her commentaries were invariably prescriptive, stipulating 
how the international system (or statecraft, for agency was more important than 
structure) should function. In fact, adept statecraft can create sound structures. 
It has also been pointed out (by Wesley) that Coral emphatically opposed value-
laden foreign policies, but not because she lacked values; rather, values were 
difficult to negotiate, whereas contests over power could be bargained and 
managed. In fact, contests over values were usually resolved by power contests 
anyway. 
6 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, p. 192.
7 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, 2nd edn, Touchstone, New York, 
2002, p. 288.
8 Cited in Coral Bell, Crises and Australian Diplomacy, Arthur F Yencken Memorial Lecture 1972, Australian 
National University Press, 1973, p. 1.
9 Kim Beazley, ‘Thinking Security: Influencing National Strategy from the Academy; An Australian 
Experience’, Coral Bell Lecture 2008, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 19 March 2008, p. 5.
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For Coral, the ultimate value was the avoidance of catastrophic war (or 
Armageddon) and the ‘preservation of human life and human society’ in 
a conflict-ridden world.10 As Hall argues, she held ‘a vision of international 
relations that was both human and humane’. In the end, she was a committed 
humanitarian.
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1. Coral’s Early Life
Harry Bell
I was about two and a half years of age, when our mother returned from 
Christmas shopping complaining of a headache, lay on a bed and passed away 
due to a cerebral haemorrhage. Coral was about seven years of age at the time.
Coral was born at Gladesville in Sydney on 30 March 1923. After this date we 
moved to Queanbeyan where I was born, and then returned to Sydney, living at 
Bondi, opposite Bondi Beach.
Our father had been an electrical contractor, but his business collapsed in 
1930 and he was out of work for almost eight years. We grew up in a society 
dominated by the Great Depression. Our father never really recovered from the 
double blow of losing his wife and having to bring up three young children 
alone, with no money.
On the death of our mother, Coral was sent to live with our aunt (our mother’s 
sister) and uncle, who owned the local hotel in Eden on the South Coast, and 
were quite well off. Coral later said that, having been sent to Eden, she had not 
only lost her mother but had also lost her two brothers and her father.
Coral attended a Catholic school in Eden, run by the Sisters of St Joseph, and did 
well scholastically. Coral proved to be a diligent student in Eden and, when she 
completed sixth class, aged about eleven, gained entry to the selective school, 
Sydney Girls High, and returned to live with us in Sydney. I had no memory of 
Coral before she returned.
When she completed sixth class she was awarded a bursary of twenty-five 
pounds per year to complete her Intermediate. When she completed her 
Intermediate, she gained eight straight ‘A’s and a bursary of fifty pounds per 
year. She completed her Leaving Certificate at Sydney Girls High, where her 
name appears on the Honour Roll, in 1941.
She won a scholarship which paid all her fees to attend Sydney University from 
1942 to 1944, where she completed a Bachelor of Arts Degree. She joined the 
Department of External Affairs as a diplomatic cadet in early 1945.
During her years in high school and at university, she was very serious and 
very studious. As a teenager, she had some friendships with girls from school, 
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but she was not a ‘party girl’. As far as I know, she never had a boyfriend. She 
did not play any sports, and had no hobbies. She liked going to the movies and 
listening to classical music, but mainly she just studied.
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2. From External Affairs to Academia: 
Coral’s Encounter with the KGB’s Spy 
Ring in Australia1
Desmond Ball
Coral Bell was one of the world’s foremost academic experts on international 
relations and power politics. However, her life in academia was unintended. She 
had envisaged a vocation in international politics, but in some aspect of public 
service. Her move to academia was essentially an accidental by-product of a 
friendship with colleagues who were spying for the Soviet Union.2
She began her career in the Australian Diplomatic Service, joining the 
Department of External Affairs as a Diplomatic Cadet in Canberra in 1945. Over 
the next three years, she got to know well several members of the Department 
who were members of the Soviet spy ring, especially Jim Hill (code-named 
‘Tourist’) and Ric Throssell (‘Ferro’). She subsequently became ‘absolutely 
persuaded’ that John Burton, the head of the Department, ‘provided top-cover’ 
for the spies. She believed that an attempt was made to recruit her in late 1947, 
and that her caustic response caused Burton to move quickly to sideline her in 
the Department.
Coral recorded her recollections of this controversial period in an unpublished 
memoir, which I discussed further with her on 15 November 2011 and 10 
January 2012. She described the general security situation in External Affairs at 
the time, as well as her own personal experience, in great detail.3
In 1946–48, External Affairs was one of several Departments housed in West 
Block, on the western side of Parliament House. ‘In those days we were a very 
small group: the whole of the diplomatic staff [about 30 people] could fit into 
one medium-sized seminar-room’. Security in the building was appalling. ‘In 
those innocent days, no one, from the Minister down [in fact particularly the 
Minister], was in the least security-minded. There were no guards about, and 
practically no locks or barriers within the building.’ Bell recorded that the staff 
‘used in most cases to bring sandwiches for lunch, and eat them sprawled on 
the lawn outside the office, not even bothering to lock our rooms as we left 
1 This is a revised version of Desmond Ball, ‘Soviet Spies had Protection in Very High Places’, The Australian, 
14 January 2012.
2 Desmond Ball and David Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia’s KGB Network, 1944–1950, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1998.
3 Coral Bell, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’, unpublished memoir, Canberra, 2012.
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temporarily, though foreign diplomats roamed unescorted about the building’. 
She says that Dr Evatt, the Minister, ‘not only did not believe in security; he 
despised security’.
In 1946, Bell was assigned to the United Nations Division of the Department, of 
which Burton was then the head as well as being head of the entire Department. 
Here she formed a close relationship with Hill and Throssell, her senior colleagues 
in the Division. ‘I said I used to bring sandwiches for lunch, and eat them 
on the West Block lawn. And much of the time I had very pleasant company 
in the shapes of three agreeable young men, Jim Hill, Ric Throssell, and Fred 
Rose. Fred was an anthropologist who worked nearby, a great charmer who 
always seemed to be at everyone’s parties’. Rose, who worked successively in 
the Department of Territories and the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, 
also worked for Soviet intelligence (code-named ‘Professor’).
At one of the lunches with Throssell, Hill and Rose in late 1947, after they had 
finished eating, Throssell said to Bell that, ‘Some of us think that the Soviet 
Union ought to see these documents’. Bell said that, ‘I assumed he was joking, 
so I laughed merrily, and said something to the effect that it sounded like a 
splendid way to get oneself into jail’.
Bell believed that Throssell told Burton of her ‘frivolous’ response, and that 
Burton ‘acted fast’ to remove her from his central policy division. ‘A [week or 
two] after that carefree mention of jail, I had found myself transferred out of 
Dr Burton’s UN Division to the Southeast Asia Division, so I saw less of the 
others. And again only a few months after that, in 1948, I was “posted” to 
the Australian office in New Zealand, so I never saw any of them again’. She 
resigned from the Department at the end of her term in Wellington in 1951, and 
moved to London to begin her illustrious academic career.
The ‘documents’ that were specifically referred to at the lunch were officially 
called Foreign Office Prints. They were important British Foreign Office 
dispatches and telegrams which were routinely distributed around the Foreign 
Office itself and to the Cabinet, other relevant government agencies in London, 
and the External Affairs Departments of a few Commonwealth countries. They 
were classified ‘Confidential’ rather than ‘Secret’ or ‘Top Secret’. Jim Hill had 
already been providing this material to Soviet intelligence on a regular basis 
(every week or two) since at least September 1945. It was relatively low-level 
political reporting, although it gave Moscow a detailed picture of British foreign 
policy regarding numerous other countries and international issues. 
Bell recalled the incident on the West Block lawn eight years later, in late 1955, 
when she was at Chatham House in London and read the section on Fred Rose 
and June Barnett in the Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage (the 
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Petrov Royal Commission). In April 1950, Barnett, who had only recently joined 
the UN Division, was invited to dinner by Rose at his home in Froggatt Street in 
Turner, where Rose introduced her to Walter Seddon Clayton, the ‘spy-master’ 
of the KGB’s espionage network in Australia. Bell found that the arguments used 
by Rose to suborn Barnett included a ‘precise sentence said to me, by Ric,’ at 
the lunch in 1947.
Barnett’s story raised with Bell ‘the possibility that I might have been initially 
seen as a “possible recruit to the cause” by Ric and Fred and Jim, [and others 
higher up?]’; and that she ‘had disappointed that expectation with my light-
hearted remark about jail’. She also realised ‘that my subsequent days in the 
Department might have been influenced by those circumstances’.
Bell firmly believed that Burton provided ‘top-cover’ for the spies in his 
Department. ‘Someone in Moscow must have had a sense of humour, for the 
code-name given to the Department of External Affairs was “Nook”, and it 
definitely appears to have been one, in its standard definition of “a sheltered 
place”. But who was doing the sheltering? To my mind, [it was] Burton, not 
Evatt’.
Indeed, Bell believed that Burton was more involved with Soviet intelligence 
than merely his ‘top-cover’ role. In particular, she considered the possibility that 
Burton was the principal contact of the head of the Soviet military intelligence 
(GRU) office in the Canberra Embassy, Victor Zaitsev. She said, ‘I wouldn’t be in 
the least surprised’.
Bell recalled Rose with some fondness. She said he was ‘such a nice person’, and 
‘very charming’. She went to parties at his house in Turner, which were also 
attended by Throssell and Hill. In 1948 to 1950, this house was the main ‘drop’ 
used by the spies in External Affairs to leave documents and other material for 
collection by Clayton. For the previous three years, Clayton had used a flat in 
Braddon, occupied by Throssell from 1947 to 1949, for this purpose.
Bell believed that: ‘The truly tragic figure in all this was to my mind Ric 
Throssell. When I first knew him, round 1947, he was a handsome young man 
with apparently everything to live for, and prospects of rising to whatever 
eminence he wanted, either in diplomacy or politics, or even literature. He used 
to read to us, during those lunchtimes, bits of a play he was writing, all about 
atomic weapons and such’. 
Coral was a woman of high personal principles. Although she had often 
intimated to me over the previous two decades that she had more information 
to tell about Burton, Throssell and Hill than Horner and I had recounted in 
Breaking the Codes, she had wanted to withhold it until her memoirs were 
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completed. She would not betray friends; she never lost affection for Rose and 
Throssell. She was always adamant, however, that the truth as she recollected it 
should eventually be told.
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3. Coral Bell: A Preoccupation  
with Armageddon
Geoffrey Barker
In mid-2005 Coral Bell, aged eighty-two, sat with me in an Australian National 
University (ANU) conference room for more than two hours discussing her 
life and work as perhaps Australia’s most eminent and respected international 
security scholar. A lengthy article based on our conversation was published on 
29 July 2005 in The Australian Financial Review Magazine.1 Coral later told me, 
‘You have made me famous’. In fact I had barely done justice to her, but I did not 
appreciate the extent of my inadequacy until early 2013 when I read her own 
short memoir entitled, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’—a marvellously 
insightful, witty, and personal account of her life and career.
It was not just that her writing was superior to my hasty journalism. It was also 
that I missed some key aspects of her life—most notably the approach to her, by 
colleagues in the old Department of External Affairs in 1947, that she act as a spy 
for the Soviet Union. The approach, which she laughed away, was subsequently 
revealed in January 2012 by Professor Desmond Ball in an article published in 
The Australian newspaper. I confess that I was overawed by the grey-haired 
grandmotherly figure with the white shawl over her shoulders sipping coffee 
with me: I had known and admired her work for many years and I had enjoyed 
her company when I was a Visiting Fellow at the ANU Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre. I just didn’t ask the right question at the time.
Now, following Coral’s death in September 2012, I have the opportunity to 
revise and update The Australian Financial Review Magazine article for this 
publication. I hope I can serve her better in death than I could in life because 
Coral Bell deserves to be recognised and memorialised as a great international 
scholar who was present at the creation of the post-War world of US–Soviet 
superpower competition and who, to her last days, remained an astute analyst 
of the emerging post-Cold War world of rising state powers like China and 
India and non-state players like Jihadist terrorists. Coral Bell was a woman who 
understood and appreciated the complexities and contradictions of international 
relations. She understood the importance of history and of patience in dealing 
with international disputes and crises. Her views were conservative and realist, 
but of the English realist school labelled ‘rationalism’ which sought to blend 
1 This is a revised version of Geoffrey Barker, ‘The Analyst’, The Australian Financial Review Magazine, 29 
July 2005.
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the pessimism of realism with the optimism of liberal internationalism. She 
remained fundamentally optimistic about the future of the world because, as 
she said, ‘I have seen far more dangerous times’.
Unlike many of her colleagues Coral did not pursue public recognition. She did 
not play the media game and seek to promote her views. That scholarly modesty 
might explain why it was not until 2005 that Coral received her Order of 
Australia in the Queen’s Birthday Honours. To her, international security issues 
were too profound to be reduced to the often glib formulas to which journalists 
seek to reduce complex issues. ‘My work is a sort of meditation on history’, she 
told me. ‘History is what you have to be guided by. You can’t change everything 
overnight and history teaches the necessity for patience’. She also recalled with 
approval the words of the great conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott 
that international politics was about maintaining an even keel in ‘a boundless 
and bottomless sea’ where there were no safe harbours.2
Bell’s optimism was reinforced by the fact that she had, as she said, ‘grown up 
when the world was preparing for war’. ‘I think on the whole there has been 
a very great improvement in the way people think. The world was far more 
dangerous during the outbreak of war in 1939 and at the beginning of the Cold 
War in 1946 that it is at present. That’s because we survived the Second World 
War. In the years between 1946 and 1989 we survived the very great dangers of 
the bipolar nuclear world with the tension between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In 1962 and 1983 the world was very close to the brink. I don’t 
see any such closeness at the moment’.
‘The Jihadists are an awful problem, of course, but they are not as devastating 
a problem as nuclear war between the great powers’, Bell said. ‘We calculated 
there would be 300 million dead in the first 60 minutes if there were all-out war 
between the US and Soviet Union. That’s a reason for an optimistic view. We 
have survived all that and I think we can survive a lot more’.
To the end of her life Bell’s realism attracted her to the notion that a European-
style concert of powers could preserve peace more effectively than the so-called 
balance of powers that underpins standard realism. Her two late papers Living 
with Giants and The End of the Vasco da Gama Era both argued for a concert 
of powers to oversee the re-emerging multi-polar world of large and powerful 
states, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.3 It is a fascinating and controversial 
view that is still being debated in realist circles.
2 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘Political Education’, Inaugural Lecture delivered at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 6 March 1951.
3 See Coral Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australia’s Place in a More Complex World, Strategy Report, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, April, 2005; and The End of the Vasco da Gama era: The Next 
Landscape of World Politics, Lowy Institute Paper 21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2007.
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Coral Mary Bell was born in Sydney in 1923, the middle child and only 
daughter of a poor Anglo-Irish family. Her mother died when she was seven 
and her father, an electrical contractor who was out of work for almost eight 
years during the depression, sent her to live with relatives at Eden on the south 
coast of NSW where she attended St Joseph’s convent school and later returned 
to attend Sydney Girls High School.
The nuns at Eden taught Bell what she called ‘the most useful lesson I ever 
had’. The nuns taught what Bell remembered as ‘a very Catholic version of 
history’, but she knew that state examiners would expect a Protestant version. 
‘So at age eleven’, she said, ‘I still remember cheerfully describing a fourteenth 
century character called Wycliffe as ‘the morning star of the reformation’ for 
my Protestant examiners and as a ‘dissolute and heretic monk’ for my Catholic 
examiners. Complexity did not intimidate Coral Bell.
From a young age Bell started bumping into the historical crises that ensured 
her work was informed by much more than reports and texts. She recalled the 
1938 Munich Crisis as ‘the first event in the history of my times to affect me 
intellectually and emotionally’. ‘My preoccupation with crisis as diplomatic 
process began there … and I’ve been writing about it ever since’, she said. Bell 
heard the explosions and gunfire when Japanese mini-submarines attacked 
Sydney in June 1942 and she had a vivid memory of hearing of the atomic 
bomb attack on Japan in August 1945, the year in which she graduated in Arts 
from Sydney University. As she said in her private memoir: ‘I have never been, 
in any of its senses, a party girl …’.
During the war, while a university student, this serious young woman had a job 
doing secret work for the navy in the university’s national physics laboratory 
degaussing (demagnetising) warships to protect them from mines. Just down the 
corridor from where she worked other scientists and engineers were working 
on radio location (radar) devices. She saw this experience as a key to her career. 
‘For three war years I spent my days surrounded by scientists and technicians. 
I think the reason I took to strategic studies was that I had started in the field 
of weaponry. Degaussing and radio location were things for the troops. I think 
I acquired a certain interest in strategic hardware at the time. Likewise, an 
empiricist mindset which is still with me’, she said.
Having read mainly English, history and philosophy, in 1944 Bell sat an 
examination for admission to the new diplomatic service being set up by 
the External Affairs Minister Dr Herbert Vere (‘Doc’) Evatt. She was the only 
woman in an intake of ten cadets which included Donald Horne (briefly) and 
the legendary public servants Bill Pritchett and Bob Furlonger. It was an age 
of innocence at the Department of External Affairs. Bell recalled that there 
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was no security. ‘We left our offices open when we went to lunch which we 
would eat on the lawns outside while foreign diplomats were allowed to wander 
unescorted around the building. Things were very primitive’, she said.
Bell spent six years at External Affairs working mainly on policy surrounding 
the founding of the United Nations and ANZUS (Australia New Zealand United 
States) Treaty. In 1948 she was posted to New Zealand which she said felt 
like being awarded ‘the wooden spoon’ although the posting was ‘reasonably 
interesting’. It was while Bell was working in the United Nations Division of 
External Affairs in Canberra that she received the espionage approach from 
colleagues she described in her memoir as ‘rather charming spies’ who she 
‘assumed to be friends’.
They were Fred Rose, an anthropologist and open Communist Party member, and 
External Affairs colleagues Jim Hill, brother of communist leader Ted Hill, and 
Ric Throssell, son of well-known communist Katharine Susannah Prichard. One 
day, after lunch, Throssell said to Bell, ‘some of us think that the Soviet Union 
ought to see these documents’. Bell wrote, ‘I assumed he was joking so I laughed 
merrily and said something to the effect that it sounded like splendid way to 
get oneself into jail’. Professor Desmond Ball, who reported this exchange after 
conversations with Bell, wrote that Bell believed Throssell told Burton of her 
‘frivolous’ response and that Burton ‘acted fast’ to remove her from his central 
policy division. ‘Bell firmly believes that Burton provided “top cover” for the 
spies in his department’, Ball wrote. In her memoir Bell describes Burton as ‘the 
most controversial and ambiguous’ of the three intellectually dominant young 
officials in External Affairs (the others were Paul Hasluck and Arthur Tange). 
She also writes that she believes Burton, not Evatt, was ‘doing the sheltering’ 
of the Communist spies in the Department. But despite her apparent suspicions, 
she stops short of making the contentious and contested claim that Burton was 
himself a spy.
In 1951, Bell resigned from the External Affairs department feeling, she said, 
‘like a cog in a large machine’ and sailed to the UK to study at the London School 
of Economics (LSE) and to embark on her extraordinary career as a university 
teacher and researcher. She did not marry. ‘In my day you were told that if you 
married you were deemed to have resigned from the diplomatic service. So I 
gave up the idea’, she said. Like so many of her contemporaries, war claimed her 
first sweetheart. In a brief moment of undisguised sadness Bell told me:, ‘He was 
killed during a landing in Papua New Guinea. They told me he was shot in the 
head and died instantly without suffering. I hope that is true’.
At LSE she was an evening student doing research work during the day at the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. Working with the historian Arnold J 
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Toynbee she wrote the Institute’s Survey of International Affairs for 1954.4 Bell 
admired Toynbee, describing him to me as ‘splendid, delightful, loyal, modest, 
diffident’. It was at the LSE too that she came under the influence of the noted 
English international relations theorist Martin Wight whom she called ‘the 
chief intellectual influence of my life’. She was present when the conservative 
Michael Oakeshott took over the LSE leadership following the retirement of the 
socialist Harold Laski. Among her colleagues was Karl Popper whose great book 
The Open Society and Its Enemies she greatly admired.
Appointed the first international relations lecturer at Manchester University 
in 1956 Bell started work on her PhD on the US Cold War strategy labelled 
Negotiation from Strength.5 A Rockefeller Fellowship took her to the US where 
she met the giants who created the modern bipolar world—George Kennan, 
the author of the US containment policy, Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze. And J 
Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb who, she said, gave her the 
first clue about US strategy in the nuclear world when he directed her to a top 
secret document written by Nitze. Bell said Oppenheimer ‘looked like a being 
from outer space’. He had lost his security clearances due to past communist 
associations and was less discreet than some others, she said. Bell’s work was 
later much admired by Henry Kissinger.
In 1961 Bell was appointed the first Senior Lecturer in International Relations 
at the University of Sydney. She returned to England to a Readership at the 
LSE in 1965 and in 1972 was appointed Professor of International Relations 
at the University of Sussex. In 1977 she returned to The Australian National 
University ‘to spend my last ten years before retirement in my native land and 
in a research appointment’. From 1988 until her death she was a Visiting Fellow 
at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre where, to her last days, she 
continued to hone her craft as a compelling lecturer and a prolific and elegant 
writer. ‘I suppose’, she wrote in her memoir, ‘I was one of the last generation to 
feel one could pursue a career on both sides of the world without any conflict 
of loyalties’.6
In his 2003 Boyer Lecture, Professor Owen Harries spoke about Coral’s ‘ability to 
cope with and enjoy complexity’, he said: ‘there is nothing simplistic or crude 
about her analysis’. To ANU Professor Emeritus Paul Dibb, Bell is simply, ‘one of 
the great unrecognised and unsung strategic experts in this country. During the 
Cold War, she did absolutely magnificent work on the central balance between 
the US and Soviet Union and what she called the ‘signalling’ in their relations.’
4 Survey of International Affairs for 1954, Oxford University Press, London, 1956.
5 See Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962, 
and Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963.
6 Coral Bell, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon, unpublished memoir, Canberra, 2012.
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In a handsome tribute to Bell, Henry Kissinger wrote in his book, Does America 
Need a Foreign Policy: ‘The Australian scholar Coral Bell has brilliantly described 
America’s challenge: to recognise its own pre-eminence but to conduct its policy 
as if it were still living in a world of many centres of power’.7 Australia and the 
world are poorer for the loss of her wisdom, judgement and insight.
7 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, Simon & 
Schuster, New York, 2001.
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4. Coral Bell: Recollections of an 
Optimistic Realist
Meredith Thatcher
Eighty-nine years separate Coral Bell’s birth on 30 March 1923 from her death 
on 26  September 2012, but how Coral spent those years was, quite simply, 
remarkable. In one lifetime, she lived more than two. Despite earlier hardships 
and coming of age at the end of the Second World War, Coral’s optimism about 
the outcome of world-shaping events never waned. With a pragmatic lens, 
she looked through her glasses clearly, never dimmed. She was, I believe, an 
optimistic realist.
Coral lived her life in three parts: her youth (spent mostly in New South Wales), 
her academic career (spent overseas and in Australia), and her twilight years 
(in semi-retirement, spent mostly at home and at The Australian National 
University).
When asked to contribute to this volume, I selected some of Coral’s writings 
that were sitting on my shelf and considered my options: an academic essay 
or a personal recollection. Other contributors to this volume write of Coral’s 
early years and her stellar academic career and impact on the international and 
domestic stage. I have chosen to offer a snapshot of Coral’s recollections of her 
school and university years and time abroad, and of my own time knowing 
Coral during her later years in Canberra. The chapter ends with the eulogy I 
gave at her funeral.
Forging Connections
Sometimes you connect with a person instantly, and so it was when I first 
met Coral in August 2002. Coral may have been in her late seventies by then, 
but it was her computer that brought us together for the first time. I had just 
started working at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), while 
Coral was spending part of her working day at the Centre and part at home in 
Downer. At the time she was untangling the complexities of and linkages in 
the multipolar world that would be the focus of A World Out of Balance,1 and 
1 Coral Bell, A World Out of Balance: American Ascendancy and International Politics in the 21st Century, 
Longueville Books, Sydney, 2003. The Lowy Institute for International Policy launched the book on 4 March 
2004 at the State Library of New South Wales.
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talking of a concert of powers. Yet figuring out how to use her computer was 
proving harder to crack. Some would have opted out, staying with pen and 
paper. Not Coral. She never got frustrated, choosing instead to see the rapid 
changes in technology as just another hurdle to overcome. So we joined forces 
with her: the Centre’s then-administrator Anne Dowling, the rest of the SDSC 
team, and the IT team in the College all coming to her aid.
Coral was highly intelligent, as the writings about her in this volume attest, but 
it was her dry wit and warm personality that were infectious. You can admire a 
person with a razor-sharp mind: the exceptional person is one with such a mind 
who is also diplomatic, humble and empathetic. Coral never sought awards, 
fame or fortune. She spent her life in service: furthering our thinking on 
weighty topics, inspiring students, and communicating with colleagues. Most 
of all, even when living abroad, she spent her life in service of Australia.
Turning Points
For Coral ‘the Past is a foreign country’ was relevant to Australia. She had grown 
up in a society still dominated by the Great Depression. She was fifteen when she 
started writing essays on international crises. A wonderful teacher at Sydney 
Girls High School encouraged her to view current events as history waiting to 
be written, so Coral wrote an essay on the Munich Crisis of 1938. But it was in 
two exams to enter high school that Coral was faced with writing a paper on the 
same topic. She chose to do so from differing perspectives. Coral regarded this 
moment as ‘the most valuable lesson of her life’. In the understanding of wars 
and crises ‘one must have some understanding of “where each side is coming 
from”, and how the history of the whole conflict looks to them’. Turning points 
in history was a theme that Coral would return to again and again throughout 
her life.2
After high school, during the Second World War, Coral studied at the University 
of Sydney and spent time at a physics laboratory sited on campus. She was 
one of three people in a team that degaussed ships (neutralised their magnetic 
field) to protect them from magnetic mines. Others at the CSIRO Division of 
Radiophysics were working on developing radar. In the days before computing, 
‘practically back in the Ice Age’ as she put it, her calculations were done on 
graph paper and with slide rule. So it was that, between 1942 and 1945, Coral 
spent almost all her waking hours doing war work, surrounded by physicists. 
In the evenings she attended lectures on history, literature, economics and 
2 One of Dr Bell’s research themes was turning points in history and she started her Introduction to her 
Lowy Institute power, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era, with the words, ‘The next landscape of world 
politics is just beginning to be visible through the lingering twilight of the unipolar world’. 
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philosophy. The war made living austere, but Coral took to university life from 
the start. She had found an intellectual home and considered seminar rooms and 
libraries to be ‘my natural habitat’.
Towards the end of the war, Coral contemplated her career options. She passed 
the exams to enter the diplomatic service and in early 1945 travelled to Canberra. 
At the time the capital offered minimal accommodation (with hostels for most 
new arrivals) and few social opportunities. As Coral said, ‘visiting nearby 
Queanbeyan was rated a big day out’. Coral walked and caught buses, and it 
was not until she was posted to Wellington, New Zealand, that she got a driver’s 
licence.
We always remember where we are when life-changing or momentous events 
happen. Coral said the reason for her work revolving around wars and crises 
(what Coral called ‘my preoccupation with the possibility of Armageddon and 
how to avoid it’) dated back to the day a fellow diplomatic cadet rushed in to 
tell her that an atomic bomb had destroyed Hiroshima. What always kept this 
event to mind was remembering the pattern of the hearth-rug she was standing 
on when she heard the news.
Yet of all the changes in Australia and the world that Coral chronicled she saw 
the ‘status of (and rules for)’ women in the workplace ‘as the most radical’. She 
entered the Australian diplomatic service in an age when there were few female 
diplomats, and she recalled being told that she would have to resign if she chose 
to marry. Even after leaving the service, she selected a field of study then not 
often undertaken by women. In many respects Coral was a pioneer—ahead of 
her time by twenty to thirty years.
Today the diplomatic corps is larger than when she was a member—a time when 
all the staff could fit into a medium-sized seminar room. The small group meant 
that, even as a junior diplomat, Coral’s work was varied and complex. In 1948 
she was ‘posted’ to the Australian office in Wellington. She found the posting 
‘reasonably interesting’ and the people she met ‘able and amiable’. She attended 
balls at Government House, dinner at the Soviet Embassy, and many luncheons. 
In one notable episode, she found herself at a diplomatic function at the US 
Embassy. Having just learned to play golf, but never having played croquet, she 
swung her mallet back over her shoulder ‘in my best golf style. The ball sailed 
over a group of trees and landed in the lake. There was a pained silence’.
The social side of diplomatic life was not, to quote Coral, ‘my cup of tea’. She 
said she had never been ‘a party girl, and diplomacy is a very party-ridden 
occupation, especially in a small post, as Wellington then was’. She noted, ‘If 
you meet roughly the same fifty or so people at cocktail and dinner parties five 
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evenings a week, you tend to run out of small-talk, which has never been my 
favourite form of conversation anyway’. Anyone who knew Coral can confirm 
that idle chitchat was not her way to communicate.
Coral needed a ‘more reflective kind of life’, and in 1951 she applied for study 
leave without pay. When this was refused, she resigned from diplomatic service. 
A life of travel, research, teaching and writing was to follow.
Beyond the Horizon
Coral’s mind never stood still and neither did she. In the decade I knew her she 
moved house four times in Canberra: first from a house in Downer to a unit in 
O’Connor, then to retirement villages in Deakin and Ainslie. How she moved 
was by car and tales of Coral’s style of parking and her driving to and from the 
Centre became legend. If she nudged a pole too much, she would state matter-
of-factly, ‘only a slight bingle’.
These days we take the speed of travel for granted. In the age of jets, we often 
forget the main modes of travel of the past, by ship across oceans and by train 
across continents. When Coral left for London in 1951, ‘taking the slow boat’ 
meant the journey was a destination in itself. She spoke of the fun aboard ship, 
and visiting exotic, unfamiliar port towns and cities. One photograph from that 
trip has her astride a camel, visiting the pyramids in Egypt.
The war was half a decade past when Coral arrived in London. She thought the 
city had ‘a melancholy romantic charm. The cathedral then still stood among 
a wilderness of ruins, which were overgrown by a pretty pink-blossomed 
wildflower called rose-bay willow herb, or London Pride. It all looked 
wonderfully symbolic’.
A few weeks after her arrival Coral moved into a shared flat in Kensington, and 
got her ration-book and first week’s rations ‘for three shillings and ten pence’. 
The rations were ‘one chop, two eggs, a square of cheese barely enough to bait 
a mouse-trap, and a cube of butter about the size of a postage stamp, along with 
an ounce or so of tea and sugar’. She immediately missed the food from home. 
Coral’s friend in the Royal Australian Air Force persuaded a friend who was 
flying aircraft back to England to bring her a case of tiny cans of condensed 
cream. With some brisk bartering, ‘a lot more dinner tables than mine rejoiced 
in apple pie with real cream’. Coral supplemented the meagre rations with meals 
at the London School of Economics (LSE), which was to become the centre of her 
life for her first years in England.
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She absorbed the political upheavals of the time, viewing the appointment of 
Michael J Oakeshott at LSE as ‘a straw in the winds of change in the general 
intellectual climate of the world’.3 While at LSE, she met Martin Wight. He was 
to become Coral’s friend and colleague and ‘the chief intellectual influence of 
my entire life’. Geoffrey Goodwin, another of Coral’s lecturers, introduced her 
to Chatham House (or the Royal Institute of International Affairs)—‘a second 
major influence on the way I saw the world’. At Chatham House she became 
rapporteur of the research study groups.4 A group’s meeting usually began in 
late afternoon and lasted through dinner until people had to leave to catch their 
train or drive or walk home. At Chatham House she met ‘the rising stars of both 
sides of politics’, who ‘were willing to come and talk frankly’. The small (about 
twelve people) informal meetings gave Coral the opportunity to meet people 
she would not otherwise have met, including the founders of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (years before its founding in 1958). At Chatham 
House Coral met Arnold J Toynbee, a man she described as ‘a most delightful old 
gentleman, everyone’s favourite scholarly grandfather’. Toynbee was the editor 
of the annual Survey of International Affairs when Coral wrote the 1954 issue.5 
When Geoffrey Barraclough took over Toynbee’s role in 1956, Coral applied for 
a Lectureship in Government at the University of Manchester.
Once appointed to the position, she moved to northwest England. At the 
university she came to appreciate one of what she later called ‘the antique 
pleasures of university life … the conversation of the Senior Common Room’. 
Those gathered in that room would ‘bounce ideas from their respective fields 
of expertise off each other’. It was at the University of Manchester that Coral 
began to develop her research into managing international crises by avoiding 
war and into managing defeat without recourse to war. Coral’s professor was 
WJM (‘Bill’) Mackenzie, who had been appointed Chair of Government and 
Administration in 1948. He ‘built up an outstanding Government Department 
which until the early 1960s was the best in Britain and gained an international 
reputation. He did it by spotting talent: from Aberdeen to Oxford’.6 He ‘created 
a culture, not of publish or perish, but of intellectual excitement and keeping 
abreast of developments in the discipline in the United States. In the early 1950s 
his young colleagues were pioneers in studies of voting behaviour, community 
power, pressure groups and developing countries. He had a remarkable instinct 
3 Michael J Oakeshott (11 December 1901–19 December 1990) became Professor of Political Science at LSE in 
1948, succeeding Harold J Laski (30 June 1893–24 March 1950). Oakeshott retired from LSE in 1969.
4 A person appointed by an organisation to report on the proceedings of its meetings.
5 Arnold J Toynbee (14  April 1889–22  October 1975) was Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (RIIA) in Chatham House between 1929 and 1956. He edited the annual Survey of 
International Affairs from 1920 to 1946.
6 See Dennis Kavanagh, ‘Obituary: Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie’, The Independent, 27 August 1996. www.
independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-wjm-mackenzie-1311688.html (accessed 16  September 
2013).
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for where the subject was heading’.7 As the originators of containment were 
mostly based in Washington, Coral asked Mackenzie to back her application for 
a Rockefeller Fellowship.8 Once awarded, in early 1958 Coral left for the United 
States.
Upon her arrival, Coral found that the convivial atmosphere and ‘intellectual 
excitement’ in discussions over coffee hardly existed. Academics were so 
pressured to write that they ‘drank their coffee in their rooms, with one hand on 
the typewriter’. Coral believed an academic’s life should be half spent teaching 
and half spent doing research. She felt privileged to have known ‘the system in 
its golden day’ when academics faced few pressures. While in Washington, in 
late May 1959 Coral saw the funeral procession of former US Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles. A few days later she began her travels around the country—
to the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, to 
interview Robert Oppenheimer and to Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, to 
interview Henry Kissinger, a young professor there at the time.9 Coral then set 
out for new territory by train: travelling across the north to San Francisco, 
then back across the south to New York. The trains were quite luxurious, and 
she enjoyed watching the scenery through the sight-seeing domes. While at 
Yellowstone National Park in 1959 she was caught in a ‘minor’ earthquake and 
had to travel on by bus.10 The convoy stopped at every small bridge in the park 
to allow the passengers to walk across before re-boarding the buses. After the 
three months of travel Coral ended up at Columbia University in New York for 
the September re-opening of the academic year. 
Coming Home
Once her research was complete, Coral sailed back to England. When she 
returned to the University of Manchester at the start of term, she learned 
that her father had died of a heart attack in Australia (about the time she was 
embarking for the voyage back to England) and she had missed his funeral.
Coral turned her research into the book Negotiation from Strength: A Study in 
the Politics of Power.11 She continued to teach as a Lecturer in Government, 
7 Kavanagh, ‘Obituary: Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie’.
8 Coral Bell spent her time on the Rockefeller Fellowship at the School of Advanced International Studies at 
John Hopkins University in Washington, DC, and Columbia University in New York.
9 Between 1954 and 1959 Henry Alfred Kissinger was a member of the Harvard faculty in the Department 
of Government and the Center for International Affairs.
10 Yellowstone National Park recorded a series of earthquakes from 17 August 1959. The first earthquake 
(also known as the Hebgen Lake earthquake) measured 7.3–7.5 on the Richter magnitude scale. With her gift 
for understatement, Coral called this ‘minor’.
11 Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962, 
and Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963.
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remaining at the university until 1961.12 But the call of Australia was strong, 
so she decided to leave for home. Her first appointment was as Senior Lecturer 
in Government at her alma mater, the University of Sydney, and she lived in 
a small flat at Double Bay, ‘a long time before it became fashionable’. Coral’s 
travels had taken her around the world to acclaim, and she would continue to 
garner accolades as her career continued at institutions such as the University of 
Sydney (1961–65), London School of Economics (1965–72), University of Sussex 
(1972–77), and The Australian National University (1977 until her death).
At 10:30am on 2 September 2005 I watched Coral Bell receive her much-deserved 
Order of Australia (Officer in the General Division) at Government House in 
Canberra. I was honoured to be one of the three people Coral chose to accompany 
her to this prestigious occasion; the others being a close Australian friend Betty 
MacFarlane, and another New Zealander Brendan Taylor, now the Head of the 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU. The citation in the Investiture 
booklet reads: ‘Dr Coral Bell: For service to scholarship and to teaching as a 
leading commentator and contributor to foreign and defence policy debate 
internationally and in Australia’.13 Few people at the gathering knew Coral’s 
work, yet there was an audible murmur when the then-Governor-General Philip 
Michael Jeffrey mentioned Henry Kissinger when speaking about Coral.
Reflecting on an Intellectual Giant
In 2005 just after Coral’s book A World out of Balance was published,14 Verona 
Burgess wrote an article in The Canberra Times. She started with the paragraph, 
‘Coral Bell might look as if she belongs in the knitting circle, but she has just 
published her newest book on global politics—sixty years after she first joined 
the Australian Diplomatic Corps in the era of the legendary ‘Doc’ Evatt’.15
When you conversed with Coral, you knew you were in the presence of an 
intellectual giant. Her ability to place events and patterns of thinking in context 
was admired greatly. She was able to stand back from any topic to get full view. 
She and I chatted in depth about education, history, politics, international crises, 
research, and writing. I even had the privilege to co-edit with Coral a book 
entitled Remembering Hedley, a compilation of recollections about Professor 
Hedley Bull and his work.16
12 Coral’s academic qualifications were BA (Sydney, 1945), MSc Econ (London, 1954), and PhD (London, 
1962).
13 Investiture booklet for 2 September 2005, Government House, Canberra, p. 5.
14 Coral Bell, A World Out of Balance.
15 Verona Burgess, ‘US-style World Power “Not Seen Since the Days of the Romans”’, Canberra Times, 5 
February 2004, p. 4.
16 Coral Bell and Meredith Thatcher (eds), Remembering Hedley, ANU E Press, Canberra, 2008.
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When I visited Coral in her residence in the Canberra suburb of O’Connor, 
we sometimes bought fish and chips for dinner. With much of her life spent 
overseas, Coral’s favourite fish was barramundi. It brought back memories of her 
youth. When she moved into Goodwin Village in Ainslie, she couldn’t wait until 
the social areas were built and we could lunch there. Until then we chatted over 
a roast meal at the nearby Ainslie Football & Social Club. 
Coral kept minimal possessions, but she had a chair ready for whoever might 
drop in. Among her prized possessions were books and journals, including a 
bookcase full of The National Interest to which she contributed. She listened 
to radio and watched television less than she wrote, but always kept up with 
the news (usually ABC and SBS). She tried never to miss one of her favourite 
programs—the PBS NewsHour. If I was visiting, we would watch it together 
and debate the topics. Sometimes we agreed; sometimes we would agree to 
disagree. That’s how it is with friends. Yet Coral had an even temperament and 
never raised her voice. Being so reasoned, she could make any disagreement a 
pleasurable experience. She never got cross, yet the one pastime we could never 
reconcile was crosswords and similar puzzles. I am a fan of them; Coral was not. 
She wisely spent her time on less frivolous endeavours.
Doing even the smallest task for Coral was a privilege. Towards the end of her 
life, Coral’s mind stayed strong but her body became frail. She relented to using 
a walking stick and taking an arm when necessary as my brother Greg and I 
helped her with the weekly grocery shop. To my great regret, distance separated 
us in her final two years. But I visited her once and we corresponded by ‘snail 
mail’, her words always elegantly penned in flowing, open, cursive script.
Coral felt that today few opportunities exist for staff and students to sit 
down to discuss international and strategic affairs: the pressures of academic 
administration on the one hand and the need to pay off students loans on 
the other are simply too great. Her greatest wish towards the end of her life 
was that professors and others with long careers at a university might have 
a residence (even just one room) on campus where they could live the rest of 
their days. Coral had seen this while in England—the benefit of having easy 
access to chat with former colleagues and to continue enjoying university life 
after retirement. Lacking this environment she established a group at Goodwin, 
at first with few participants and Coral chairing the sessions. As word spread 
through the village that this new group discussed international affairs and the 
like, attendance increased rapidly and Coral started to share her chairing duties. 
I believe that underpinning Coral’s intellectual pursuits was the need to always 
stay connected. I quote the words of Minh Bui Jones—a sentiment that echoes 
what I saw in her. Upon hearing of Coral’s passing, he wrote:
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It’s a rare thing in an international relations expert to possess a balance 
of theory and experience, history and imagination, realism and hope. 
… She brought an antipodean temperament and perspective to the great 
questions of our time; she was our George Kennan in thick glasses, blue 
floral dress, white sneakers and a string of pearls.17
I conclude this chapter with my eulogy, without amendment, as delivered at 
Coral’s funeral in Canberra in late 2012.
Last Words for a Wise and Gentle Soul
As we gather in Canberra today, it seems fitting to start with an acronym: 
CORAL—Compassionate, Original, Remarkable, Astute, and Loyal. To these 
qualities, I would add gracious, humble and independent.
Coral mapped out and chartered her own life, sacrificing much as she sailed 
across oceans to unfamiliar horizons and back. Yet she always steered a centre 
course on an even keel—a lesson learned when very young. Coral said that 
she learned her most valuable lesson in history at age eleven. This was when 
a decision needed to be made about whether she would attend a Catholic high 
school, some distance away from home, or a public school in Sydney. The only 
way to decide was for Coral to sit the Catholic Diocesan exams and the State 
school exams. As you would expect, she sailed through both—until she reached 
the history essay. As Coral put it, ‘the convent she was attending taught a 
narrative rather heavily oriented to the woes of Ireland; the state schools rather 
heavily oriented to the glories of the British imperial story’.18 What to do? For 
Coral, even at age eleven, it meant charting a course of what she called ‘double 
think’—describing fourteenth century John Wycliffe as the ‘morning star of 
the Reformation’ for her Protestant examiners, and a ‘dissolute and heretic 
monk’ for her Catholic examiners. Coral said that ‘such was her precocious ease 
with this post-modernist approach that, for her Catholic history, she won the 
Diocesan gold medal—and for her Protestant history, a place at Sydney Girls 
High School’. 
In this tale we see a first glimpse of not only Coral’s ability to stand tall and 
navigate through dilemmas, but her tolerance and ability to see events from 
differing perspectives. Not only was Coral elegant; the way she could weave 
the threads of disparate thoughts and patterns together into a cohesive fabric 
was also elegant. Discussions with Coral were never dull. You always felt the 
17 Minh Bui Jones, ‘On Coral’s Calmness’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 5  October 2012: www.
lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/10/05/On-Corals-calmness.aspx (accessed 16 September 2013).
18 Coral Bell, as noted in her unpublished memoir, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’.
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penetrating feelers of intellect entering your mind. Always weighing the 
options and giving measured yet thought-provoking responses, Coral continued 
to discover more and to question more—to the end.
Coral wrote to me saying that she was content with her decision to move to 
Goodwin. She liked the village atmosphere—the exchange of greetings when 
out for walks. She enjoyed greatly the group that discussed international 
relations. Most of all, Coral remained optimistic about the future for players 
on the international stage. She said she liked the ‘delicate, ironic scepticism 
and pragmatism’ of Michael Joseph Oakeshott. Indeed terms that might have 
suited Coral. She said the words she heard in his inaugural lecture haunted her 
through the years:
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea: there 
is neither harbour nor shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-
place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to stay afloat on an 
even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists 
of using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to 
make a friend of every hostile occasion.19
Throughout Coral’s life, her intellectual anchor was international and strategic 
relations and crisis management. Her destination was our minds—and our 
hearts. And we found shelter in her kind words and wisdom. 
A warm, engaging and humble spirit who gave of herself to others unselfishly, 
Coral imparted her knowledge without seeking validation in return. And, like 
some today and outside these walls, I came to understand the meaning of the 
word ‘mentor’. Coral was compassionate, original, remarkable, astute and loyal, 
gracious, humble and independent. And the world is poorer for her no longer 
being here with us. Coral was for me—as for all those gathered here today—
simply irreplaceable. 
19 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘Political Education: An Inaugural Lecture delivered at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science on 6 March 1951’, Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge, 1951. Also see Michael 
Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, Methuen, London, 1962.
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5. Coral Bell and Her Mark on 
Strategic Studies
Robert O’Neill
Coral Bell’s death on 26 September 2012 has taken from our field one of Australia’s 
most able specialists in strategic studies. This loss is felt both nationally and 
internationally by all who knew her and studied her works, not least because 
she remained intellectually active right until her passing at the age of eighty-
nine. Her writing was clearly focused, she was interested in some of the most 
important international problems of her lifetime, and she had great gifts of wit 
and sparkle which have illuminated her publications over a fifty year period.
I first came to know Coral personally in the early 1970s, when she held a 
chair at the University of Sussex. Thereafter, through our membership of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), we had more regular contact, 
enabling me to see how highly regarded she was in Western Europe and North 
America. She became well known for her work on American foreign policy in 
the 1940s and 1950s, the nuclear weapons contest of the Cold War, and crisis 
management. I began to read her works in 1962, as a result of the publication 
of her second book, Negotiation from Strength.1 This volume was a wonderfully 
powerful and illuminating analysis of US policy in the late 1940s and 1950s, and 
had much to teach any new scholar (such as myself) on the nature of the Cold 
War in the nuclear era. I first saw it soon after its publication in 1962, when 
browsing the shelves of Blackwells’ Bookshop in Oxford during my time as a 
student there. Very soon I purchased my own copy. I also took heart from the 
discovery that an Australian scholar could achieve such a breakthrough on the 
home territory of many of the great names of our discipline.
Coral had come to adulthood during the Second World War, and knew from 
her own experience just how much was at stake when great powers went to 
war with modern weapons. The consequences of war were, of course, even 
more horrifying to think about in the 1950s when the opposing sides could 
use nuclear weapons on each other. Coral had become interested in weapons 
technology as a result of war work in the National Physics Laboratory in Sydney 
on de-magnetizing steel-hulled ships, known then as degaussing. She never 
forgot the experience of learning about the atomic bombing of Japan in 1945, 
and her fertile brain was able to imagine how the world would fare in an era 
1 Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962, and 
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963.
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where these weapons had proliferated and become even more destructive than 
those of 1945. This experience coloured the whole of her intellectual life, as 
is made clear by the title of her unpublished memoir, ‘A Preoccupation with 
Armageddon’.
Coral was fascinated by the importance of the challenges posed, and had the 
intellect and confidence to get to grips with them. In 1944 she opted for a 
career in diplomacy because she thought that it was the most interesting work 
available. She wanted to understand the nature of the problems presented by 
modern warfare, and have some influence on the development of national and 
international policies to deal with them. Initially the Department of External 
Affairs in Canberra gave her the stimulating assignment of analysing the Baruch 
Plan for the international control of nuclear weapons. However, as her conclusion 
to that study was that the Russians would kill it through refusal to participate, 
there did not seem much point in her continuing with that study. She moved 
on to study the Arab-Israeli problem, and then the Southeast Asian region. 
Given that she was also reading a mass of highly secret cables from London 
and Washington in those early years of the Cold War, she received an excellent 
grounding both in the complexities of these major international problems, and 
in the realities of power politics at the international level.
After six years, having seen that a diplomat, particularly a woman, was likely 
to be assigned minor responsibilities and a life of social tedium on the round 
of National Day receptions, cocktail parties and ‘dips dinners’, she decided in 
1951 to pursue her professional interests through becoming an independent 
scholar of international relations. She had a lot to contribute to the policy-
making deliberations of the Australian government, but not many people in 
the Department of External Affairs were prepared to listen to a young woman 
on these issues. She had not been impressed by being posted to Wellington. 
At least she had fared better in being admitted to Dr Evatt’s Department of 
External Affairs than had Jill Ker Conway, later to be a celebrated author and 
academic, who in the late 1950s was turned down flat when she applied for an 
entry-level post in the same Department. 
Coral knew how small was the group of Australian academics who specialised 
in international relations. Also she had a low opinion of several of them, so she 
decided to work in a wider arena, namely London, where she won a place as 
a graduate student at the London School of Economics (LSE). She arrived in 
time to experience the sea-change which occurred after Michael J Oakeshott 
replaced the deceased Harold Laski as Professor of Political Science. The 
Marxist-inspired values of Laski were replaced by a much more conservative 
flow of ideas and challenges from Oakeshott, which ran in parallel with other 
changes in dominant modes of thinking in other parts of the world. The Soviet 
Union in particular became much more the object of criticism and suspicion, 
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and governments in many countries such as Britain and Australia turned from 
what Coral called a Fabian outlook towards something much more in harmony 
with the philosophies that Oakeshott espoused. 
While she was at the LSE, Coral was strongly influenced by Martin Wight, whom 
she described as ‘not only a friend and a colleague but the chief intellectual 
influence of my entire life’. She was also assisted by Geoffrey Goodwin who 
introduced her to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, Chatham 
House). There she was appointed as rapporteur of a group of scholars who were 
assisting Goodwin in the production of a book on Britain and the United Nations.2 
Having worked in the United Nations Division of the Department of External 
Affairs in Canberra, Coral was well placed to make her own contributions to the 
group’s thinking. 
Soon afterwards she was appointed to assist Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Director 
of Studies at Chatham House, with the preparation of the Survey of International 
Affairs for 1954.3 Toynbee had written the earlier volumes in this series himself, 
but after more than twenty years of such labours, he was keen to delegate the 
task to a younger person. After some initial testing of Coral’s abilities, he selected 
her for the post. This appointment was important for Coral not only in terms of 
building her academic reputation but also as a necessary source of income while 
she was still a graduate student at the LSE. She distinguished herself in this, her 
first book, by lessening the usual emphasis of the series on European affairs and 
giving prominent treatment both to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and to 
nuclear weapons and their implications for international politics.
Coral’s post as rapporteur for the project on Britain and the United Nations gave 
her the opportunity to meet and get to know several rising British political and 
academic leaders, especially three who were to play major roles in founding the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958: Denis Healey MP, 
Michael Howard and Alastair Buchan. She was impressed both by the intensity 
of their experience in the Second World War and by their belief that war had 
become too dangerous to be an acceptable way of solving international problems.
Her results at the LSE and Chatham House earned her the strength of reputation 
to compete successfully for a Lectureship in International Relations at the 
University of Manchester in 1956. This post gave her the opportunity to 
develop her ideas on how the US was managing the Cold War, and her doctoral 
thesis formed the basis of her second book, Negotiation From Strength. The 
central theme of her research became the development of Western policies 
which would maintain essential Western interests and values, while avoiding 
2 See Geoffrey L Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations, National Studies on International Organization, 
Manhattan Publishing Company, New York, 1957.
3 See Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs for 1954, Oxford University Press, London, 1956.
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the need to go to war with nuclear weapons. To understand the bases of current 
Western security policies, she saw that it was necessary to undertake research 
and interviews in the United States. With the strong support of her department 
head at Manchester, Professor WJM (‘Bill’) Mackenzie, she won a Rockefeller 
Fellowship which gave her the necessary financial support, and some useful 
contacts, for her to spend several months in the United States in 1959. Coral 
certainly did not lack intellectual ambition and confidence, and by the time that 
she was aged thirty-six she was interviewing former senior US officials from 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson downwards, and she was applying her mind 
and powers of expression to the critical analysis of the most central elements of 
Western strategy in the early years of the Cold War.
One of the targets of her criticisms was the CIA-inspired operation to topple the 
Iranian nationalist leader, Dr Mossadegh, and put the young Shah back on his 
throne. Coral saw in this move a major encouragement for Islamic fundamentalists 
which would result in the overthrow of the Shah and the series of Ayatollah-led 
governments that Iran has had since then. She had become wary of United States 
administrations which exerted their economic and military power to re-shape 
other national societies in accordance with US preferences. This line of thought 
led her to oppose US military involvement in Vietnam. During her travels in the 
United States she became increasingly aware of the internal debate on policy 
towards Southeast Asia. Having administered Australian policies for Southeast 
Asia in the late 1940s, she knew a lot about that region and its conflicts, and 
could see how counter-productive a major American military effort there might 
be. On the other hand, as she examined US policy during the Korean War, 
she perceptively noted that the main American influence in that conflict was 
diplomatic rather than military. The military pressure applied by the Truman 
administration was to strengthen the UN Command’s negotiating position rather 
than to achieve a military victory on the Korean Peninsula. At least the United 
States had learned from its Korean experience not to take Chinese passivity for 
granted in Vietnam. But this awareness did not enable the US to find a way to 
close off the vital supply links between China and North Vietnam on the 1960s. 
The two main rivals of the Korean War therefore faced each other for over a 
decade in Vietnam, while the North Vietnamese slowly built up their strength 
just as American public support for the conflict was declining.
During her time in the US in 1959, Coral also came to focus on nuclear weapons 
policy, and had the good fortune to interview Robert Oppenheimer, reputed to 
be ‘the father of the atomic bomb’ (with Enrico Fermi) and by then Director of 
the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton. Oppenheimer, who had been 
the object of political controversy in the United States for several years on 
account of his communist links in the 1930s, had been deprived of political 
power and influence, so the opportunity to be questioned rigorously by a young 
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political scientist must have been stimulating for him, and he opened up, in the 
unguarded way that some senior US officials do when out of office. Oppenheimer 
was willing to discuss secret matters with Coral, and alerted her to the existence 
of the memorandum NSC-68, which was one of the main guidelines of American 
policy through the Cold War. Although she was not able to see a copy of this 
key policy statement on that visit, she soon learned enough about it through 
other interviews to have a reasonably detailed knowledge of its contents. Coral 
was impressed by its espousal of George Kennan’s policy of containment of the 
Soviet Union, as she was by the friendship which existed between Kennan 
and Oppenheimer. She was learning at first hand of the fascinating debates in 
Washington on nuclear weapons policy and US–Soviet relations which were 
such a strong feature of the 1950s and 1960s. This was an excellent foundation 
for one of her main life-long fields of interest, as well as equipping her for a role 
in the debates on nuclear weapons policy which were the central element in the 
work of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the 1950s and 1960s. 
It was all very stimulating for her research and writing on the policies of the 
great powers, and with this reserve of knowledge on which to draw, she was 
able to produce work at a high international standard and further enhance her 
rapidly growing reputation. 
By the early 1960s Coral felt the pull of her homeland and successfully sought a 
post as a Senior Lecturer in Government at the University of Sydney, which she 
held from 1961 to 1965. She found the experience of being back in the midst 
of the Australian foreign policy debate disappointing, and even alienating. 
Australian foreign policy had been stuck in an orthodox conservative rut for over 
a decade, and while Coral was relatively conservative herself, she thought that 
the growing tensions between the United States and North Vietnam should be 
wound down and certainly not exploited as a justification for the United States 
and Australia to go to war in Vietnam. She became caught up in the discussions 
on Vietnam organised in Sydney by Dick Krygier and Owen Harries, two of 
the central figures in the production of Quadrant, then as now, a conservative 
journal which focused on culture and literature, but also covered foreign policy 
issues, among others.4 Coral’s perspective was that of an opponent of Soviet 
and Chinese attempts to gain more influence in world affairs, but who saw 
participation in a war in Vietnam as more likely to serve communist interests 
than those of the West. In putting forward these views, she had been greatly 
reinforced by her personal experience of the debate in the United States of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.
4 See Coral Bell, ‘The State of the Discipline: I.R.’, Quadrant, vol. 12, no. 1, January–February 1968, pp. 
79–84.; ‘The Winning of the Cold War’, Quadrant, vol. 34, no. 3, March 1990, pp. 13–24; ‘The Future of Power 
in World Affairs’, Quadrant, vol. 39, no. 9, September 1995, pp. 49–56; ‘A Hard and Bitter Peace: The Cold 
War in Retrospect’, Quadrant, vol. 40, no. 3, March 1996, pp. 18–22; ‘World Out of Balance?’, Quadrant, vol. 
41, no. 7–8, 1997, pp. 35–40; and ‘Washington and its Allies’, Quadrant, vol. 41, no. 1–2, 1997, pp. 19–24.
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The debate in Australia on Vietnam in the early 1960s had been influenced 
strongly by recent experience of The Malayan Emergency. It was further 
reinforced towards anti-communism by growing tensions with Indonesia which 
were to result in Australia’s deployment of forces in Borneo to resist Soekarno’s 
confrontation of Malaysia (1964–1965). Coral, having been out of Australia for 
most of the 1950s, saw things differently and did not want to plunge into a 
series of controversies with other experts who, on the whole, had similar views 
on the conduct of East–West relations in the broad, if not on Vietnam. As far as 
the Australian government was concerned, Menzies was very much in charge 
of foreign policy in the early 1960s. As she herself has written, ‘Much more 
important, Australia seemed suddenly to be in a lonely place, internationally, 
diplomatically and strategically’. Coral’s disapproval of government foreign 
policy views was fully mirrored by her low opinion of Labor leaders’ views, 
especially those of Arthur Calwell, despite his opposition to the Vietnam War. 
Coral saw little hope of making an impression in policy-making circles with her 
views, so she turned her gaze back to the academic scene in Britain.
There she was soon successful, being offered a Readership in International 
Relations at the LSE, a senior post at one of the most prominent centres for the 
study of international relations in the world at that time. She enjoyed returning 
to the broader work in which she had been so heavily involved in the 1950s, 
and did well. She added to her reputation through her work for the IISS and 
Chatham House on nuclear weapons, American and NATO policies, and Western 
relations with the Soviet Union. In 1972 she was appointed to a Professorship 
at the University of Sussex, there working with her much-esteemed former 
colleague, Martin Wight. 
After twelve years in Britain, Coral again felt the pull of home, drawn especially 
by the strength of the International Relations Department at The Australian 
National University (ANU) in Canberra. She had known JDB (‘Bruce’) Miller, 
the Head of the Department, in Britain in the 1950s, and while Coral was at the 
University of Sydney in the early 1960s, Bruce had relocated to ANU from the 
University of Leicester. Coral, however, in the 1960s regarded Canberra with no 
special favour, and preferred to return to London in 1965.
Much as she liked working in good British universities and living in London, 
Coral became increasingly uncomfortable at the growth of radicalism among 
the student body in the UK. Although she had remained opposed to the 
Vietnam War, her opinions on other major issues of the Cold War were on the 
conservative side, and she soon came under attack for some of her more ‘realist’ 
views of international affairs. Also administrative pressures were eroding the 
very collegial atmosphere that senior common room members in the UK enjoyed 
in the years before the Thatcher era. Thus, for several reasons, ANU seemed to 
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Coral in 1977 to be a better place in which to work than the UK. Also Canberra, 
no longer dominated by Menzies and his pro-British attitudes, seemed to Coral 
to be a much more interesting place to work in.
Another of the reasons for the change in Coral’s attitudes towards Canberra 
had been Hedley Bull’s work there from 1967 to 1977. They had known each 
other in London in the 1950s and 1960s, and had similar interests in power 
politics. Although Hedley had come and gone again before Coral made her move 
to Canberra in 1977, he had shown an ambitious scholar like Coral what could 
be achieved from ANU. Bruce had been keen to bring Coral to a senior, tenured 
post in the Department for some time, and she was appointed as a Senior Fellow 
in 1977. She worked in that capacity for the next eleven years until her formal 
retirement in 1988. 
The ideological opposition that she had encountered was particularly galling to 
Coral because from the early 1960s she had been a profound sceptic about the 
ultimate worth of American and allied participation in the Vietnam War. She 
had studied the debate at first hand inside the United States in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, and although the Vietnam War did not become a central part 
of her work, she did not fail to let everyone know that she was opposed to it. 
Having had to go to Vietnam myself as a member of the Australian Army, I did 
not share all her views on the conflict, particularly her willingness to allow 
the South Vietnamese to be ruled by a fairly dictatorial regime based in the 
North. But having seen how much of the US Army failed to learn from painful 
experience in Vietnam, it was not difficult for me to see the wisdom of Coral’s 
overall evaluation as to how the war was likely to end. I learned a lot from her.
In 1977, when Hedley Bull left ANU for the Montague Burton Chair of 
International Relations at Oxford, a senior vacancy was thereby created in the 
ANU International Relations Department. Unfortunately it was not Hedley’s 
chair, for ANU snaffled it back and left only a Senior Fellowship to be filled. But 
that was still an attractive position in terms of emoluments, research support and 
standing, and Coral was an obvious candidate. She was duly appointed and joined 
the Department for the following eleven years until she reached retiring age.
Coral was an expert organiser of interesting seminar series. She would build 
a series largely out of existing resources in terms of presenters, connected 
thematically to give PhD scholars and faculty members alike an opportunity 
to present their recent work. She was also an excellent seminar chair, keeping 
discussion focused on the most important issues, and moving along at a good 
speed. She could briskly terminate any self-indulgent monologues from other 
participants. Her seminar series continued to be in demand well after her 
official retirement, so she was appointed an Adjunct Fellow and continued to 
run discussions until well into the 1990s. She also maintained her international 
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contacts by travelling, especially to the annual conferences of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, which gave me a good opportunity to catch up 
regularly with her views and activities in the post–1982 period. I well remember 
the warmth of Coral’s greetings and how much I enjoyed her thoughts on what 
were likely to be the new issues to emerge in the forthcoming debates of this 
world-wide body of policy shapers, scholars and journalists.
During Coral’s first five years at ANU, when I was the Head of the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, she was a wise and supportive counsel, especially 
in university-political matters. She was a regular attendee at Centre seminars, 
discussion groups and conferences. One set of insights for which I shall always 
be grateful to her was her characterisation of the NATO alliance as ‘always in 
disarray’. This appraisal has been truer over many years than many observers 
realise or will admit to. For most of its life in the twentieth century, NATO was 
good for one thing only: supporting the Germans against any Soviet conventional 
attack through Central or Northern Europe. For the rest it seemed to be largely 
an arena for complaints against the United States and debate about the need for 
making any commitment outside the ‘NATO area’. For Australia there were some 
positive and some negative lessons from this experience of handling relations 
with the United States. For myself, as Director and then Chairman of the IISS, 
the wisdom of Coral’s words on NATO was continually borne out through the 
1980s and 1990s. I never forgot her characterisation. 
For most of her professional academic life, Coral was primarily concerned with 
studying and analysing American methods of managing the alliance. While 
this focus had led her to oppose the war in Vietnam, she thought better of 
US policies in the field of arms control—a policy area that she held to be a 
very important way of stabilising the East-West relationship. Although Coral 
was regarded as a ‘conservative realist’, and even used that term about herself, 
she had her own very independent and well founded view of US policies and 
capabilities. Hence, like Owen Harries, another ‘conservative realist’, she was 
a strong critic of George W Bush’s foreign and military policies. She could 
see how counterproductive Bush’s illegal invasion of Iraq would be, and she 
became increasingly clear in her own mind that the US had lost ‘sole super-
power’ status and was moving towards a world order in which power would be 
shared by several major states. Right until the last, Coral remained committed 
to this complex view of the world. She was certainly not a conservative in the 
American sense of the term.
I refer those interested in a more detailed summation of how Coral’s thinking 
moved with, or ahead of, the times to an article she published in American 
Review, the journal of the United States Studies Centre of the University of 
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Sydney in 2009.5 It is a forward-looking analysis of what President Obama had 
to do over the coming seven years of the two presidential terms that she gave 
him. While not an uncritical admirer of Barack Obama, Coral praised him for 
recognising that the world had undergone a ‘profound, irreversible redistribution 
of power … that actually has far more to do with China and India than with the 
Europeans’. Obama’s increased emphasis on the G20 was very much to his credit, 
and accorded with the real distribution of power in the world.
Coral developed this forward looking analysis on the basis of the historical 
record, particularly the experience of Europe in the nineteenth century, 
when its disputes were dealt with through the Concert of Powers mechanism, 
which had been set up to restore stability at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. 
With an experienced eye for the strengths and limitations of diplomacy, Coral 
advocated a broadening of this well-founded concept in order to help resolve 
the international problems of the twenty-first century. We are now five years 
further into the seven about which Coral was writing in 2009, and so far, so 
good. The world still has many problem areas and issues, from the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to political instability within several key Islamic countries 
in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia.
Her support for Obama’s basic outlook on world affairs reveals a significant 
degree of change from the attitudes of a ‘conservative realist’ of the Cold War 
era who placed high value on authority and cohesion within alliance systems, 
nuclear weapons and arms control agreements. The causes of this change were 
two-fold: the rise of other powers within the international system, and the 
counter-productiveness of the policies of President George W Bush and his neo-
con advisers. She was aware of the growing fragility of the international system 
and many of its second-level players, and the increasing leverage of non-state 
actors, who were anathema to someone who had learned about international 
relations from the perspective of a member of a well-run national diplomatic 
corps. 
Coral brought together a capacity for anticipating political and strategic changes 
in the world, and a historical knowledge which enabled her to put forward ways 
and means for implementing new policies to deal with these changes and keep 
the world on an even keel. She was primarily interested in improving policy 
rather than in international relations theory. For the whole of her professional life 
she wrote clearly and comprehensibly on the major policy issues of the time—a 
demanding field in which to operate because there was so much competition. 
But she was better than most of the other analysts that she was up against. 
When she came to annual conferences of the International Institute for Strategic 
5 Coral Bell, ‘Seven Years to Get it Right’, American Review, November 2009, http://americanreviewmag.
com/stories/Seven-years-to-get-it-right, (accessed 11 November 2013).
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Studies, she could always command a good audience of other participants, both 
in the formal sessions of the conference and the informal, over meals, coffee or 
cocktails. She had remarkable longevity as an expert analyst, serving as a model 
for us all of how to enjoy one’s senior years without overdoing the commitment 
to professional work, while still maintaining a clearly visible position in the 
international panoply of distinguished scholars.
Her analytical legacy is a view of a world where US power and influence have 
been eroded through poorly thought-out policies and lack of understanding 
of the United States’ own weaknesses in the first decade of this century. At 
the same time the capacities of China, Europe, Russia, and India have grown 
and they need to be taken more into account by the strongest power in the 
world, if it is not to be displaced by one or more of the others. For some, 
including myself, this view is a little too neat. It understates the likely influence 
of subnational groups, running to perhaps a few hundred persons each, some 
armed with weapons of mass destruction, and composed of young people 
willing to give their lives to kill Westerners. But Coral would respond to me that 
these subnational groups will lack the power of state governments and, with the 
right policies and military means, they could be ground down and eliminated 
individually. It was a merry discourse that we had in her apartment in Canberra 
on this topic three years ago. Who will be shown by events to be right?
Whatever our personal differences on matters of international policy, Coral was 
a splendid scholar and all of us who had the privilege of working with and 
learning from her, owe her a great debt for devotion to principles, intelligence, 
leadership and organising abilities. She had immense and accurate knowledge of 
international events and a warm nature. And she made an impressive climb to the 
high ground of international debate which is where most professional international 
relations analysts aspire to be. For all of us, regardless of nationality or gender, she 
has shown how to exert a wider impact in understanding our world.




6. The Interpretation of Power 
Politics: Coral Bell’s  
International Thought
Ian Hall1
It is fair to say that Coral Bell remained somewhat sceptical about international 
relations theory throughout her long career. She could, at times, even be 
scathing about the subfield, calling it ‘a very unimpressive growth’, a plant 
that ‘ought to be centrepiece and glory of the garden’, but which—alas—had 
‘obstinately refused to put on more than a few inches in height, despite much 
watering, pruning, tilling, crooning over, and feeding with rare and expensive 
nutrients’.2 She declared herself fully persuaded by Martin Wight’s argument 
about the ‘intractability of international experience’ and the near-impossibility 
of theorising about such a challenging domain.3 But none of this should distract 
attention from the fact that Bell had an international theory of her own, albeit 
one half-buried in her work, and rarely at the surface. 
Bell’s international theory was an old-fashioned kind, akin to that of the 
traditionalist realists and liberals of the first generation of theorists, who 
flourished before the behaviouralist revolution in the social sciences of the 
1950s and all that came after. It sought to interpret the beliefs that shape 
policies and practices in international relations and to explain their evolution 
in historical perspective, with a particular focus on key agents and the ideas 
they espoused. She drew inspiration for her approach from many sources, but 
one was particularly important: her erstwhile mentor at the London School 
of Economics (LSE), Martin Wight.4 She inherited from Wight a profound 
hostility to scientific approaches to the field and a staunch belief that studying 
international relations involved, as she put it, a ‘meditation on history’.5 In this, 
of course, she was not alone—various bits of the so-called ‘English School of 
1 I am very grateful to Desmond Ball, in particular, for asking me to write the chapter and talking to me 
about aspects of Bell’s life and work, as well as to Renée Jeffery, Paul Keal and Brendan Taylor, for the various 
conversations about this piece.
2 Coral Bell, ‘The State of the Discipline: I.R.’, Quadrant, vol. 12, no. 1, January–February 1968, p. 82.
3 ibid., p. 82.
4 On Wight’s ideas in general, see Ian Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, Palgrave, New York, 
2006. Bell did graduate work under Wight’s direction at the London School of Economics in the early 1950s. 
He later helped appoint her to the Professorship of International Relations at Sussex, where Wight served as 
Professor of History and Dean of European Studies from 1961 until his untimely death in 1972.
5 Bell, ‘The State of the Discipline’, p.83. Wight used the same phrase in unpublished papers. See, for 
example, ‘History and the Study of International Relations’, no date, but probably mid–1950s, Wight MS 112, 
British Library of Political and Economic Sciences, p. 1.
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International Relations’ have put this argument since Wight suggested it in the 
1950s and Hedley Bull popularised it in the 1960s and 1970s.6 Bell departed 
from Wight and from his followers, however, in one important aspect: unlike 
them, she had no time for what she called the ‘metaphysics of history’.7
Her attachment to the past and her dislike of the ‘metaphysics of history’, 
together with an innate scepticism, helped make Bell a conservative. Her 
fascination for power—or, rather, for the ways in which power is wielded in 
international relations—made her a realist, of sorts. But the label ‘conservative 
realist’ makes Bell sound theoretically unsophisticated—except to the occasional 
admirer8—and her international thought was not. So this chapter sets that label 
aside, not so much because it is inaccurate but because it is unhelpful in the 
task at hand. It argues instead that Bell advanced what might best be called an 
agent-centred interpretive theory of international relations. This might not be 
the most elegant description—and Bell would probably have disliked it—but 
it is, the chapter contends, the most revealing about her international thought.
Foundations
Bell came to the study of international relations as many of her generation of 
British and Australian scholars did, through the study of history, and especially 
through the work of good history teachers. In a short memoir, she recalled 
how her interest in the past and its relationship to the present was kindled at 
both primary school and Sydney Girls High. At the latter, she noted, she was 
‘encouraged … to see the world of current events as history just waiting to 
be written’ and asked to write it, producing an essay on the Munich Crisis of 
1938 in its immediate aftermath.9 Bell nurtured these interests at the University 
of Sydney, studying history as well as literature, economics and philosophy, 
6 On the English school in general, see Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English 
School, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997; and on Bull’s views, see especially his ‘International Theory: A Case for 
a Classical Approach’, World Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, 1966, pp. 361–377. Richard Devetak rightly acknowledges 
Bell’s close relationship with the early English school in his ‘An Australian Outlook on International Affairs? 
The Evolution of International Relations Theory in Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 
55, no. 3, 2009, p. 349.
7 Bell, ‘The State of the Discipline’, p. 84. For English school ventures into that area, see inter alia Martin 
Wight, ‘The Church, Russia and the West’, Ecumenical Review, vol.1, no. 1, 1948, pp. 25–45, Herbert 
Butterfield, History and Human Relations, Collins, London, 1951; and Peter Savigear, ‘International Relations 
and the Philosophy of History’, in Michael Donelan (ed), The Reason of States: A Study in International 
Political Theory, Allen & Unwin, London, 1978, pp. 195–205.
8 Robert O’Neill observes that Bell sometimes used this phrase to describe herself, but also finds it 
unhelpful—see his obituary ‘Coral Bell AO 1923–2012: A balanced, independent, realist-minded scholar 
of world politics’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 3 October 2012. http://www.
lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/10/03/Coral-Bell-AO-1923-2012-a-balanced-independent-realist-minded-
scholar-of-world-politics.aspx (accessed 2 August 2013).
9 Coral Bell, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’, unpublished memoir, Canberra, 2012, p. 2.
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taking full advantage of a broad curriculum and an impressive faculty, 
including the great empiricist philosopher, John Anderson, who also taught 
Hedley Bull.10 These studies served Bell well, helping her to secure the position 
in the Department of External Affairs she held from 1945 to 1951. In turn, 
her government work provided invaluable—and, if her memoir is any guide, 
eye-opening11—experience of the making of foreign policy and the practice of 
diplomacy.
Bell’s enduring interest in the past and her interest in the practices of 
international relations no doubt predisposed her to Wight, whom she later 
called ‘the chief intellectual influence of my entire life’, and his approach to 
the field.12 In 1951, when Bell resigned from External Affairs and applied for 
graduate studies at the LSE, Wight was a relatively minor figure in the nascent 
but tiny field of International Relations, and a man with a somewhat unusual 
background. Born in 1913 into a relatively prosperous middle-class family, 
Wight read Modern History at Hertford College, Oxford in the tumultuous 
early 1930s. He won a First but also engaged in university politics, becoming 
known as a passionate defender of the League of Nations at a time when many 
were starting to question its efficacy. Wight abandoned that cause soon after 
leaving Oxford, during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935–36, turning instead to 
Christian pacifism and the Reverend ‘Dick’ Sheppard’s ‘Peace Pledge Union’ 
(PPU). At around the same time, Wight began to further his professional interest 
in international relations, securing a temporary post at Chatham House, where 
he worked closely with its Director of Studies, Arnold J Toynbee, the author 
of the Survey of International Affairs and A Study of History.13 After three 
years or so, Wight moved on again, this time to become a History Master at 
Haileybury School, but he was forced to give up this post in 1940 after a failed 
application to register as a conscientious objector. He passed the remainder of 
the war back at Oxford, working (unhappily) with Margery Perham on British 
colonial constitutions. In 1945, he escaped Oxford and Perham to travel to the 
United States and spend a year as The Observer newspaper’s United Nations 
10 On Anderson and Bull, see Renée Jeffery, ‘Australian Realism and International Relations: John Anderson 
and Hedley Bull on Ethics, Religion and Society’, International Politics, vol. 45, no. 1, 2008, pp. 52–71.
11 See especially Bell, ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’, pp. 5–10.
12 ibid., p. 13.
13 Arnold J Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, various vols., Royal Institute of International Affairs 
and Oxford University Press, London, 1924–58; and A Study of History, 12 vols., Oxford University Press, 
London, 1934–61.
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correspondent. After another brief stint at Chatham House, Wight finally ended 
up at the LSE, where the idiosyncratic head of the Department of International 
Relations, Charles Manning,14 appointed him to a Readership in 1949.15
Wight’s early scholarly achievements were few, but what he had published 
was well-regarded. The highlight was a seventy page pamphlet produced for 
Chatham House, Power Politics (1946),16 which displayed Wight’s extraordinary 
historical range as well as his analytical acuity and moral concern. Other 
projects, however, distracted him from making further significant contributions 
to the field. By the time Bell met Wight in 1951, Wight’s only other substantial 
works of scholarship were three reference works on colonial constitutions and 
four brilliant but over-wrought essays in a forthcoming volume of the Chatham 
House Survey of International Affairs covering the war-years.17 His journalism, 
reviewing and extensive reading unquestionably slowed Wight’s productivity, 
but so did two other things: his suspicion about the ways in which international 
relations was being approached, at that time, as an academic discipline and his 
exacting approach to the study of world politics.
Wight was sceptical about international relations when he accepted his 
Readership in 1949 and he was just as sceptical when he resigned it twelve 
years later, to take up a Chair in History. He disliked the social sciences in 
general, for what might today be considered peculiar reasons—he thought them 
dehumanising, but also a sign of a neo-pagan return to cyclic views of human 
destiny once banished by Christian historiography.18 His religious beliefs—he 
was a devout but intellectual Anglican—prevented him accepting that history 
could repeat itself, and thus prevented him from accepting that general ‘laws’ 
about social life could ever be determined. Only philosophy, literature and 
history were capable of capturing truths about human societies, Wight argued, 
and only these disciplines should underpin political thought and practice.19 In 
14 On Manning, see Hidemi Suganami, ‘C. A. W. Manning and the study of international relations’, Review 
of International Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, 2001, pp. 91–107; and David Long, ‘C. A. W. Manning and the discipline 
of international relations’, The Round Table, vol. 95, no. 378, 2005, pp. 77–96, as well as Manning’s own The 
Nature of International Society, Macmillan, London, 1962.
15 On these various details of Wight’s early career and thought, see Hall, International Thought of Martin 
Wight, pp. 4–8.
16 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Looking Forward Pamphlet no. 8, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London, 1946.
17 See Martin Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945, Faber & Faber, London, 1946; 
The Gold Coast Legislative Council, Faber & Faber, London, 1947; and British Colonial Constitutions 1947, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1952; as well as his essays on ‘Spain and ‘Portugal’, ‘Switzerland, The Low Countries, 
and Scandinavia’, ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Germany’, and ‘The Balance of Power’, in AJ Toynbee and FT Ashton-
Gwatkin (eds), Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946: The World in March 1939, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1952, pp. 138–150, pp. 151–165, pp. 206–292, pp. 293–365 and pp. 508–532. 
18 See especially Martin Wight, ‘History and Judgment: Butterfield, Niebuhr and the Technical History’, 
The Frontier: A Christian Commentary on the Common Life, vol. 1, no. 8, 1950, p. 306.
19 As Wight wrote to his friend and erstwhile colleague at the LSE, Elie Kedourie, ‘the teaching of 
International Relations … convinced me that the only subjects which ought to be taught were philosophy, 
literature and history’ (Wight to Kedourie, 21 November 1961, Wight MS 233 3/9, British Library of Political 
and Economic Sciences, London).
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his mind, the new social sciences were implicated in some way with not merely 
the secularisation of the West, which he lamented, but also the rise of new and 
more extreme forms of tyranny to any that had existed in the past.20
These beliefs conditioned Wight’s approach to international relations. He was 
convinced that world politics required serious study, but unconvinced by the 
approaches used and the findings generated since the first chairs in the discipline 
were founded in the 1920s. Just after he first arrived at the LSE he proposed that 
the subject should have two poles: contemporary history and what he called, 
uncomfortably, but with hints of necessary deference to Manning’s preferences, 
the ‘Sociology of the International Community’. He rejected the objections of 
some professional historians to the study of contemporary history as palpably 
silly—they argued that it could not be written for lack of available sources, 
by which they meant official archives; Wight objected by saying—rightly—
that medievalists work with far less. Some of the greatest history, he noted, 
was contemporary history: think of Thucydides, Clarendon or Churchill. But 
Wight argued that students of the field could not stop at contemporary history: 
they needed also to explore the relationships between ‘powers’, especially the 
‘certain kinds of habitual behaviour’ which have ‘crystallised in diplomacy’.21
How might this be done? Wight had been trained as a historian in the early 
1930s, and at Oxford, where the History Faculty was notoriously conservative. 
In Cambridge, at the same time, historians had long been concerned with general 
and thematic history, and were then experimenting further, with social and 
economic history, with Marxist and sociological modes of analysis, and with the 
histories of science and medicine. At Oxford, however, the syllabus remained 
dominated by the political (primarily constitutional) history of England, studied 
by exhaustive investigation of mainly short periods. The principal concerns 
were ideas and institutions: the study of the changing ideas that informed the 
evolving institutions of English government. 
Wight disliked the Oxford curriculum intensely, as he later recalled,22 but 
never fully escaped it. He shared Toynbee’s belief that human societies only 
made sense to the observer if they were approached as wholes, but struggled 
to reconcile this belief in ‘holism’ with his continued insistence that the past 
must still be studied by the meticulous examination of primary sources.23 
Understandably, this requirement placed too great a burden on Wight’s own 
shoulders—he found it impossible to meet his own standards of scholarship and 
his output suffered as a consequence. He was able, however, to transmit some 
20 See Hall, International Thought of Martin Wight, especially pp.6 5–85 (on ‘The Crisis of Modern Politics’).
21 Martin Wight, ‘What is International Relations?’ (1950), Wight MS 112, p. 17.
22 Martin Wight, ‘Devising a History Syllabus’, talk given at Reading, 28 February 1963, Wight MS 50.
23 On Wight’s relationship with Toynbee’s thought, see Ian Hall, ‘Challenge and Response: The Lasting 
Engagement of Arnold J Toynbee and Martin Wight’, International Relations, vol. 17, no. 3, 2003, pp. 389–404.
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elements of what he had inherited as an Oxford historian to his students. Above 
all, there was the insistence that politics is best explained in terms of ideas and 
institutions—specifically, the beliefs of agents and what we would now call the 
‘norms’ of behaviour those beliefs generated—and best studied by looking at 
what politicians, diplomats, lawyers and other practitioners, say about those 
ideas and institutions.
This was Wight’s vision of the study of international relations that Bell 
encountered in 1951 and that she carried forward, albeit with her own 
modifications. It combined the study of contemporary history and the 
institutions of international society—not the formal institutions, like the United 
Nations, but the informal ones that had arisen over time, like war or diplomacy, 
for managing the relations of political communities. It entailed the rigorous 
examination of the beliefs of decision-makers, the ways in which these beliefs 
shaped their perceptions of their circumstances, and manner in which these 
beliefs and perceptions shaped their changing practices. It was, in other words, 
an ‘interpretive’ approach to international theory which puts the beliefs of 
policy-actors and the traditions of thought that shape those beliefs centre-stage, 
as explanations for what occurs in international relations. It rejects the idea that 
systems and structures determine events and emphasises agency, contingency 
and contestability.24 
Beliefs, Conventions and Crises
Under Wight’s supervision, Bell’s graduate work was an apprenticeship in 
this interpretive approach to international relations. She was set a project 
that involved the examination of a belief or set of beliefs and their effect on 
international practice in contemporary world politics: in her particular case, the 
idea of ‘containment’ and the ways in which it was translated into policy. Others 
who worked with Wight at around the same time were set similar tasks. For 
Hedley Bull, who arrived at the LSE as an Assistant Lecturer in 1955, soon after 
Bell’s departure for Manchester, and began a PhD there under Wight’s direction, 
it involved various aspects of Labour Party internationalism.25 For others, like 
Peter Lyon, it was ‘neutralism’ and ‘nonalignment’.26 
For most of the first half of the 1950s, Bell balanced this work on containment 
at the LSE with other commitments at Chatham House, where she was employed 
24 For further explorations of the interpretive approach, see Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall, 
‘Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 
15, no. 2, 2013, pp. 163–174.
25 See Robert Ayson, Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2012.
26 Peter Lyons, Neutralism, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1963.
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as a research officer. Her duties included aiding the production of key projects, 
including Geoffrey Goodwin’s ponderous Britain and the United Nations (1957), 
but she was also able to make a more substantial contribution of her own: the 
Survey of International Affairs for 1954 (1956).27 Bell recalls in her memoir that 
Chatham House provided the invaluable opportunity to meet and to speak to 
scholars and policy-makers in a relatively informal setting. But it also provided 
much-needed resources for the writing of contemporary history in the 1950s, not 
least the scrupulously-maintained press-cuttings archive that Toynbee had built 
up since the 1920s, which included material from newspapers and wire services 
across the world. Toynbee’s inter-war Surveys were greatly dependent on these 
resources; Bell’s volume is too. Apart from personal interactions with politicians 
and diplomats, these cuttings were the core source material of contemporary 
history until at least the latter part of the 1960s.
Bell used these kinds of materials not merely to determine factual information 
but also to gain insight into the beliefs of practitioners, a task that Wight insisted 
was crucial to the proper study of international relations. Beliefs dominate Bell’s 
first major book, Negotiation from Strength (1962),28 which grew out of her 
graduate studies at the LSE. Her principal concern in the book is to tell the 
story of the rise and fall of a policy concept, ‘negotiation from strength’, which 
emerged in American foreign policy circles in 1950 as a possible alternative to 
‘containment’. But Bell also had another concern: to explore ‘[w]hat makes “an 
effective decision”’. ‘How many people’, she asked, ‘have to feel what degree of 
conviction to turn aspiration into intention and intention into actual policy?’.29 
And there were other issues too. Bell was interested not just in the failure of 
a concept to be translated into an effective policy, but also the failure of that 
concept to disappear once its initial shortcoming had been detected.
These were big questions and Negotiation from Strength—arguably Bell’s best 
book—delivered some intriguing answers. It shows how containment was 
replaced by a Western (mainly American) aspiration to be able to ‘negotiate 
from strength’ was related not just to changes in key personnel—principally 
from George Kennan to Paul Nitze, and from Harry Truman to John Foster 
Dulles—but to the relative popularity of differing accounts of Soviet strategy 
and diplomacy. Proponents of containment, Bell notes, believed that the ‘power 
struggle’ between the US and USSR would only end with domestic political 
change within the Soviet Union; proponents of negotiation from strength 
27 See Geoffrey Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations, Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford 
University Press, London, 1957; and Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs for 1954, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs and Oxford University Press, London, 1956.
28 Coral Bell, Negotiation Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1962, and Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963.
29 ibid., p. 12.
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assumed, by contrast, that ‘diplomatic adjustment’ was possible.30 During 
the course of the 1950s, she demonstrates, negotiation from strength came to 
replace containment as the dominant policy concept for the West, especially for 
American decision-makers. This occurred despite the hostility of John Foster 
Dulles, in particular, to diplomacy in general and to negotiation with the USSR 
in particular.31
Bell’s book traces this story in minute detail and considerable insight into 
the beliefs of the key figures involved—without, it should be noted, any 
access to official documents. Her pen-portrait of Dulles and what she calls his 
‘theory of international politics’ is especially perceptive and characteristically 
unemotive: she picks through his published works, interviews and profiles, 
and draws upon backgrounding interviews she carried out in Washington to 
provide a dispassionate assessment of his motives and his strategy.32 Bell argues 
that despite Dulles’ position and extraordinary energy, he was overtaken by 
demands for negotiation as he worked to build American and allied strength. 
These came from Winston Churchill and indeed from the Soviets themselves, 
and from the general public. But the most powerful part of the book, arguably, 
is Bell’s assessment of the perceptions of the participants in the negotiations, 
especially how they miscalculated and misunderstood their adversaries and 
failed to achieve any kind of deal.33
What, then, did Bell think we might learn from the rise and fall of negotiation 
from strength? In the conclusion, she reflected:
[I]t may be regarded … as chiefly an illustration of how two competing 
alliances may be bound to the policy-purposes of their most vulnerable 
members, or … as an illustration of the progress of a policy through 
stages of ambition, distraction, approximation and supersession, as a 
study in cross-purposes and the political uses of illusion, an example of 
how wide the gap may be between declared policy and what is actually 
done, and of how much more important in politics than intention is 
what Fisher called the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.34
This is a distinctively ‘interpretivist’ passage and a subtle one. Bell suggested 
that negotiation from strength might be regarded as little more than an ‘official 
myth’ or a ‘harmless necessary public-relations-man’s phrase’—a kind of noble 
lie that comforts democratic electorates but means little.35 But to dismiss it 
that way would be to ignore the ways in which the concept clearly shaped 
30 ibid., p. 29.
31 ibid., pp. 67–76.
32 See especially ibid., pp. 93–94.
33 ibid., pp. 112–125.
34 ibid., p. 188.
35 ibid., p. 189.
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policy, albeit a failed one, and shaped expectations of what might be possible 
and what might eventuate. As Bell argued later, she was convinced that 
‘[i]nternational politics proceeds essentially on nothing more substantial than a 
set of expectations: expectations as to where power will prove to be and how it 
will be used’.36
Bell’s subsequent work—with the major exception of The Diplomacy of Détente, 
which concentrates on the beliefs and behaviour of one man above all: Henry 
Kissinger37—focussed less on beliefs and more on what she called ‘conventions’. 
We might call them social institutions, perhaps laws (in a social scientific sense), 
or even just norms. What Bell meant by conventions was ‘just what it conveys 
in ordinary parlance: expected or understood signals (as in the conventions 
of bridge), or rules of behaviour with no particular moral or legal backing, 
sanctioned chiefly by prudence and custom, and stemming from a particular 
society’.38 Here again, Bell moved in a Wightean universe, but in parts Wight 
himself neglected. He had argued that international society was defined and 
ordered by its ‘institutions’—not formal institutions, like the UN, but informal 
bundles of beliefs, expectations, rules and indeed conventions of behaviour. 
Borrowing from contemporary social anthropology, consciously or not, Wight 
cast war, diplomacy, international law, great powers and the balance of powers 
as social ‘institutions’ in which there were assumptions, acceptances and 
anticipations of particular kinds of behaviour by practitioners.39
Bell narrowed her concerns merely to conventions and especially to what 
she termed, in the book of the same name, The Conventions of Crisis (1971).40 
Her interest was in the evolving conventions that existed during crises—
expectations around behaviour and conduct—focussing attention once more 
upon the beliefs of practitioners as the motive forces of international relations. 
Crisis management, she argued, is ‘learned behaviour’ which may or may not be 
‘institutionalised’—by which she meant learned, taught and re-learned within 
communities of practitioners.41 The conventions that might be used, learned 
and taught varied: they could be forms of signalling, some crude and some 
highly subtle, military, economic, political or diplomatic, or certain techniques, 
36 Coral Bell, ‘Local Threats and the Central Balance’, in her edited Academic Studies and International 
Politics: Papers of a Conference held at the Australian National University, June 1981, Canberra Studies in 
World Affairs, The Australian National University, no. 6, 1982, p. 151.
37 Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era, Martin Robertson, London, 1977.
38 Coral Bell, ‘Crisis Diplomacy’, in Laurence Martin, ed., Strategic Thought in a Nuclear Age, Heinemann, 
1979, London, p. 158.
39 See especially Wight’s Power Politics.
40 Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, Oxford University Press for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1971.
41 ibid., p. 25.
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like the ‘creative use of ambiguity’.42 And crucially, in Bell’s world, they come 
into play when self-consciously and deliberately selected by individual agents 
confronted with changing sets of circumstances.
In this way, Bell succeeded in developing Wight’s interpretive approach, with 
its emphasis on agents and beliefs, but succeeded not just in describing the 
emergence of concepts and policies, but also in explaining significant changes 
in the everyday practices of the society of states. Other thinkers influenced by 
the early English School struggled to get this balance right. Bull, for example, in 
his The Anarchical Society, never got into sufficient detail to really explain how 
that society and its institutions were changing and why.43 Bell’s dogged focus on 
crisis management, by contrast, tells us a great deal more about what is evolving 
and what is perennial, giving her the platform for later works, like A World 
Out of Balance,44 that take the ‘long view’ of contemporary events and generate 
important arguments about the drivers of change in international relations. 
Conclusion
Bell’s other perennial concern—apart from conventions—was ‘power politics’ 
or, more precisely, because that term has become synonymous with international 
relations, the politics of power. She was concerned with how power was 
conceived and especially how it was used, principally by great powers. But 
for Bell ‘power’ did not mean the material capabilities of actors. It was a much 
more complex concept. Power was something perceived or misperceived, 
calculated or miscalculated, not innate in a set of resources or weapons. Power 
was relational: it implied to Bell the capacity of one party to influence or even 
control the actions of others. Power could be wielded in crude ways, by making 
military threats or imposing economic sanctions, by forcing others to bend to 
one’s will. But equally power could consist of the ability to seize and hold an 
agenda, to articulate a set of ideas and thereby to force others to justify or even 
modify their behaviour. Power might flow from a concerted effort to utilise 
an institution or to mobilise opinion-something which even those who lack 
material military or economic power can do. 
One of Bell’s earliest articles dealt with these kinds of uses of power by the 
hitherto powerless. Her ‘The United Nations and the West’ (1953), published in 
the Chatham House journal International Affairs, bears like her other work of 
42 ibid., p. 74.
43 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd edn, Macmillan, London, 
1995.
44 Coral Bell, A World Out of Balance: American Ascendancy and International Politics in the 21st Century, 
Longueville Books, Double Bay, 2003.
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that period the distinct signs of the influence of Wight in its composition and 
its message,45 but it is also revealing about Bell’s own views. She opens with the 
observation—commonplace in British international thought in the immediate 
post-war years—that the Second World War and its aftermath had brought 
about the ‘contraction of Europe’ after two hundred years of expansion and the 
‘eclipse of Europe in Power-terms’ not just by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, but by anti-colonial forces.46 The latter, Bell acknowledged, might be 
relatively weak in material terms, but they are irresistible politically:
Political control rests on elements of consent and coercion, and the belief 
that the controlling Power can exert force of a decisive kind tends to 
reduce to the minimum the amount actually needed. Conversely, where 
doubt is thrown upon the effective power available to the controlling 
nations, as in the case of the defeat of the European Powers in South East 
Asia by Japan, forces inimical to that control are encouraged, and the 
re-imposition of authority is rendered difficult or impossible.47
Bell’s concern in this article, however, was not so much with challenges to 
European authority on what used to be called the colonial periphery, but with 
the ways in which those ‘forces inimical to control’ mobilised themselves at the 
UN to build and project power.
Bell’s power politics was a politics with agency where the materially-rich did 
not, as many other realists might argue, necessarily prevail. International 
politics were to her an arena in which agents manoeuvred, making good or bad 
use of both the intellectual and material resources they had at their disposal. For 
that reason, the beliefs of agents mattered, because they informed the ways in 
which they approached predicaments, deployed what resources they had at their 
disposal, and shaped policies to achieve their objectives. What Bell presented in 
her international thought, in other words, was a vision of international relations 
that was both human and humane.
45 For a point of comparison, see Martin Wight’s ‘The Power Struggle at the United Nations’, Proceedings of 
the Institute of World Affairs, 33rd session, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1956, pp. 247–259.
46 Coral Bell, ‘The United Nations and the West’, International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 4, 1953, pp. 464–465.
47 ibid., p. 465.
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7. The Importance of Being  
Coral Bell1
JDB Miller
Declaring one’s interest is often necessary, very much in this case. I have known 
and admired Coral Bell for fifty years, ever since she and I were tutoring students 
in International Relations at the London School of Economics (LSE). She has 
since become the most respected and prolific of Australians in this field, and 
remains an acute analyst of what happens in the world, especially in terms of 
conflict and alliances.
Having graduated from the University of Sydney, she entered the Australian 
Diplomatic Service. After some time abroad, she evidently decided to enter 
academic life, and proceeded to the LSE to do postgraduate work. There she 
came under the influence of Martin Wight and became a colleague of Hedley 
Bull. Even though I would personally regard it as to some extent a barren 
time because of the tenure of Professor Charles Manning as Head of Affairs, 
there was no doubt of the effect of Wight’s personality and his awareness of 
the international system: he was an inspiration to all who knew him. When, 
years later, he told me that, when asked to recommend someone for the Chair 
of International Relations at Sussex University, he could only hesitate between 
two Australians, Coral Bell and Hedley Bull. Coral took the job.
The Sussex Department turned out to be an unhappy place; after some time, Coral 
thought of returning to Australia. Hedley and I, learning of this, were delighted 
to lure her to the Department of International Relations in the Research School 
of Pacific Studies at The Australian National University (ANU), of which we 
were joint heads. Here she continued her published work, and contributed to 
both the Department and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. She joined 
Hedley, Robert O’Neill, TB Millar and myself as a Fellow of the Academy of the 
Social Sciences in Australia. She continues to produce: the ANU Library lists 
thirty books she has either written (the majority), edited, or contributed to (the 
smallest category). They cover the world situation, Australian foreign policy, 
and particularly American policy under a succession of presidents.
The work displays great clarity with an absence of jargon, much practicality and 
historical sense, and a full awareness of the problems of high-level diplomacy, 
1 This is a revised version of an article previously published by Taylor & Francis Ltd., as: JDB Miller, ‘The 
Importance of Being Coral Bell’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 3, September 2005, pp. 
261–263; and has been reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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as, for example, in her studies of John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger. It is 
not surprising that she has been widely acknowledged in Britain and the US for 
the depth and range of her thinking.
Though her numerous books on the international situation are all important, it 
seems to me that Coral Bell’s main interest and considerable achievement lie in 
the foreign policy of the US, a power which has been dominant (but not always 
successful) in the international system, and which she knows intimately through 
personal contact and frequent visits. For the purposes of this treatment I shall 
concentrate on a single article, hoping to indicate her methods and her insight 
into how the US goes about its activities, and why. The article is ‘American 
Policy in the Third World’.2
Bell makes it clear that the US is an ‘intensely plural society’—a matter not 
sufficiently recognised in much Australian discussion of the country, which tends 
to concentrate on the east and west coasts and ignores the mid-west and south 
and the social make-up. She discerns two earlier strands in US policy towards 
the Caribbean and Latin America, those identified with Theodore Roosevelt’s 
aggressive ‘backyard’ policy, in which the US pushed the Monroe Doctrine to 
extremes, and the ‘good neighbour’ policy of Franklin Roosevelt, which, along 
with private efforts, emphasised humanitarian and friendly connections with 
the often unruly neighbours to the south.
Her point in recalling this history is that these two traditions persist: even 
in such apparently belligerent regimes as those of Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan, one can see both strands at work. She sees them extend in later years, 
including the present, from the western hemisphere to the Third World at 
large—though she does not accept the notion that there is a unified Third 
World: it is individual Third World countries, especially in the Middle East, 
that she has in mind.
Out of this matrix of earlier and recent themes she sees two approaches to US 
foreign policy. On the one hand,
American official spokesmen … desire and promote change (in the 
‘right’ direction, admittedly), citing the official Wilsonian progressive 
notions of human rights and national self-determination, and making a 
case for linking these political desiderata to economic policies allowing 
reasonable play to the forces of the market.
Bell sees these attitudes as having been largely dominant in recent times, but 
with an underlay of attitudes of the second strand, preserved in the bureaucracy, 
2 See Coral Bell, ‘American Policy in the Third World’ in Robert O’Neill and RJ Vincent, (eds), The West and 
the Third World, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp. 51–66. 
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and reflected in the fact that US public opinion, especially liberal-democratic 
opinion, maintained an authentic humanitarian concern for the welfare of Third 
World peoples in general, and that strand of public feeling was quite articulate, 
and also quite able to bring pressure to bear on Washington policy-makers, even 
in the days of the ‘Reagan Doctrine’, as witness Congressional recalcitrance on 
Nicaragua.
She sees ‘a large gap between operational and declaratory policies, what the 
President [Reagan] did and what he said.’ Perhaps it will be the same with all 
administrations, the two strands/traditions coinciding and clashing in varying 
degrees. Bell sums it up:
The Reagan Administration’s decision-making process (if that is not too 
charitable a term) seems even more dispersed and incoherent than has 
been the case for most American administrations. And nowhere was that 
more true than on Third World issues. Thus the inherent pluralism of 
American society was often expressed in what seemed a confused and 
confusing multiplicity of attitudes and policies.
Of course, much has changed since 11 September 2001 and the re-election of 
President George W Bush. Yet Bell’s analysis, based on history and shrewd and 
penetrating as it is, remains a reliable guide to much of how American policy 
proceeds. There is much more to ponder in the realism of her other writings: 
she has brought a practical and sophisticated analysis to the study of the 
international system and Australia’s reaction to it. She continues to do so. That 
is the importance of Coral Bell.

61
8. Coral Bell and the Classical  
Realist Tradition1
James L Richardson
Like JDB Miller, I have known Coral Bell for half a century, having met her in 
London in 1955-56—I an intending graduate student, she already an established 
scholar at Chatham House. Later our paths crossed quite frequently, but we 
were direct colleagues only for a few years in the 1980s, in the Department of 
International Relations at The Australian National University.
Her contributions to international relations are multifaceted, but I shall focus 
on three of her books on American foreign policy and Cold War diplomacy—
each of them a significant and timely input into the scholarly discussion of the 
burning issues of the day. (It is easily forgotten how intense were some of the 
concerns, and how fierce some of the debates, in those years). The books in 
question—Negotiation from Strength (1963), The Conventions of Crisis (1971) and 
The Diplomacy of Detente (1977)—influenced my understanding of the issues at 
the time, when I was working on closely related topics. Returning to them, one 
is not only reminded of old debates but also rewarded with new insights.2
Negotiation from Strength offers a sparkling commentary on the 1950s: the 
decade during which the Cold War in Europe hardened into a rigid confrontation 
between two heavily armed military blocs, seemingly in perpetuity. At first 
sight, the diplomatic formula which provides the book’s title offered little more 
than a device for indefinitely deferring unwanted negotiations, but Bell shows 
that, on the contrary, the varied uses of the formula can serve to illuminate the 
potentialities for a more imaginative Western diplomacy during those years, 
and the reasons why this was not attempted. The reader gains a heightened 
sense of choices forgone and an appreciation of the qualities of key decision-
makers—of Winston Churchill’s eagerness to explore potential openings for 
diplomacy, Dean Acheson’s scepticism and John Foster Dulles’s stubborn belief 
in the dangers attending any negotiation.
She does not, in the manner of George Kennan’s advocacy of disengagement, 
argue for a particular course of action, but more subtly counters the familiar 
1 This is a revised version of an article previously published by Taylor & Francis Ltd., as: James L 
Richardson, ‘Coral Bell and the classical realist tradition’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, 
no. 3, September 2005, pp. 265–268; and has been reprinted by permission of the publisher.
2 See Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
1963; The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971; 
and TheDiplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era, Martin Robertson, London, 1977.
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apprehensions of the risks of negotiation with the unfamiliar thesis of the costs 
of indefinitely postponing it. Her thesis is that in the pursuit of absolute military 
strength the Western leaders lost sight of the relative overall strength of their 
position in the early to mid–1950s. By the early 1960s, a skilful Soviet diplomatic 
offensive had narrowed the agenda to the preservation, or otherwise, of the 
special status of West Berlin. For contemporaries this was a highly challenging 
interpretation of the central Cold War issues. For later scholars it offers many 
illuminating insights: into the (often unfortunate) interplay of domestic and 
external ‘imperatives’; the role of key decision-makers (the sketch of Dulles has 
not been improved upon); and the relentless priority accorded to the military 
build-up, but also the facile claims associated with it. For this reader, the 
multiplicity of reasons for American policy-makers’ subordinating diplomatic 
to narrowly conceived military considerations remains of particular interest.
This is not a criticism that can be made of Henry Kissinger, whose diplomacy 
is examined in The Diplomacy of Detente. Indeed, although Bell does not 
labour the point, Kissinger is shown to have remedied the deficiency exposed 
in Negotiation from Strength. That is to say, he based his policy on an acute 
perception of America’s overall strength relative to its communist adversaries. 
In exchange for their easing the way for a face-saving settlement in Vietnam, he 
could offer the Soviet Union a relaxation of economic restrictions, and China 
strategic reassurance vis-à-vis the perceived Soviet threat. Detente, of course, 
also signified shared benefits, in particular a limitation of the strategic arms 
competition, but did not signify a general relaxation of the Cold War conflict, 
merely its pursuit at lower levels of tension. Just how robustly Kissinger could 
pursue American interests is shown in his manipulation of the October 1973 
crisis in the Middle East to exclude the Soviet Union from its resolution and, as 
it proved, from a major role in subsequent Middle Eastern diplomacy.
At the time of its publication the book offered a discerning interpretation of the 
detente and a persuasive rebuttal of many of the polemical charges levelled against 
détente diplomacy. From today’s vantage point, notwithstanding or perhaps 
because of the vast literature that has accumulated, it stands up remarkably 
well as an overview, and also a reminder of central issues and insights half-
submerged in the subsequent accumulation of voluminous specialised studies 
of the period.
Similarly, although for different reasons, The Conventions of Crisis remains 
of more than historical interest. At the time it offered both an introductory 
overview and well-informed reflections on what was, arguably, the central 
problem for Cold War policy-making, vis-à-vis how best to cope with the 
crises that appeared to be built into the superpower relationship. Like most 
of the earlier literature on the topic, it can be read as a historical document: 
a statement of how things looked at the time. Some of its suggestions were 
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superseded by the vast scholarly literature of the following years, much of it 
highly specialised and even more firmly embedded in the context of the Cold 
War. What stands out today, however, is that this slim volume also raises issues 
that were not followed up, or only to a very limited extent—for example, her 
image of the ‘crisis slide’, or the relationship between external and ‘intra-mural’ 
crises, and even the nature and significance of conventions in this context 
and, by implication, of their absence. Thanks to its wide-ranging, essay-like 
character, The Conventions of Crisis still has much to offer to those who might 
seek orientation to the problems raised by crisis diplomacy in quite changed 
circumstances.
How might one best locate her work in relation to the traditions of international 
thought, and to the contemporary discipline of international relations? Most 
readers would place her in the realist tradition—that of ‘classical realism’, 
drawing on the humanities, not the neorealism of contemporary American 
theory, based on a narrow conception of social science theorising. She prefers 
to characterise her approach not as realist but as traditional analysis: ‘in the 
sense that it derives from the tradition of reflection on political and diplomatic 
and strategic events that goes back to Thucydides … and uses rather simple 
and traditional concepts and … vocabulary’.3 And she refers to the formative 
influence of Martin Wight, for whom international relations could never be 
subsumed under a single theoretical approach but required an appreciation of 
the insights afforded by multiple perspectives. Even if we, her readers, want to 
insist that the message that comes through is unmistakably realist, her particular 
version of realism, and the richness and subtlety of her arguments, show the 
imprint of Wight’s multi-perspectival thinking.
Classical realism, grounded in history and the humanities, is out of fashion in 
the contemporary international relations discipline, especially in the US, even 
though it remains alive and well in the policy journals. But times may be changing. 
Leading academic journals, even in the US, now invite contributions from ‘the 
variety of intellectual traditions included under the rubric of international 
relations’, to quote one formulation.4 It cannot be said that classical realism, or 
even ‘traditional analysis’, has been finally superseded.
Even more unfashionable, however, is her Wight-like scepticism concerning 
theory and her total disdain for methodology.5 Arguably, the discipline’s current 
3 Coral Bell, ‘Journey with Alternative Maps’, in J Kruzel and JN Rosenau, (eds), Journeys through World 
Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-four Academic Travelers, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1989, 
p. 344.
4 The policy statement of International Studies Quarterly, each issue.
5 For her own comments on her ‘marked resistance to the use of the word ‘theory’, see Bell, ‘Journey with 
Alternative Maps’, pp. 347-8). For Wight’s scepticism, see Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no International 
Theory?’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
International Politics, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, pp. 17–34.
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preoccupation with methodology is excessive and a robust affirmation of the use 
of everyday language in academic writing is a useful corrective. However, it has 
come to be accepted in international relations, as in the other social sciences, 
that even when explicit theory is absent, research and scholarship are guided by 
theoretical assumptions. Of course, there is much bad theorising, but the answer 
cannot be to reject theory as such, but rather to enhance one’s awareness of 
the strengths and weaknesses of different theories, and of one’s own theoretical 
presuppositions.
Coral Bell’s writings, like those of many historians, leave it to the reader to tease 
out the theoretical assumptions that underlie the analysis. It is instructive to 
attempt this, if only in order to locate her work more confidently within the 
spectrum of classical realist ideas. My reading is that it is at the opposite pole 
from the realism that postulates harsh necessities, inevitabilities or structural 
imperatives. It is a realism that highlights the scope for political and diplomatic 
choice, not only in the case of a superpower such as the United States but also 
with respect to Australia—not all the time, but much more than is generally 
recognised.6 The constraints that figure most prominently in her narratives stem 
from domestic politics and the fixed beliefs of decision-makers and those in 
their milieu. If this reading is correct, her version of realism is a much-needed 
corrective to the systemic, structural emphases in the prevailing neorealist 
doctrine. But why is this not made explicit? There may be art as much as 
modesty in the disclaiming of theoretical intent: a theory is never so persuasive 
as when it is securely embedded in a good narrative.
6 On Australia, see for example, Coral Bell, ‘Introduction’, in her Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian 
Foreign Policy, 3rd edn, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1993.




9. Realist Optimist: Coral Bell’s 
Contribution to Australian Foreign 
and Defence Policy1
Brendan Taylor
In a collection of essays dedicated to the memory of TB Millar, Coral Bell 
described Millar as a scholar ‘never given to provincialism: he was very much 
a citizen of the larger Western world, deeply fascinated by the problems of the 
East-West balance during the Cold War years’.2 This description is one that 
perhaps applies even more aptly to Coral and her work. Her preoccupation was 
very much the diplomatic and strategic relations between the great powers 
of what Coral liked to term ‘the central balance’. Yet like Millar, a significant 
portion of her career was also spent advancing the study of Australian foreign 
and defence policy. As this chapter goes on to demonstrate, much of her work 
in this area addressed the interplay between the central balance and Australian 
policy. It did so by bringing a formidable grasp of history together with an 
enduring desire to decipher the contours of the emerging international political 
landscape. And despite her realist proclivities, Coral was also—by her own 
admission—very much the optimist regarding Australia’s prospects in that 
emerging landscape.
The Past as Prologue
Coral’s earliest experiences of Australian foreign and defence policy revolved 
much more around its practical elements than the academic study thereof. In 
a number of respects, she experienced the use of force against Australia in the 
most direct, even personal of ways. She spent three years (1942–1945) during the 
Second World War, for instance, in a University of Sydney physics laboratory 
which assisted with the degaussing of ships. In a short memoir of her career, 
she recalls purchasing a rather large poker for protection against any Japanese 
invasion. In characteristically colourful terms, she writes of her intent ‘to sell 
my life or virtue as dearly as possible when they came up the garden path.’ 
1 A version of the essay has previously been published by Taylor & Francis Ltd., as: Brendan Taylor, ‘Coral 
Bell’s contribution to Australian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 3, 
2005, pp. 257–260; and has been reprinted by permission of the publisher.
2 Coral Bell, ‘Preface’, in Coral Bell, ed., Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War in Honour of 
Professor T.B. Millar, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 112, 1995, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Canberra, 1995, p. xiii.
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Unduly dramatic as that may now seem in light of evidence that the threat 
of Japanese invasion was perhaps more imagined than real,3 Coral elsewhere 
does recall hearing ‘a Japanese shell or two whistl[ing] overhead during the 
submarine raid of 1942.’4 More tragically, she also lost her ‘first love’ during the 
Papua New Guinea campaign.
As the Second World War drew to a close, Coral decided to contribute to the 
practice of Australian foreign policy by entering the diplomatic service. She 
moved to Canberra in 1945 as one of ten new recruits—Coral being the only 
female among them. ‘Doc’ Evatt was the Minister for External Affairs at that 
time and Coral’s new career brought her into contact with a number of historical 
figures of Australian foreign and defence policy, including the formidable Sir 
Arthur Tange.5
Her first assignment was under John Burton in the Department’s United Nations 
Division. She moved subsequently to work on Southeast Asia, becoming the 
only desk officer in a small department—even by today’s standards—to work 
on this entire sub-region. Coral was later dispatched to Wellington, New 
Zealand—a posting she regarded as a ‘wooden spoon’. But it was a posting 
which saw her involved as a ‘bit player’ in negotiations leading up to the signing 
of the ANZUS (Australia New Zealand United States) agreement. Again in her 
memoir, Coral recounts a secret visit by then Head of the Department, Alan 
Watt, to talk the New Zealanders out of siding with Britain. When Watt arrived, 
the High Commissioner and Official Secretary were elsewhere, leaving Coral as 
the only staffer ‘holding the fort.’
Notwithstanding her involvement in the practice of Australian foreign policy 
during such a formative period, Coral never made any secret of the fact that she 
disliked diplomatic life and felt immeasurably more comfortable in the corridors 
of academia. She was never attracted to the prospect of being a mere ‘cog in the 
wheel’ of government. At a more personal level, the more debauched side of 
diplomatic life was anathema to Coral’s character. As she recalls:
[T]he diplomatic life-style did not really suit me. I have never been, 
in any of its senses, a party girl, and diplomacy is a very party-ridden 
occupation, especially in a small post, as Wellington then was. If you 
meet roughly the same fifty or so people at cocktail and dinner parties 
five evenings a week, you tend to run out of small talk, which has 
never been my favourite form of conversation anyway. I needed a more 
reflective kind of life.
3 For further reading see Peter Dean, ed., Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, 
Port Melbourne, 2013.
4 Coral Bell, ‘Australians and Strategic Inquiry’, in Bell, Nation, Region and Context, p. 51.
5 For further reading see Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2006.
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Living with Giants
After six years in the diplomatic service, Coral left Australia and spent most of 
the next two and a half decades in the United Kingdom, where she first went 
to take up graduate study at the London School of Economics (LSE). Here she 
encountered the renowned International Relations theorist Martin Wight—
who Coral identified as ‘the chief intellectual influence of my entire life’ and 
frequently described in conversation as her ‘guru.’ During this period she 
also worked as a research officer at the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Chatham House), where the renowned historian Arnold J Toynbee handed 
her the editorial reins to Survey of International Affairs—a flagship Chatham 
House publication and almost certainly the most authoritative textbook in 
international politics at that time.
Coral went on to take up an appointment at the University of Manchester. In 
1959 she also held a Rockefeller Fellowship in the US, which allowed her to 
spend time as a visiting academic at Columbia University and the School of 
Advanced International Studies in Washington. Over the course of this entire 
period, Coral came into contact with key figures in the fields of strategic studies 
and international relations, including the likes of Alastair Buchan, Hedley Bull, 
Michael Howard and Henry Kissinger.
These encounters were significant from an Australian perspective in that they 
raised the intellectual profile of analysis from this country. Denis Healey, the 
former British Labor MP and one of the founding fathers of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), observed in his own memoir that ‘from the 
middle fifties Australia has contributed far more to international understanding 
of defence problems than any country of similar size.’6 Certainly he had Coral 
in mind when making this observation. Secretary of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, made a similar observation of Coral in the early 1970s 
when he wrote that ‘her work has brought a new lustre to the reputation of 
Australia in all countries where people follow the serious study of foreign 
affairs.’7
Coral herself was never shy about referring to her antipodean origins and 
offering a distinctly Australian perspective on international politics. In her 
classic 1968 Adelphi paper on the Asian balance of power, for instance, she 
stated from the outset that:
6 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, p. 192.
7 Cited in Coral Bell, Crises and Australian Diplomacy, Arthur F Yencken Memorial Lecture 1972, Australian 
National University Press, 1973, p. 1.
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It will be an Australian view in the sense that the author, as an Australian, 
must be conscious that her own country’s efforts to provide for its future 
security should include some assessment of the prospects for such a 
balance. Perhaps there is a certain appropriateness to an Australian 
examination of this question, since Australians are the only group of 
Westerners who must remain fully and inescapably vulnerable to the 
diplomatic stresses arising in Asia, on whose periphery they live or die.8
By the 1960s, however, Coral was beginning to feel the pull of home, a feeling 
exacerbated by the unexpected passing of her father (Coral’s mother had also 
passed away unexpectedly, of a brain aneurism, when Coral was a child). She 
thus returned to Australia for four years during the early 1960s as the University 
of Sydney’s first appointment in the field of international relations. Here she 
first encountered a young Desmond Ball, another emerging Australian scholar 
of strategic studies who, like Coral, would go on to make a significant impact 
internationally.9
Yet for a scholar really beginning to make her mark on the international scene, 
one gets the sense that Australia was simply too small and too remote for Coral 
at that time. In her memoir she recalls that ‘Australia seemed suddenly to be 
in a lonely place, internationally, diplomatically and strategically’. To be sure, 
amongst her students at Sydney there were some who would make their own 
mark internationally, such as Richard Butler and Martin Indyk. Owen Harries, 
who would go on to become editor of the prominent American policy journal, 
The National Interest, was also a colleague and ‘cherished friend.’ Yet Coral ‘did 
not find the intellectual climate of Australia in the late Menzies period much to 
my liking.’ Hence, when the offer of a Readership at LSE came along, Coral ‘was 
not much tempted to resist it’.
Coral retained some interest in Australian foreign and defence policy during her 
time away. In 1972, for instance, she delivered the Arthur F Yencken Memorial 
Lecture on the theme of ‘Crises and Australian Diplomacy.’ She divided the 
lecture into two parts, delivered over two evenings. The first addressed the 
nature of crises more generally and how they are managed by the great powers. 
The second examined their impact upon Australia and what, if anything, 
Australian diplomacy might do to ameliorate or influence them.10
When Coral returned permanently to Australia in the late 1970s—to take up a 
position as Senior Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations 
8 Coral Bell, The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents, Adelphi Paper no. 44, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 1968, p. 1.
9 For further reading on the life and work of Ball see Brendan Taylor, Nicholas Farrelly and Sheryn Lee 
(eds), Insurgent Intellectual: Essays in Honour of Professor Desmond Ball, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 2012.
10 Coral Bell, Crises and Australian Diplomacy.
9 . Realist Optimist: Coral Bell’s Contribution to Australian Foreign and Defence Policy
71
at The Australian National University (ANU)—this interplay between the global 
and Australian policy remained a theme of her research. For instance, in 1980 she 
edited a volume considering choices in Australian foreign and defence policy, 
including a chapter which Coral contributed entitled ‘The Central Balance and 
Australian Policy.’ As she wrote in that chapter, ‘Australia’s security has always, 
one may argue, been taken by its decision-makers to depend on its status as a 
protégé of one of the central-balance powers’.11
This latter observation was a central element of what is almost certainly Coral’s 
most significant contribution to the study of Australian foreign and defence 
policy. Dependent Ally was first published in 1984 and went on to appear in at 
least three different editions. It examined the evolution of Australia’s relations 
with Britain and the United States over the previous two hundred years. It did 
so with an eye to illustrating some of the dilemmas of diplomatic and strategic 
dependency, as well as some of the costs and benefits of alliance.
One of the most enduring conclusions to emerge from Coral’s sweeping study 
was the manner in which Australia’s dependency on its great and powerful 
friends has not remained entirely consistent but has instead been subject to a 
variety of influences. Foremost amongst these, Dependent Ally concluded, was 
the personality and assumptions of Australia’s chief decision-maker at any given 
time. As Coral so colourfully put it:
One might see the history as that of a succession of chefs with the same 
basic raw material to work on, and much the same ‘notional preferences’ 
among the consumers. The flavour and texture and palatability of what 
is achieved will vary chiefly in accordance with their respective skills 
and techniques, because there are not many other factors of variation.12
A standout feature of Dependent Ally is Coral’s deep knowledge and application 
of history which is, indeed, a feature of much of her work. In surveying the 
history of the British–Australian relationship, for instance, she reaches back to 
the 1850s to an episode during the Crimean War which she argues highlights 
some of the central problems of the relationship which would culminate with 
Australia’s ‘turn to America’ almost a century later.13 Later in the book she again 
draws comparisons between the time at which she was writing and the world a 
hundred years previous: ‘the diplomatic wheel seems to have turned full circle 
11 ‘The Central Balance and Australian Policy’, in Coral Bell (ed), Agenda for the Eighties, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1980, p. 6. A decade on, Coral edited a second such volume which 
included a similarly titled contribution. See Coral Bell, ‘The Changing Central Balance and Australian Policy’, 
in Coral Bell (ed), Agenda for the Nineties: Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy, Longman Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1991, pp. 1–23.
12 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 175.
13 ibid., p. 7.
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over a century, Russia being a Pacific power in the 1990s as it had been in the 
1890s. Then it was a putative adversary, to be succeeded by quite an assortment 
of other actual or putative adversaries’.14
Like so many scholars of international relations and strategic studies, Coral 
spent the early years of the 1990s adjusting to and trying to make sense of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. In 1991 for 
instance, she produced a short monograph examining Australia’s alliance 
options in a world transformed. The potential significance of these shifts 
was captured by Coral’s observation that they represented ‘nothing less than 
the disappearance of the whole organizing principle of the world in which 
ANZUS was created’.15 Notwithstanding these epochal changes, Coral remained 
convinced that Australia’s alliance with the United States would endure over 
the short to medium term. This was in large part due to her pessimism that 
a still nascent Asian regionalism could deliver a satisfactory alternative. Over 
the longer term, she presciently observed, the ‘central balance’ was likely to 
evolve in ways not necessarily as conducive to Australia as had been the case 
previously. Against that backdrop, Coral posited that the expectation of strong 
backing from its American ally—particularly during a crisis—would remain 
critically importantly to Canberra.16
Next only to Dependent Ally, however, Coral’s most substantial contribution in 
the field of Australian foreign policy came in the form of her 2005 Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) paper Living with Giants.17 In this study, Coral 
peered several decades into the future in an attempt to decipher the shape of the 
emerging landscape of international politics. Her focus was primarily upon the 
security implications of population growth and, in the main, the fact that the 
world several decades from now will be comprised of at least nineteen societies 
of at least a hundred million people. Of particular significance to Australia, 
ten of these would be located within Australia’s own area of primary strategic 
concern.
Despite the potential for a re-run of the 1930s conflict between the ‘haves’ and 
the ‘have nots’—albeit on a much larger scale—Coral saw at least two positive 
diplomatic patterns emerging as part of this new landscape. The first was 
the beginnings of a ‘regional security community’ built around the fledging 
ASEAN-plus-three countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand. Second, she 
also suggested that the US-led unipolar world was fast reaching its twilight and 
14 ibid., p. 185.
15 Coral Bell, Australia’s Alliance Options: Prospect and Retrospect in a World of Change, Australian Foreign 
Policy Publications Program, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, p. 2.
16 ibid, p. 57.
17 Coral Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australia’s place in a more complex world, Strategy Report, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, April 2005.
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that it could be replaced by a global ‘concert of powers’—a concept discussed at 
greater length by Hugh White in his contribution to this volume—comprising 
at least eight nuclear powers and possibly other countries. Coral saw such a 
structure as a far safer alternative than a competitive ‘balance of power’ between 
these ‘giants.’
Coral’s exploration of the emerging landscape of international politics and its 
relevance to Australia continued in her 2007 paper The End of the Vasco da 
Gama Era, which was published under the auspices of the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy.18 In this study, Coral identified four powerful historical 
factors that were shaping this landscape. First, the end of the Vasco da Gama 
era—a term she used to refer to the end of the five hundred years of Western 
ascendency over Asia. Second, she again pointed to the end of the ‘unipolar 
moment.’ Third, a changing distribution of power both between and within 
states. And finally, environmental change.
Of these four forces, Coral saw the end of the Vasco da Gama era and environmental 
change as having the most significant ramifications for Australia. But she was 
also optimistic regarding the prospects for order in the emerging multipolar 
structure, namely because the greatest challenges to that order—the ‘Jihadists’, 
climate change and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to small powers—were 
all emerging outside the circle of the six most obvious great powers of the new 
order—the US, the European Union (EU), China, India, Russia and Japan. This, 
Coral argued, was likely to facilitate cooperation amongst the six with respect 
to these challenges.
Throughout her long and distinguished career, optimism remained a consistent 
feature of Coral’s work. And it certainly rings through strongly in the conclusion 
to The End of the Vasco da Gama Era:
But there is no reason for Canberra to view with apprehension the coming 
of a prospective multipolar world balance. We have no special enemy 
among the six great powers who appear likely to share the governance of 
that emerging world. … As middle powers go, Australia is exceptionally 
well endowed with both economic and strategic assets. … The United 
States will remain the paramount power in the society of states, only in 
a multipolar world instead of a unipolar or bipolar one.19
Yet this sense of optimism should not be mistaken for complacency. Rather, 
Living with Giants and The End of the Vasco da Gama Era both illustrate the 
extent to which Coral was consistently pushing the envelope in an unrelenting 
18 Coral Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics, Lowy Institute Paper 
21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2007.
19 ibid, pp. 52–53.
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drive to look imaginatively toward the future. This is certainly made clear in the 
conclusion to Living with Giants, which contains echoes of Barbara Tuchman’s 
influential history of the opening days of the First World War, The Guns of 
August, and its central argument that miscalculation and a failure of imagination 
sent the European powers tumbling into the abyss of war.20 In Coral’s terms:
This essay was inspired by the conclusion of the September 11 
Commission report, naming a ‘failure of imagination’ as the origin of the 
disaster. Its speculations have been intended to promote the avoidance 
of a similar danger for Australia.21
Influencing the Climate of Opinion
Coral’s contributions to Australian foreign and defence policy clearly extends 
beyond the scholarly works referred to in this chapter. To be sure, her impact 
has not been as direct as some of her long-standing academic colleagues, such 
as Paul Dibb whose 1986 Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities has had such 
a profound influence on the shape of Australian strategic policy during the 
period since,22 or Desmond Ball, whose path-breaking work on US strategic 
installations in Australia markedly expanded the contours of the public debate 
on this subject.23
It could be argued, however, that Coral was more a believer in the power of 
analysis to filter its way indirectly into the system. As she once observed, ‘it is 
of course always difficult to show direct causal connection between the choices 
of decision-makers and the analyses published by outsiders, but such analyses 
do help create the climate of opinion within which both the policy makers and 
the decision makers live, work, and have their being.’24
During her career, Coral influenced that climate of opinion in a number of 
ways. Internationally, she did so (and lifted Australia’s diplomatic profile in the 
process) through her conversations with prominent statesmen—such as Henry 
Kissinger, who has cited her prominently in his own work25 —and through 
her appearance in a number of high-profile American policy journals, such as 
Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and The American Interest.26
20 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, MacMillan, New York, 1962.
21 Bell, Living with Giants, p. 55.
22 Report to the Minister for Defence by Mr Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Australian 
Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1986.
23 See, for example, Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Hale 
and Iremonger, Sydney, 1980.
24 Bell, ‘Australians and Strategic Inquiry’, p. 70.
25 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, 2nd edn, Touchstone, New York, 
2002, p. 288.
26 See, for example, Coral Bell, ‘The Twilight of the Unipolar World’, The American Interest, vol. 1, no. 2, 
Winter 2005, pp. 18–29.
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Coral also influenced that climate of opinion through the people she worked 
with, taught and mentored. Former students recall with fondness the seminars 
and now almost legendary morning teas which were held during the 1970s and 
1980s at the ANU HC Coombs building. Through her presence and participation 
in these, Coral contributed in a substantial way to the education of a significant 
number of emerging scholars. Many of those subsequently moved on to take up 
senior positions in academia, government and the military.
Moreover, during a period when women were woefully under-represented in 
the Australian foreign and defence policy debate, it is worth keeping in mind 
that Coral served for over half a century—ever since her appointment as one 
of Australia’s first female diplomats—as a mentor and role model for female 
scholars and practitioners working in these fields. In March 2005 for instance, 
she was the keynote speaker at the inaugural meeting of the Canberra chapter 
of the ‘Women in International Security’ initiative.
From the Shadows
Despite her passing, Coral’s work continues to exhibit particular relevance 
to a number of Australia’s contemporary foreign and security policy debates. 
There has been recent speculation, for instance, that Washington is becoming 
increasingly frustrated by Canberra’s unwillingness to assume a greater share of 
the defence burden at a time when the US is hurting financially. These tensions 
were apparent in the lead up to the 2012 AUSMIN talks, for instance, when 
Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Locklear and Assistant Secretary of State 
Kurt Campbell each expressed concerns about the Australian defence budget.27 
Speaking with an Australian Financial Review journalist in August 2013, former 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was even more direct, arguing that 
Australia simply cannot continue ‘free-riding’ on its alliance with America.28
While these are indeed valid criticisms that should not be taken lightly, Coral’s 
work reminds us that they are not particularly new ones. In Dependent Ally, 
for instance, she makes the following observation regarding the pattern of 
commitment of Australian forces in support of allied operations and the levels 
of funding budgeted for defence:
The forces sent were as near to ‘token’ size as the ally concerned could 
be induced to acquiesce in. Australian defence policy-makers seem to 
27 See Peter Jennings, ‘Trunk Call for AUSMIN’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 12 
November 2012.
28 Christopher Joye, ‘Free Ride on US Defence Must Stop’, Australian Financial Review, 19 August 2013.
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have been as passive, politically, as any liberal could wish, not activist 
or adroit, even about getting what they would regard as funds adequate 
to the sort of armoury Australia needed.29
Coral’s work is also of continuing relevance to what is arguably Australia’s 
leading foreign and defence policy debate of recent years regarding this 
country’s response to the rise of China. A central figure in this debate, Hugh 
White, has written extensively on the dilemmas he believes Australia faces 
given that its leading economic and strategic partners—China and the US—are 
on opposite sides of a deepening strategic competition. He sees the possibility 
looming—potentially sooner than many analysts may believe—of Canberra 
having to choose between the US and China in the context, for instance, of 
an armed clash between China and Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands.30 However, by observing that there has traditionally been a ‘slow 
motion quality’ to Australia’s responses to changed strategic circumstances, 
Coral reminds us that White’s ‘China choice’ is quite unlikely to play out in the 
manner he describes, if indeed there is even a choice of that nature to be made 
at this present juncture in history.31
Indeed, rather than a stark choice occasioned by deepening strategic rivalry 
between the US and China, the next two to three decades is much more likely to 
involve a mix of cooperation and competition between these two heavyweights. 
Contemporary analytical frameworks for understanding the US–China 
relationship have thus far proven unable to anticipate and to accommodate 
these dynamics particularly well. Instead, they have tended to gravitate towards 
one of two opposing poles. At one end of the spectrum, pessimists such as 
John Mearsheimer and Aaron Friedberg point to the inevitability of strategic 
competition between the US and China.32 At the other, optimists such as Henry 
Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and White himself have instead pointed to the 
possibility of a power-sharing agreement between Beijing and Washington. This 
idea reached the peak of its popularity during the 2008–2009 global financial 
crisis in the form of calls for a ‘G2’.33
Developed during the 1960s, Coral’s concept of a ‘shadow condominium’ offers 
a ‘third way’ between these two diametrically opposing positions and one that 
is potentially better able to capture to competitive and cooperative dynamics of 
29 Bell, Dependent Ally, p. 176.
30 See, for example, Hugh White, ‘Australia’s Choice: Will the Land Down Under Pick the United States or 
China?’, Foreign Affairs, 4 September 2013. 
31 See Bell, Dependent Ally, p. 178.
32 See, for example, John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, WW Norton & Company, New 
York, 2001; and Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in 
Asia, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2011.
33 See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘The Group of Two That Could Change the World’, Financial 
Times, 14 July 2009.
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the emerging US–China relationship.34 Inspired by the dynamics of superpower 
diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis (which marked its fiftieth anniversary 
in the same year as Coral’s passing), the ‘shadow condominium’ that she referred 
to was a temporary power-sharing arrangement that emerged during periods of 
acute crisis engaging the interests of the two dominant powers. But once the 
danger had passed, this arrangement retreated ‘into the shadows of the future’ 
and default adversarial postures resumed.
Ever the optimist—albeit one with strong realist proclivities—Coral maintained 
that there was always a prospect for the condominium to re-emerge out of those 
shadows during times of deep crisis. In her view, periods of power transition are 
especially conducive to such arrangements because they are invariably dangerous 
and difficult. The primary function of the ‘shadow condominium’ during such 
periods is to provide stability through joint great power management of the 
balance of power.
In the context of Asia’s current power shift, the best evidence that Bell’s 1960s 
template applies aptly to US–China relations comes from the Korean Peninsula. 
To be sure, strategic competition between China and the US has been a perennial 
feature of security politics surrounding this flashpoint.35 Arguably of greater 
interest, however, has been the cooperation that has occurred between Beijing 
and Washington during periods of crisis.
In early 2003, following the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, for instance, 
Beijing and Washington worked to initiate three party talks with North Korea 
which subsequently morphed into a larger and moderately successful Six Party 
format. Again in 2006, in the midst of heightened tensions following North 
Korea’s first nuclear test, American and Chinese officials came together to bring 
North Korea back to the negotiating table.36 In 2010, following the North’s 
November bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, tensions heightened to the point 
where highly respected analysts such as Victor Cha pointed to the possibility 
of all out conflict between the two Koreas.37 By December, however, Beijing and 
Washington were again reportedly working together to create calm.38
This pattern recurred once more following the sudden death of North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-Il in late 2011. The US and China maintained very close contact 
34 Coral’s concept of a ‘shadow condominium’ is outlined in Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in 
Anglo-American Relations, Chatham House Essays No.3, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, pp. 108–113.
35 See Benjamin Schreer and Brendan Taylor, ‘The Korean Crises and Sino-American Rivalry’, Survival, vol. 
53, no. 1, February-March 2011, pp. 13–19.
36 For a useful summary of US–China cooperation during this period see Bonnie S Glaser and Wang Liang, 
‘North Korea: The Beginning of a China–US Partnership’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1, Summer 
2008, pp. 165–180.
37 Victor Cha, ‘What to do about N. Korean Aggression?’, The Chosun Ilbo (English edition), 6 December 
2010.
38 See Mark Landler, ‘China’s North Korea Shift Helps US Relations’, New York Times, 23 December 2010.
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in the aftermath of that event. Indeed, during a visit to Beijing at the time, 
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke in terms not inconsistent with 
Coral’s ‘shadow condominium’ concept when intimating that ‘I think the US 
and China share a strong determination to maintain peace and stability’.39
Will a US–China ‘shadow condominium’ manifest itself in the case of future 
strategic crises—in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or over Taiwan—if 
and when these emerge? Only time will tell. Yet aside from the fact that it was 
conceived by one of our great strategic intellectuals, Australian foreign and 
defence policy-makers might do well in the meantime to entertain and further 
explore the possibility.
First, it offers a more realistic way of thinking about US-China relations than a more 
formal, institutionalised power-sharing arrangement, such as the ‘G2’. Beijing 
and Washington simply do not share the same common values or compatible 
strategic cultures necessary to sustain an arrangement of that nature.40 Second, 
a US–China ‘shadow condominium’ will be more palatable to countries—
including Japan and India—who fear their potential marginalisation under a 
more formal US–China power-sharing arrangement because they read it as a step 
towards some mild form of world government. Finally, and most importantly, 
a US–China ‘shadow condominium’ is also a more attractive proposition than 
the intense and inherently unstable US–China strategic competition that some 
analysts predict, along with the stark strategic choices that such competition 
would likely imply for Australia.
39 US Department of State, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
‘Remarks to the Media on Departure at the Beijing Capital Airport’, 4 January 2012.
40 For a useful critique of the ‘G2’ concept see Elizabeth C Economy and Adam Segal, ‘The G2 Mirage: Why 
the United States and China are Not Ready to Upgrade Ties’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 3, May/June 2009, 
pp.14–23.
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10. Interpreting the Cold War
Michael Wesley
Coral Bell watched the Cold War take shape from one of ten offices in a building 
known as West Block, where Australia’s Department of External Affairs was 
accommodated during the 1940s and early 1950s. There is an old saying that 
even the greatest diplomats never lose the desk officer’s eye and fascination for 
the telling detail that hints at the big strategic picture; in all of Coral’s writings 
on the Cold War one can feel her attentive mind pouring over papers, opinion 
and quotes, the strategist-as-detective amassing the fine detail and the telling 
bon mots into a masterful narrative. That Coral’s first professional engagement 
with international affairs was as a practitioner had a lasting impact on her work; 
that this particular practitioner began watching the world as the reality of the 
Cold War became very real to Australia was to structure how she interpreted 
that conflict from beginning to end.
In her many writings on the Cold War, Coral always showed the practitioner’s 
sensitivity to the often galling realities of policy-making. For example, she 
instinctively sensed George Kennan’s frustration that, despite being in charge of 
Policy Planning in the State Department, he was prevented by security barriers 
from knowing America’s actual military strength, and thus was unable to make 
a clear judgement about the relationship between America’s commitments and 
capabilities.1 Coral’s practitioner’s view of the unfolding of the Cold War also 
contributed to her distinctly Anglo-centric view of the conflict. A striking thread 
of continuity through all of her writings on the Cold War is her determination 
to make the point that the free world was not led by America alone, but by 
an Anglo–American condominium. As David Lowe and Christopher Waters 
chronicle, the early years of the Cold War saw a resurgence of Anglophilia in 
Australia, which the Pacific War and the American alliance had eroded during 
the 1940s.2 Between 1948 and 1952, Australia’s strategic preoccupations changed 
from regional worries about Japan’s resurgence to global concerns about the 
Cold War—and to supporting the Anglo-American cause in the global struggle 
with communism. Coral was at pains to point out at several junctures that the 
eventually successful western strategy in the Cold War, from the Marshall Plan 
to the ‘scaffolding’ that became NATO to the integration of West Germany into 
the western alliance was as much London’s as Washington’s design. Indeed, 
1 Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962, 
p. 36.
2 David Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War, 1948–1954, UNSW Press, 
Sydney, 1999; Christopher Waters, The Empire Fracture: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s, Australian 
Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 1995.
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there is more than a hint of Harold Macmillan’s belief that Britain could play 
the tempering role of the ‘Greek’ nuance and intellectualism in strategy to the 
Americans’ ‘Roman’ muscle when she observed that the design for NATO was 
actually ‘a return to the long-standing British tradition of a continental alliance 
as the basis of a balance of power coalition against any new potential contender 
for European hegemony’.3
But none of this is to argue that Coral Bell was either a detail-mired pedant or a 
slavish Anglo-booster. What really emerges from her writings on the Cold War 
is the mind and judgements of a master strategist. Without being cased in the 
ponderous methodology or self-congratulatory philosophics of American and 
British international relations, the theoretical and conceptual gems that pepper 
her Cold War writings nestle amidst her elegant prose, guaranteed to cause the 
reader to pause and look into the middle distance regularly. Her wonderful 
use of level-of-analysis reasoning (without ever referring to that awful phrase) 
to distinguish between containment and negotiation-from-strength is one 
example.4 Her incisive contribution to alliance theory, in terms of a balance 
between ‘net producers’ and ‘net consumers’ of security, is another.5
Coral was also a thinker who had the uncanny knack of previewing debates and 
controversies decades before others were to use them to make their names. Her 
discussion of mutually-abrasive values systems arising from the empowerment of 
newly-independent states, particularly in the wake of the Khomeinist revolution 
in Iran, prefigured Bull’s and Watson’s writings and Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ by years.6 Similarly her considerations of the rise and origins of 
America’s neoconservatives, and their philosophical and policy differences from 
realists and liberals, preceded the arrival of the George W Bush administration 
by well over a decade.7 In retrospect, Coral’s clear and balanced discussion of 
the neo-cons, with its subtle undercurrent of irony, stands as still the best there 
is, even after the avalanche of analyses that accompanied the Bush years.
The Cold War was the conflict that animated Coral Bell’s writings. She pushed and 
probed at the confrontation, teasing out the inner logics of its grand strategies 
and concepts and subjecting them to the judgement of her incisive mind. Even 
when she confined herself to writing about Australia, she began and ended her 
3 Coral Bell, The Cold War in Retrospect: Diplomacy, Strategy and Regional Impact’, Working Paper no. 298, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra. 1996, p. 3.
4 Bell, Negotiation From Strength, p. 30.
5 ibid., pp. 172–173.
6 Coral Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue?, Canberra Studies in World Affairs, The 
Australian National University, no. 1, 1980, pp. 100–101
7 Coral Bell, The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1989, pp. 
5–12.
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analysis with the ‘central balance’.8 She never tried to set herself the task of 
writing a grand all-encompassing account of the Cold War, probably precisely 
because the practitioner in her knew such a task would see the telling detail be 
overwhelmed by the straitjacket of narrative; the scholar in her probably also 
knew that the analytical meat lay in isolating and investigating aspects of the 
bigger conflict. To my reading, Coral Bell interpreted the Cold War according 
to six broad preoccupations. Some of these preoccupations animate a single 
book or article. Others run through the long period of her scholarship, and 
with each return, a different aspect of the preoccupation is explored. Each on 
its own stands as a major contribution to Cold War scholarship; together they 
constitute a remarkable monument to understanding the defining stand-off of 
the twentieth century.
Democratic Alliances Versus Authoritarian 
Blocs
The earliest preoccupation in Coral Bell’s Cold War writing is with whether 
democracies in an alliance are able to muster the will, strength and flexibility to 
prevail in a contest with an authoritarian bloc. Negotiation From Strength can 
be read as an extended analysis of the disadvantages of democratic decision-
making and alliance management and strategising in an extended low-intensity 
confrontation such as the Cold War. Her ultimate conclusion is that, during 
the first decade of the Cold War, an alliance of democracies was unable to 
summon either the strength or to choose the right time to negotiate based on a 
judgement of the most favourable correlation of forces. While her apprehensions 
about the authoritarian advantage in strength and negotiation were inevitably 
to wane with the passing of the years, Coral’s sober pessimism about democratic 
strategising and alliance politics remained undimmed.
From the start, Coral regarded military alliances as a necessary weakness for 
the United States. While Washington needed a strategic foothold and eventual 
arsenal in western Europe, it bought these at the cost of difficult and at times 
all-consuming alliance relations. ‘There are’, she wrote,
two surprising things about the history of NATO. The first is that its 
strategic concepts have borne so little relation to the ostensible political 
or diplomatic ambitions of its members. The second is that though the 
states to whom was allotted the task of raising the forces proposed for 
the Central Front have included some of the most notable and successful 
8 Coral Bell, ‘The Central Balance and Australian Policy’ in Coral Bell (ed) Agenda for the Eighties: Contexts 
of Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1980.
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military powers in modern history … they have never succeeded in 
reaching actual force figures commensurate with even their minimal 
strategic objectives, … a politically dismaying demonstration of their 
inability to match intention and performance unless the knife is at their 
throats.9
For Coral, the problem had two parts: democracy and alliances. Each seemed to 
exacerbate the inability of the other to function effectively. Alliances seemed to 
mire strategy in a form of collective small-mindedness: ‘in the nature of things, 
the ability of an alliance to pursue a common policy is limited and conditional: 
limited and conditioned by the behavior of the putative enemy, the lowest 
common denominator of individual cost and the highest common denominator 
of individual interest’.10 Democracy on the other hand was the constant enemy 
of the strategist, be he Acheson, Dulles, Kissinger or Bzrezinski. Populism was 
heightened by the constant tension of the Cold War, forcing American policy-
makers towards decisions that brought strategic disadvantage. Democracy 
foregrounded morale and mood as the key ingredient of Cold War policy-
making: on reading Coral’s account of the psychological impact on America of 
the triple shocks of 1949—the communist victory in China, the Soviet nuclear 
test, and the discovery of communist spies in the American government—one is 
left in little doubt about the constraints under which the Truman administration 
was acting.11 
It was perhaps the difference in unity and resolve between the Cold War and 
the Second World War that was most dismaying. Coral was pessimistic about the 
‘political limitations on the ability of a government in a democracy to pursue 
an unpopular course of action in a period of less than immediate crisis’.12 The 
problem was that in conditions of crisis, ‘decisions had to be taken at great 
speed, with little leisure for reflection on the limits they might later impose on 
the negotiating position of the West’.13 In the final analysis, the West’s ability to 
build requisite strength in the Cold War’s first decade was the result of failures 
in leadership, the nature of democratic institutions, and the commitment to 
pluralistic decision-making within countries and across the alliance.14 On the 
other hand, the time at which it was most advantageous to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union from a position of comparative strength, Dulles was unable to do 
so because of the hyper-aroused state of the domestic political climate.
9 Bell, Negotiation from Strength, p. 46.
10 ibid., pp. 202–203.
11 ibid., pp. 76–77.
12 ibid., p. 47.
13 ibid., p. 47.
14 ibid., p. 191.
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Coral seemed to shift in her thinking over time about whether grand strategic 
coups were within the capacity of democracies. At the end of Negotiation From 
Strength she concludes that democratic strategising must be from necessity 
about pragmatism, the finding of least-worst outcomes, a ‘sophisticated 
Micawberism’.15 A couple of decades later, she was not so sure. Kissinger’s grand 
strategising as the animation of the policy of détente emerges as a case where 
a democracy considerably outpaces sophisticated Micawberism.16 Carter’s ‘sho 
‘nuff’ earnest idealism emerges as a more unfortunate example,17 while Reagan’s 
calculated bravura is judged more favourably.18
A Study in Competitive Psychology
Coral Bell’s intuitive power is best and repeatedly illustrated by her focus on 
issues and tendencies that at the time were not widely known or discussed, 
but which later became defining frameworks of analysis. One such remarkable 
example occurs late in Negotiation From Strength, in which her discussion of 
the competitive psychology of Cold War strategy clearly anticipates by nearly 
two decades Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s defining work on prospect 
theory and decision bias. While Kahneman and Tversky’s theories were based 
on painstaking empirical research, Coral comes to very similar conclusions 
based on sheer deductive intuition.
She begins with a careful discussion of the clear conceptual differences between 
status quo and revisionist strategies in the Cold War. Unlike Kissinger and others 
who were inclined to label entire foreign policies status quo or revisionist, 
Coral pointed out that there were elements of status quo-ism and revisionism 
in both American and Soviet policy. ‘There is a stronger unconscious element 
of revisionism in American foreign policy attitudes than Americans are usually 
prepared to perceive’, she wrote. That revisionism was the constant desire 
to make the world more compatible with American principles and interests. 
Soviet revisionism came from the same motivation. Negotiation from strength, 
in these terms, meant ‘an effort to improve the balance of military power, and 
to use your new position to seek a new status quo of a more satisfactory sort’.19 
But the revisionist policy of each threatened the status quo perceptions of the 
other; thus ‘issues like Berlin are obviously not only important in themselves 
but important as psychological rallying points. The status quo is physically 
expressed in a number of territorial arrangements, and the demand to change 
15 ibid., p. 189.
16 Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1977.
17 Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy.
18 Bell, The Reagan Paradox.
19 Bell, Negotiation from Strength, p. 201.
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one of them is heavy with psychological significance’.20 Therefore, ‘faced with 
the clear prospect of encroachment on its sphere of power by a dangerous enemy, 
a nation may stake its survival on resistance to that encroachment … especially 
in a period in which the memory of Munich has been invoked unceasingly to 
prove that whenever anything is conceded, everything is lost’.21
On accepting the Nobel Prize in 2002, Kahneman said that his and Tversky’s most 
important discovery was a pervasive decision bias they named ‘loss aversion’: 
the widespread human tendency to forego the chance of making a gain if taking 
that chance could also result in a loss. This had been detailed in a breakthrough 
article in 1979.22 Here is Coral Bell, writing in 1962: 
The prospect of loss is a stronger motive in international affairs, as in 
individual ones, than the hope of gain. This may not be logical, but it 
is reasonable enough. The powerful forces of anger and immediate fear 
reinforce calculation when loss is in question: where it is a matter of gain 
only a remoter fear can be enlisted to aid calculation, and a heavy inertia 
exists to dampen its schemes.23
So much depends on this insight into psychology: 
A rich and happy country like America will not stake much for the 
hypothetical advantages of increasing its sphere of power. … A 
revisionist policy likely to incur serious costs, even in the form of 
conventional warfare, would be difficult for a prosperous democracy 
to contemplate. … A revisionist policy backed solely by the power of 
a nuclear strike would surely be possible only in a pathological state of 
political opinion.24
Not content with this powerful insight into American motivations, Coral then 
applied it to the Soviet Union’s. While conceding that Moscow was status quo-
oriented in relation to its sphere of power in Eastern Europe, she argued that 
‘Russian power is, in aspiration, revisionist a l’outrance [in seeking] not only 
an ultimate total remaking of the power map of the world but a transformation 
of the nature of the whole society of states’.25 Moscow had discovered during 
the Suez Crisis, she argued, that by backing revolutionary urges in the Third 
World, it could invest in a revisionist policy with little threat to its status quo 
interests in Eastern Europe: ‘So there is a sense in which it can be said that the 
20 ibid., pp. 199–200.
21 ibid., p. 202.
22 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Making Under Risk’, 
Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2, March 1979, pp. 263–291.
23 Bell, Negotiation From Strength, p. 202.
24 ibid., p. 202.
25 ibid., p. 203.
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Russians have been able to use their air-atomic power as psychological backing 
for revisionist political objectives’.26 Ever on the outlook for the telling bon 
mot, one can sense Coral’s delight when she came across Khruschev’s quote in a 
Walter Lippmann interview that ‘the revolution is the status quo’.27
Two further complications add to the psychological disadvantage of the West 
in the competition with the Soviet bloc. The first is military technology, which 
has constricted decision parameters and response options: ‘the revolution in 
military technology has operated to displace status quo by revisionist intentions 
at a moment of crisis, since the military operations logically required merely to 
ensure national survival have become identical with those required by the most 
sweeping revisionism’.28 The second is the psychological effects of self- and 
other-images widespread among Americans: 
[T]he rather flattering and unrealistic persona that western opinion … 
constructs of its own character in international dealings—an essentially 
law-oriented, reasonable, even idealistic self-image—is not compatible 
with the degree of ruthlessness implied [by negotiation from strength]. 
Whereas the qualities we impute to the Russians, especially their alleged 
disregard for the human costs, even within Russia, is entirely compatible. 
Thus the West tends to be hoist with its own psychological warriors’ 
petard: the Cold War image of Russian society, constructed with some 
deliberation in the West, becomes in itself a means of diplomatic leverage 
to the Russians.29
A Game of Shifting Momentums
Whether discussing democratic passions, alliance politics or the complexities of 
competitive psychology, the hydrographic metaphor of momentum seemed never 
far from Coral Bell’s elbow. She talked from a very early stage about the shift in 
momentum within NATO from the United States to Europe, just as she observed 
Moscow’s pragmatic tilt behind the momentum of Third World radicalism and 
Western defensiveness. And it was a hydrographic sense of advantage and 
disadvantage that fired her implacable conviction of the folly of the Vietnam 
War. The war in Vietnam was for her a ‘painful and damaging misapplication 
of the strategy’ of containment: ‘The metaphor [for containment] always used, 
from the earliest days, was that of a dam, holding back relentless pressure. But 
26 ibid., p. 205.
27 ibid., p. 204.
28 ibid., p. 205.
29 ibid., pp. 212–213.
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what use is a dam if it is built on sand?’30 The conditions that existed in Vietnam, 
which were apparent at the time, meant ‘the “dam of containment” was always 
built on sand: politically, morally, militarily, even legally’.31
Coral’s critique of the Vietnam War offers a clue to her understanding of 
containment as a grand strategy of the Cold War. Containment was never about 
building a perimeter fence around the extent of world communism, but rather 
was about identifying and fortifying a set of points of strength to be prosecuted 
consistently.32 For Coral, strategy within containment must be based on a careful 
calculation of the balance-of-momentum: to make a stand at a point where the 
momentum is against you will result in a much more significant setback than just 
a tactical defeat. The hydrographic nature of the struggle meant that regional 
defeats like that in Vietnam could turn the momentum against the West in the 
central balance against the Soviet bloc.
It was unsurprising, then, that when Coral Bell looked back from the mid-1990s 
on the Cold War that had ended, that she relied heavily on a hydrographic 
metaphor of shifting advantage and disadvantage to tell the story of what 
happened.33 The first decade was defined by rapidly oscillating initiative on 
either side of Eurasia—first in Berlin, then in Korea. The second decade saw the 
Soviet bloc gain the initiative, particularly among the revolutionary forces in the 
Third World. The third decade saw the initiative flow back to the peripheries of 
the Western alliance through the economic ascendancy of Germany and Japan. 
This showed the apparent Soviet momentum to be hollow, by demonstrating 
that war-devastated capitalist economies were comprehensively out-performing 
their war-devastated communist counterparts. The fourth decade saw the 
momentum continue to shift towards the West despite what appeared on the 
surface to be a losing streak between 1965 and 1980; while the fifth decade 
saw the Soviet Union unravel as it desperately tried to rebalance the strategic 
momentum against it.
For Coral Bell, momentum was about structure and agency. There were some 
elements of momentum that just happened as a consequence of the forces of 
history: one example is the rise of Third World radicalism in the 1950s and 
1960s; another is the outbreak of revolutionary Islam in the 1970s and 1980s. 
But momentum for Coral—like fortuna for Machiavelli—is a force that needs to 
be understood and manipulated with wisdom and courage, lest it lead to ruin. 
To Coral’s mind, Stalin and Khruschev made crucial errors in overplaying their 
hands when they thought momentum was with them. Stalin’s obduracy led to a 
30 Bell, The Cold War in Retrospect, p. 8.
31 ibid., p. 9.
32 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security 
Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982.
33 Bell, The Cold War in Retrospect.
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tightening of the NATO alliance that would never have occurred without him;34 
while Khruschev’s cocksure shoe-pounding led Third World leaders to make 
ever more aggressive moves emboldened by the prospect of Soviet air support 
that never quite showed up.35 In the end, it was a B-grade actor’s sense of 
timing, messaging and proportion that harnessed building momentum without 
over-playing it, that brought an astonishingly sudden and peaceful end to the 
confrontation.36
Power Versus Values
The presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan stimulated in Coral Bell 
an interest in values as means and ends in the Cold War. Prior to the late 1970s 
and 1980s, the ideological aspect of the Cold War had interested her only insofar 
as they affected the power and resolve of the two sides. Thus democracy, while 
no doubt an important system of values for Coral personally, was for a long 
time of scholarly interest only in terms of how it affected the West’s capacity 
to act decisively and direct resources to strategic ends. Or when self-images 
of constitutionalism and moderation led to a psychological disadvantage in 
strategic manoeuver vis-à-vis an opponent depicted as authoritarian and deaf 
to the suffering of its own people.
But in Carter and Reagan the Cold War gained two primary protagonists who 
insisted at putting values to the fore. It was Carter and Reagan that brought to 
the fore the fact that the Cold War was a conflict played out on two planes—one 
between power systems, the other between values systems.37 Coral found the 
similarities between the two administrations as intriguing as their differences. 
In the end she judged the Reagan team’s ‘right-wing Utopianism’ to be the 
mirror image of the Carter administration’s ‘left-liberal Utopianism’.38 She was 
particularly intrigued that many of the neo-cons who became Reagan’s early 
cheer squad had begun their political lives on the radical left. 
Ultimately, however, there is little doubt that Coral Bell saw the power conflict 
as the primary contest, the values conflict as secondary. Despite the rising 
emphasis on values in the West, on both the right and left, ‘the maintenance of 
the Western value-system, which proposes those ideals among others [that is, 
human rights, development], depends in the last analysis on the maintenance 
of its power-position vis-à-vis adversaries proposing alternate values systems’.39 
34 ibid., p. 17.
35 Bell, Negotiation from Strength, p. 213.
36 Bell, The Reagan Paradox.
37 Bell, President Carter’s Foreign Policy, p. 100.
38 Bell, The Reagan Paradox, p. 139.
39 Bell, President Carter’s Foreign Policy, p. 2.
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For Coral, Kissinger had prioritised the power contest over the values contest to 
great effect—including for the West’s cause in the contest of values, as enshrined 
in the Helsinki Final Act.40 Carter prioritised value-system conflict and ended up 
losing on both planes. On the power-plane, while an emboldened Soviet Union 
went on the offensive in the Americas, Asia and Africa, the West lost crucial 
allies in Iran and Ethiopia. On the values-plane Carter found himself forced into 
a range of compromising choices, including upholding the Khmer Rouge’s right 
to Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations.41 Reagan too found values to be a cruel 
mistress, leading him to embarrassment in Iran and Nicaragua.42
Ultimately, Coral believed values were a dangerous commodity as an ends or a 
means in the Cold War. Power is cold and passionless; conflicts over power can 
be divided, bargained, negotiated. ‘Value-oriented foreign policy’, on the other 
hand, ‘usually tends to make international relations more abrasive than a power-
oriented diplomacy, because on the whole it is more difficult to compromise 
values than to divide or offset power’.43 In the rise of Khomeini, Coral could 
foresee a post-ideological age of values conflict, centred around religion and 
cultures. She wondered about the consequences of the possible rise of Indian, 
Japanese and African value systems driven by the same intensity as Khomeini’s 
Iranian revolution, for the future of world order.
For Coral, the discussion of power came easier than the discussion of values. It 
was as if power was a more workable medium for her mind. Perhaps her most 
acute encapsulation of the grand strategies of the Cold War came in the midst 
of her discussion of one of the most values-driven American administrations:
All recent Administrations in Washington have had in essence two basic 
tasks in international politics. First, managing the adversary relationship 
with the Soviet Union so that it produces neither war nor Soviet victory 
without war; and secondly, managing a set of relationships with the 
rest of the world which have inescapably become those of reduced US 
paramountcy.44
She could have easily extended the same analysis to the strategic goals of the 
Soviet Union, and thereby neatly summarised the whole of the Cold War.
40 Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente.
41 Bell, President Carter’s Foreign Policy, p. 93.
42 Bell, The Reagan Paradox.
43 Bell, President Carter’s Foreign Policy, p. 100.
44 Bell, The Reagan Paradox, p. 141.
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Words Versus Actions
The Reagan Paradox is to my reading the most systematic of Coral Bell’s analyses. 
It begins with an analytical framework that contrasts declaratory policy from 
operational policy, a distinction that was suggested to her by an article written 
by Paul Nitze on the foreign policy of John Foster Dulles in the 1950s. Both 
declaratory signalling—the spoken intent of a government—and operational 
signalling—the actual actions of a government—are important in the strategic 
dialogue that occurs between adversaries and allies. Although she plainly sees 
operational policy as the real thing (she re-uses a French adage that ‘the soup 
is never eaten as hot as it is cooked’ to observe, ‘The hot soup of declaratory 
policy … is necessarily cooled a bit by the breath of pragmatism before 
it is served as policy’45), she is clearly intrigued by the real-world effects of 
declaratory signalling. While the focus on declaratory signalling by the Reagan 
administration is explicit, it is by no means the first time it caught Coral’s 
attention. As far back as Negotiation From Strength she was intrigued at the real 
strategic payoffs that accrued to the Soviet Union in the Third World from its 
sabre-rattling during the Suez Crisis.46
Coral argued that both declaratory and operational signalling were crucial to 
the Cold War’s dynamics because they informed the expectations that each side 
had of the other, which in turn were incorporated into assessments of the costs 
and risks that informed the policy decisions of each side. More specifically, 
operational and declaratory signals provided the best impression of each side of 
the other’s will. This was even more the case in the dawning ‘age of surveillance’ 
of the 1970s and 1980s, because ‘the remaining ambiguities of the power balance 
are mostly in the area of will rather than capacity, and declaratory signals tend 
to determine the image of will which each group of adversary decision-makers 
forms of the other’.47
The distinction between declaratory and operational signalling was used by 
Coral to explain the paradoxical success of the Reagan administration in bringing 
on the reforms in the Soviet Union that eventually led to its collapse. She argued 
that it was Reagan’s uncompromising declaratory signalling, from his quips 
about the next world war to his ‘evil empire’ rhetoric, that forced Moscow into a 
strategic corner, unable to compete and unwilling to concede. On the other hand, 
Reagan’s mild and conciliatory operational signalling prevented the competition 
from boiling over into open confrontation, and prepared the ground for a new 
and terminal period of détente. Ultimately, the most effective declaratory signal 
was the ‘Star Wars’ missile defence program, which Coral argued the Soviets 
45 ibid., p. 7.
46 Bell, Negotiation from Strength, pp. 204–205. 
47 Bell, The Reagan Paradox, p. 23.
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over-interpreted thanks to their own defence doctrine: ‘Soviet standard military 
doctrine teaches that a strategic defensive move must be linked with a strategic 
offensive concept to conduce to victory. Therefore, Soviet analysts were more 
likely than Western ones to see a coherent strategic offensive design behind the 
defensive shield President Reagan kept talking of’.48
Ultimately, Coral’s analysis of the differential effects of Reagan’s words and deeds 
on Soviet calculations is unconvincing. It is hard to see why a confrontation-
seasoned Politburo would have been simultaneously calmed by mild operational 
signalling while at the same time panicked by Reagan’s tough-guy declaratory 
rhetoric. But even if one is unconvinced of her specific argument, it remains 
that one is still greatly enriched in having followed her reasoning and been 
challenged by her insights.
The Cold War as a Stage
Ultimately, it is impossible to read Coral Bell’s writing on the Cold War and not 
be beguiled by the cast of characters she assembles: the wise, the cunning, the 
gormless, the bombasts. Perhaps the most persistent theme of her Cold War 
writing was to see that overarching conflict as a crucible in which policy-makers’ 
character, judgement, luck and guile were put to the test. There are glimpses of 
consideration of structural forces in her work; she admits that ‘the comparative 
quiet of the first Reagan term could have been seen as a natural consequence 
of Soviet activism in the Carter years. Reagan, in other words, then enjoyed the 
good fortune of Carter’s bad fortune’.49 But these are just glimpses. For Coral Bell 
the Cold War was ultimately a Shakespearean test of the mettle of statesmen.
Coral is as pitiless at assigning blame as she is generous in giving credit. Thus 
Stalin emerges repeatedly as the great bungler, overreaching in Europe and Korea 
and ensuring an implacable Western alliance and an isolated and increasingly 
weak Soviet bloc that will lose the Cold War. Repeatedly she wonders what 
would have happened had Stalin, rather than Roosevelt, died in 1945. On the 
other hand, there are those she admires. Ernest Bevin joins Kennan, Acheson, 
Dulles and Kissinger as the wise strategists who charted the West’s course 
through the conflict. She is much less kind to the members of the Carter and 
Reagan administrations; in the end the positive momentum established by both 
appears more the result of Soviet over-reach than an American Svengali.
Despite her attention to the hard politics and strategic choices of the Cold War, 
Coral Bell was always attentive to the winners and losers. Repeatedly she asks 
48 ibid., p. 35.
49 ibid., p. 53.
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who won and who lost from a particular passage of the confrontation. Winners 
and losers could be alliance systems or countries; at other times she was very 
attentive to the women of Iran under the Khomeinist revolution. It was these 
considerations that bring home the fact that for Coral Bell the Cold War was 
always a personal, human consideration. It was probably a conviction that 
began as the confrontation started, in one of those ten rooms in West Block.
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11. Coral Bell and the Conventions of 
Crisis Management
 Robert Ayson
There aren’t many deep works of international relations theory in the short 
bibliography at the end of Coral Bell’s 1972 book The Conventions of Crisis.1 
Perhaps the most theoretically demanding are Oran Young’s two books on the role 
of third parties and bargaining in crises. There is one book on strategic theory, 
Herman Kahn’s masterfully unusual On Escalation as well as William Kaufman’s 
study of The McNamara Strategy. Of the remaining entries several consist of 
approachable works on the evolution of international politics, including EH 
Carr’s famous work on The Twenty Years Crisis, Walter Lippmann’s short early 
study of The Cold War and AJP Taylor’s popular history of the Origins of the 
Second World War. Perhaps most significantly of all there are three memoirs 
from leading American foreign policy makers: the memoirs of Dean Acheson 
and George Kennan and also Robert Kennedy’s recollection of the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis.
The reader might think that the contents of Bell’s bibliography were simply a 
consequence of timing. Still to come, for example, were the big debates between 
the neo-realists and neo-liberals which would trap generations of students in a 
powerful but often lifeless intellectual universe. But I don’t think that timing 
explains it at all. Bell’s work belonged to that set of writing which concerned 
itself with the ideas that could be gleaned from the practice of international 
diplomacy. That made her more of a commentator than a theorist, but an 
exceptionally adroit commentator at that. 
This initial judgment relies partly on personal experience. I don’t actually have 
strong memories at all of the first time I heard Coral Bell speak. I wish I did, 
because the subject she was asked to lecture on as part of the core strategic 
studies course I was taking at The Australian National University (ANU) in 1988 
was none other than ‘Crisis Diplomacy’. But I do remember in that same year 
repeated instances of spotting the author of The Conventions of Crisis very much 
at home in the Department of International Relations Reading Room which 
in those days received copies of what I think was Bell’s main source of daily 
inspiration. This was not International Organization or International Security, 
and certainly not the often brutally quantitative International Studies Quarterly 
1 See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, Oxford University Press for 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1971, p. 125.
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all of which were held in bound volumes. It was not even the more approachable 
British journal International Affairs. It was instead a daily publication, The 
International Herald Tribune, a newspaper kept on racks in that room in the HC 
Coombs Building and which Bell digested each morning along with a mug of tea 
and an obligatory biscuit. 
This International Herald Tribune habit (stronger perhaps than most other 
addictions known to modern science and even to The Australian National 
University) was purposeful. Bell was a close student of the interactions between 
the major powers of the day which in those closing years of the 1980s dealt with 
the last phases of the Cold War. Reading the latest American pronouncements 
on foreign policy, watching the reports of the meetings between Soviet and 
American leaders, and seeing how the increasingly less significant European 
leaders and the increasingly important Asian leaders were responding, revealed 
important ingredients for Bell’s assessments. This became especially interesting 
when the occasional crisis would still occur in these relations. 
Rather than imposing theoretical straitjackets onto international politics, Coral 
Bell’s approach was to let the record of the practice of modern international 
relations gently indicate patterns of behaviour which illustrated the workings 
of the system of sovereign states: ‘the results of a piece of crisis management’, 
she argues, ‘can only be observed in history, not established by theory. That 
does not mean that no theory is possible: only that theory is the stepchild of 
the activity, rather than its parent’.2 The footnote to this passage underlines 
Bell’s aversion to formal modelling, a characteristic noticeable among nearly all 
the contributors to the discussions of the British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics, of which she was already a member: ‘techniques like game 
theory, content analysis, operational research, systems analysis, and simulation 
theory already have been in use for long enough to have demonstrated their 
limitations as well as their occasional (and marginal) usefulness.’3 
That aversion to formality, a common characteristic among those scholars who 
were influenced by Martin Wight, was also evident in Bell’s assessment of the 
foundations of crisis management. ‘I shall be preoccupied with conventions 
rather than rules, laws, theories, or institutions’ she advises her readers, ‘because 
these more ambitious concepts have not seemed to show much advantage in the 
situations I have examined.’ And, in a blow for the true believers in global 
governance via organisational endeavour, she continues this passage with the 
judgement that ‘Formal institutions like the UN have only been marginally 
and occasionally useful; many of the more successful modes of management 
have been strikingly non-legal, even anti-legal in quality; moral considerations 
2 ibid., p. 6.
3 ibid., p. 6, n4.
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have been no more decisive than legal ones, theory has been less apparent 
than intuition.’ This helps to explain the rather selective bibliography alluded 
to above. But what then was crisis management to rely on: what approaches 
could possibly be left to utilise? The end of this same paragraph in the second 
page of the book reveals Bell’s answer: ‘What has emerged is the growth of 
conventions—I use this term in the normal sense of a practice based on tacit 
expectation as to what is “understood behaviour”, of no special moral or legal 
sanctity, in a particular society’.4 
The idea of a convention or pattern of behaviour which if shared could constitute 
a tacit (rather than an explicit or formal) agreement is not uncommonly found in 
the work of another British Committee member, Hedley Bull. But it is not his line: 
the inspiration comes from Thomas Schelling, a significant contributor to the 
argument that order in modern international politics depended upon informal 
agreements much more often than formal government. In the British end of this 
discussion (for Schelling was an American and, unlike Bell’s favourite trans-
Atlantic scholars, someone who used game theory to explain his arguments), 
the main contribution would come five years later with Bull’s The Anarchical 
Society.5 In that text, Bull argues that there is a series of institutions which 
provide a semblance of order for the international society of sovereign states. 
As we have already seen, Bell argues that her approach favours conventions over 
institutions, but it is not quite clear that these are mutually exclusive options. 
Of the five such institutions posited by Hedley Bull, only one, international 
law, can be excluded from our analysis and unless I am mistaken, makes little 
appearance in Bell’s work as a whole. But the other four all play a part, both in 
Conventions as a book and in Bell’s work more generally. The first is diplomacy. 
Here rather than grab this institution holus bolus, Bell indicates she has identified 
a particular gap that needs to be filled by the present study: ‘Undoubtedly crisis 
management should be considered just a special skill within the general field 
of diplomacy. … Diplomatic history recounts many such crises, but does not 
generalize about crisis as such’.6 And yet the remainder of the volume makes 
so many references to the political interactions between the major players in 
international affairs, as does so much of Bell’s work that it is undeniable that 
diplomacy is at the forefront. 
But as with the rest of her work, Bell is not just interested in diplomacy between 
any old set of countries. Her focus, she announces, will be squarely on the 
interactions between the ‘dominant powers’ which she defines as the ‘the 
powers that move and shake the world’ of which at present there were ‘only 
4 ibid., p. 2.
5 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1977.
6 Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, p. 4.
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three—America, Russia and China.’ Bell excludes Japan from this list; it belongs 
in her view to the wider grouping of great powers, a ‘traditional term’ which 
she chooses not to use.7 But that she then suggests that there were seven such 
‘dominant powers’ in the interwar years; ‘Germany, Britain, France, America, 
Russia, Japan, and Italy’ indicates that she is indeed talking about the great 
powers, which comprise another one of Bull’s five institutions for international 
order. 
As the movers and shakers, it is the dominant powers which have the unique 
ability to turn local crises into central ones, a facility whose importance grows 
because of a relatively new ingredient in their relations: the arrival of nuclear 
weapons. Hence Bell’s argument that she will be ‘preoccupied with crises 
affecting the powers of the central nuclear balance, because the policy choices 
of their decision-makers have consequences of such gravity.’8 That explains 
the omission of ‘great power’ Japan, whose lack of nuclear weapons Hedley 
Bull sometimes argued denied it a place in even that category. And it offers 
a connection to the two other institutions that feature in Bull’s anarchical 
international society. One, mentioned discreetly in this passage is the balance 
of power, which in the Cold War often became synonymous with the nuclear 
balance. Bell suggests to her readers that she has already dealt with the question 
in her earlier book, Negotiation from Strength, one of many studies she says 
had been devoted to the question of ‘the stabilization of the central balance of 
power’.9 But this feature of contemporary international relations still acts as the 
background issue for almost all that is to come in Conventions. 
Why that should be the case is revealed by the last of Hedley Bull’s institutions 
which is war. It may seem nonsensical that in an age of nuclear armaments, war 
could be part of the management of any crisis, for surely it would mean the end 
of everything. But Coral Bell for one did not believe that as a genus, war had 
been made extinct in the nuclear age: ‘War as an institution flourishes as robustly 
as ever it did: there have been about eighty sets of armed encounters of an 
identifiable sort in what is usually called the post-war period’.10 Slightly earlier 
she notes her agreement with the argument that ‘The propensity to conflict must 
be accepted as a continuing fact of human life, even though, among nations, 
the technical means for pursuing conflicts are now so monstrously efficient as 
to threaten the end of human life itself.’11 And this dual fact—the ubiquity of 
war and the hazards of its most potent form—explained the point and purpose 
of crisis management. This was not an art designed to remove crises, let alone 
war in totality. Because that might be called crisis elimination. It was to manage 
7 ibid., p. 7.
8 ibid., p. 7.
9 ibid., p. 1.
10 ibid., p. 5.
11 ibid., p. 6.
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the situation in such a way that local brushfires did not, through the careless 
involvement of the dominant powers, become all-out infernos. In that sense 
crisis management was akin to the arms control logic that both Schelling and 
Bull had outlined a decade before whose job was to effect restraint in conflict 
rather than its avoidance.12 As Bell herself argued, ‘A sense of the permanence 
of conflict, and the probability of crisis, between nations is the only adequate 
incentive to serious work on managing crises and limiting the destructiveness 
of the armed hostilities they make evoke’.13 
Here Bell was contributing to a tradition of thinking that the international 
system did not suddenly grind to a halt as soon as force was used: diplomacy 
did not stop as soon as the firing started, but could continue into it. However, 
now that nuclear weapons were on the scene, the appearance of catastrophic 
war would be a sign that the management of this state system had failed. To 
study the management of crises was therefore to study the crisis points, decision 
points or turning points (terms Bell uses) between the conflict situations which 
were only to be expected and the catastrophes which had to be avoided. And it 
was a particular turning point, which fortunately had gone the right way, that 
was responsible for the rise of the art of crisis management: the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The conscious effort to maintain a stable balance (as opposed to the more 
or less accidental turn of events beforehand—also observed by Bull) had been 
more noticeable since 1962, and thus The Conventions of Crisis is its record over 
the first decade of practice.
At the risk of artificially reducing her work to a single focus, it might therefore 
be said that Coral Bell’s main interest was the way that the practice of a special 
form of diplomacy manages the central balance between the great powers so as 
to preclude the catastrophic war that would end the inevitably conflict-ridden 
system of states. If there is any doubt that Bell’s focus here is the avoidance of 
Armageddon and not the promotion of universal peace, that uncertainty goes 
away immediately when in the first paragraph of The Conventions of Crisis Coral 
Bell asks:
[H]ow is it that peace has been preserved since 1945? What are the 
modes of behaviour which have prevented the endemic crises of the 
postwar period from turning into central wars? (I speak of central war 
because limited and peripheral wars have been a fairly constant feature 
of the time).14 
12 The author considers these in Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science, Frank 
Cass, London, 2004 and Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012.
13 Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, p. 6.
14 ibid., p. 1.
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Crisis Management not Problem Solving
Coral Bell had an unsettling habit of proffering rather innocuous and roundabout 
examples of the very serious practices of international relations that she was 
writing about. She does this by giving as an example of a convention, ‘the taboo 
on eating peas from one’s knife.’15 And she also invents some rather genteel 
metaphors—the crisis slide when multiple tensions produce a cumulative effect, 
as in the years immediately preceding the First and Second World Wars, and 
alternatively the placement of a second crisis on the ‘backburner’ while the 
first was being dealt with, an approach which she argues was applied to the 
Laos crisis of the early 1960s when there was already a major crisis occurring 
in nearby Vietnam.16 I’m not sure whether these metaphors did more to obscure 
or illustrate the deadly serious points Bell was making. But the second of them 
is a reflection of the philosophy that she took to her subject while the first is an 
indication of her objective.
There was absolutely nothing wrong in Bell’s view with the backburner strategy. 
In fact there was a lot to be said for it. Sometimes the attempt to address a crisis 
head-on could be counterproductive, and that risk was multiplied if the intent 
was to resolve it. When the cause of a crisis is especially intractable, and here Bell 
uses the ongoing example of the contest between Greece and Turkey for Cyprus, 
any hope of a real solution only rests with fools. In such conflicts: ‘No diplomatic 
formula is going to make them disappear: they have to be lived with’.17 In that 
knowledge, the dominant powers needed to be extremely cautious about getting 
involved, and needed to resist the temptation of dreaming that they could be 
successful mediators. Bell notes that in this particular case, a series of leading 
American leaders had tried, including Dean Acheson and Cyrus Vance, but she 
offers the following warning: ‘If people assume that these mediators have failed, 
it is because they do not distinguish between crisis management and conflict 
resolution. They expect crisis management to “solve” the Cyprus situation in 
some magical fashion’.18 
Crisis management was not about solving the problem at the root of the crisis, it 
was about ensuring that the crisis did not get worse—or amalgamate with other 
crises into the crisis slide that had preceded catastrophic conflict twice already 
in the twentieth century. A crisis manager was a person who helped their 
country survive the massive test that a crisis could pose to a relationship—this 
could be a relationship between opposing dominant powers where the risk was 
a passage from peace into war, or it could be an ‘intramural’ relationship within 
15 ibid., p. 2.
16 ibid., pp. 19, 90.
17 ibid., p. 93. 
18 ibid., p. 93. 
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an alliance where the risk was an alliance rupture. ‘To my mind’, writes Bell 
early on in the book, ‘the essence of a true crisis in any given relationship is that 
the conflicts within it rise to a level which threatens to transform the nature of 
the relationship’.19 
This meant that Bell was no enemy of the status quo in international politics, 
so long as that status quo was not full of dominant powers who sought to 
revolutionise the basis of their relations with one another. She had concerns 
that of her three dominant powers China, which had not properly escaped the 
Cultural Revolution, but which had an earlier history of more cautious behaviour, 
remained a revisionist actor on the international scene. But as she was writing 
her book in between Henry Kissinger’s visit to China and the subsequent trip 
to see Mao that President Nixon would lead, Bell thought that ‘the process of 
establishment of tacit understandings, already far advanced between America 
and Russia, appeared to be developing surprisingly fast between America and 
China’.20 Moreover even if China was to misbehave, it would be outweighed 
by the preponderance of power which ‘for a long time to come is likely to rest 
with the tacit understanding between the USA and the Soviet Union. And this 
I regard as conducive to peace’.21 
In fact Bell went as far to suggest that this preponderance was reminiscent of the 
European Concert22 which, in siding with the generous view (and in omitting 
the mid-nineteenth century wars in Crimea and western Europe) she saw as 
responsible for keeping the peace for the best part of the century. The European 
Concert thus becomes under Bell’s treatment a long-lasting crisis management 
arrangement. This point of comparison confirms her preference for the status 
quo and for the notion that order rests with the interactions of an elite group of 
great powers. In those tea and biscuit sessions in the Coombs Building with the 
International Herald Tribune, I suspect she was considering whether the leaders 
of the day were measuring up to the standards of Metternich and Castlereagh. 
But unlike their European predecessors (whose record was trampled in the 
first half of the twentieth century), Bell thought that the crisis managers of 
the dominant powers in the post-war era had some inbuilt advantages. Hedley 
Bull, who also harked back at times to the record of the Concert, would have 
called these accidents of history. One was the arrival of nuclear weapons and 
the mutual deterrence that in significant numbers they provided for. Almost 
undoubtedly borrowing an idea from Thomas Schelling (to whom she refers 
a little later in the book), Bell argues that the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and the United States can be characterised as a massive ‘exchange of 
19 ibid., p. 9. 
20 ibid., p. 122. 
21 ibid., p. 68.
22 ibid., p. 69.
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hostages’.23 This mutual vulnerability provided a constant reminder of the need 
to show restraint in times of crisis. That restraint in turn was made more plausible 
by another child of modern military technology: the knowledge of one another’s 
military capabilities that advanced systems of surveillance provided. This 
made it less likely for crisis slides to be encouraged by either an exaggeration 
or underestimation of the capabilities held by a potential combatant. Just as 
Britain’s underestimation of Soviet capabilities before the Second World War 
had reduced London’s view of the value that an alliance with Moscow might 
bring, in Bell’s view its exaggeration of German capabilities had also led to the 
crisis slide towards the events of 1939.24 That was now less likely. 
But crisis management was a conscious process. It did not occur accidentally 
thanks to new technology and to what others had called the balance of terror. 
Perhaps the biggest advantage the major participants in the Cold War had over 
their First and Second World War equivalents was their early admission that 
their relationship was in fact an adversarial one. Like members of the local 
branch of the Alcoholics Anonymous, their acceptance of the problem was the 
foundation for hope that things could improve. For Bell this admission had 
come as early as 1946, and it was certainly there in the Truman Doctrine of the 
following year.25 With that early recognition comes hope that in the early stages 
of their Cold War relationship the Russians and Americans were aware of the 
things that divided them. 
But that itself gave no guarantee that they would work together in what Bell calls 
an ‘adverse partnership’, a term she borrows from the American specialist on 
Soviet affairs Marshall Shulman. That partnership would not reflect the notion 
that the dominant powers enjoyed a relationship that was ‘particularly cordial, 
trusting, or friendly’. Instead, in words that again evoke Schelling (and his main 
interpreter for British audiences Hedley Bull), Bell depicts the partnership as 
consisting of a ‘consciousness between the dominant powers, that they have 
solid common interests as well as sharp conflicting interests’.26 And it had taken 
the crisis of all Cold War crises, the one in Cuba, to get the two main dominant 
powers fully aware of their need to manage the relationship they had with one 
another. 
23 ibid., p. 52.
24 ibid., pp. 56–57.
25 ibid., pp. 21–24.
26 ibid., p. 50.
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Signalling not Fighting?
How then would the dominant powers conduct that crisis management? What 
would be their weapons of choice? That second question is asked as a teaser, 
because the costs of direct war between the dominant powers were so great that 
it might seem that armed forces had become redundant. Indeed Bell herself offers 
an opinion in the later stages of the book that crisis may eventually take the 
place of war as a mechanism for change. Indeed a crisis, if ‘properly managed … 
may ultimately enable states to write their peace treaties without first fighting 
the war’.27 That makes crisis management the friend of the status quo in terms of 
the absence of a breakdown in peace. It also makes it a colleague of the presence 
of peaceful change. 
But it does not mean that questions of force have been removed from the 
picture. Bell’s nominee for the main mechanism for crisis management is the 
signal, and many of these signals have as their subject the role of armed force in 
the adversarial partnership. Again the arguments of Schelling seems to be rather 
to the front of Bell’s mind: ‘the basic instrument of crisis management’, she 
advises her readers, ‘is what I shall call the signal.’ (She was not alone in doing 
that). And ‘By signal I mean a threat or offer communicated to the other party 
or parties to the crisis’.28 In the threat side of that signalling register, Bell admits 
later on (and now with citations of Schelling’s opinions) that crisis management 
relies heavily on coercion.29 Her defence that especially in an era of nuclear 
weapons, coercion may be ‘the least of a number of evils’30 confirms that her eye 
is on the practicable and not the perfectable. 
What sort of coercion then does Bell rely on? Not for her are economic sanctions 
of which she has a low opinion.31 She sticks to her guns: ‘Some of the sharpest 
and most effective [signals] are movements of military resources of various 
sorts’.32 Even the limited use of force can act as a potent form of communication: 
‘Border hostilities themselves are a kind of signal’.33 This is Schelling’s diplomacy 
of violence,34 delivered in a more historically and politically aware fashion. 
Similar too is Bell’s argument that the adverse partnership between the Soviet 
Union and United States was based in part on a ‘common strategic ideology’ 
which included a ‘tacit consensus’ on how particular weapons systems should 
27 ibid., p. 116.
28 ibid., p. 73.
29 ibid., pp. 100–101.
30 ibid., p. 100.
31 ibid., p. 77.
32 ibid., p. 73.
33 ibid., p. 74.
34 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.
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be understood and a ‘tacit understanding’ of how they might be employed.35 
Bell also speaks of a stabilising commonality in thinking brought on by an 
exchange of ideas across the Iron Curtain: ‘if you ask who is the Soviet version 
of Schelling or Kahn or Wohlstetter, the answer is probably Schelling or Kahn 
or Wohlstetter, even though the doctrine may be mediated through Sokolovsky 
or Talensky or Rotmistrov.’36 
This is just the sort of statement that would cause the analysts of Soviet strategic 
culture, who would soon be publishing their research,37 to have kittens. In 
portraying this extent of symmetry in Soviet–American strategic behaviour 
Bell may have been getting beyond what the evidence would support, although 
she was by no means alone in doing so. What is striking is that she holds to 
these views of strategic communication and signalling in the early 1970s by 
which time America’s experience in Vietnam had dealt this style of reasoning a 
blow from which it would never completely recover. This does not mean that 
signalling has become obsolete as a strategic practice: it is all too evident (and 
not necessarily in the service of a partnership) in China–US interactions in Asia 
today. But after Vietnam confidence in exploiting what Schelling famously 
called the power to hurt dropped markedly (by which time his own work was 
exploring different subjects).
It is doubly interesting that Coral Bell stuck with this view even though she 
too held Vietnam to be an unmitigated tragedy for American policy and as such 
the most obvious reminder that intervention ‘in the civil wars of minor powers’ 
is a practice that dominant powers should ‘avoid at all costs’.38 Vietnam stood 
as a costly failure in crisis management above all because ‘the decision-makers 
concerned did not keep sight of their first principle: that political ends should 
maintain ascendancy over military means in crisis decision-making’.39 (Crisis 
managers needed to be good Clausewitzians). That danger had been aggravated 
by another technological innovation, the advent of the ‘television “global 
village”’ thanks to which ‘domestic revulsion against a remote war has certainly 
never before in history been as politically effective as it has been in America over 
the Vietnam War’.40 Bell thought this disjuncture so serious (and so paralysing) 
that ‘Western participation in counter-insurgency operations must in future be 
ruled out as unfeasible for domestic political reasons, unless the moral case is 
absolutely watertight, which it seldom is in international politics’.41 This bears 
some reflection in 2014 as the West comes out of another period of intervention 
35 Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, pp. 59–60.
36 ibid., p. 61.
37 For the leading example, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, 
R- 2154-AF, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1977.
38 Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, pp. 107–108.
39 ibid., p. 109.
40 ibid., p. 104–105.
41 ibid., p. 105.
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(this time in Iraq and Afghanistan). It is also intriguing against the findings of 
a striking new study of contemporary war, War from the Ground Up, which 
argues that the spread of information technology (the social media variant of 
the ‘global village’) brings forth a multitude of new audiences to whom strategic 
messages must be communicated effectively. But unlike Bell, this new book 
posits this as a reminder of how war needs to be waged rather than as a prime 
reason for its avoidance.42 I think on this question my money is with the author 
of The Conventions of Crisis. 
Conclusion: Strategic Elitism? 
Instead of war from the ground up, Bell’s work is clearly a case of the diplomacy 
of crisis management from the top down. Her view of international order relies 
almost completely on a small elite of decision-makers in each of the very small 
number of dominant powers, the United States, Russia and China. It is the 
interactions within these adverse partnerships (for none of them are close pals) 
where the hopes for successful crisis management really rest. She does of course 
admit the category of intramural crisis management between allies, including 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, but she relegates these to secondary importance. Bell 
was no sentimentalist for the British Empire and its descendants in the British 
Commonwealth in this respect. At one point she describes Britain, India and 
Australia all as ‘minor powers’.43 One alliance really did matter, though. This 
was NATO, where the European powers, including nuclear-armed Britain 
and France had some sway in shaping the views and decision-making of the 
dominant power. But NATO was the exception to the rule. Most of the western 
alliances were ‘like ANZUS, with the United States allied to one or two powers 
of small military strength and no great diplomatic leverage or experience’.44 
There were no favours for present-day advocates of Australia as a middle power 
here. Indeed, while most of the book was written at The Australian National 
University, Bell felt no need to be a spruiker for the country of her birth. 
In The Conventions of Crisis, and I think in her other writings, Bell is part of 
an intellectual elite speaking to other elites, including contemporary decision-
makers. Even the metaphors assume an affinity for a group of people who can 
speak about threats of enormous violence as if they were hands played in a calm 
but serious game of bridge. That possibly also helps explain the links Bell seeks 
to draw between the Concert of Europe and the Cold War, which on at least 
two occasions she says had received too much of a ‘bad press’, misunderstood 
42 See Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up, Hurst, London, 2012.
43 Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, p. 68.
44 ibid., p. 91.
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as a ‘prelude to hostilities rather than a substitute’ for them.45 The elitism also 
extends to the political actors she admits and dismisses. There is almost no sign 
at all (and in fact I think none at all) of non-state actors in her main study of 
crisis management. Later on in her career, when she admits Al-Qaeda and its 
ilk into her discussion of the world’s strategic problems, the analytical function 
of the non-state actor is to provide a common point of threat which will allow 
a new international concert of powers to emerge against it. She was ruthlessly 
state-centric even in her evaluation of actors other than states. I suspect that 
also was a reason for her questioning of the significance of the United Nations. 
Strategic elitism is not without its virtues. The notion of three dominant powers, 
for example, has the advantage of parsimony which some of Bell’s colleagues 
have found very suitable in their own analysis.46 It allowed a clarity of vision 
which populated many of Bell’s very popular talks to students and officials. It 
reminded us perhaps of an age when things seemed simpler. Or perhaps it told 
us that we have not escaped from a time when international order depends on 
how well the major players manage the crises that come between them. It is 
when they ignore crises, and even more when they try earnestly to solve them, 
that we so often find ourselves in trouble. For that reason Bell’s work on the 
conventions of crisis management deserves a contemporary audience. 
45 ibid., p. 26.
46 See my analysis of Hugh White’s China Choice in Robert Ayson, ‘Is Minimal Order Enough? Hugh White’s 
Strategic Parsimony’, Security Challenges, vol. 9, no. 1, Autumn 2013, pp. 17–26.
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12. Coral Bell’s Alliance Politics: 
Practitioner and Pundit
William T Tow
Coral Bell was Australia’s premier expert on alliance politics during and after 
the Cold War. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s famous book title, 
Present at the Creation, applies equally to this remarkable Australian figure who 
was both a practitioner in and pundit on this subject.1 She was ‘in the room’ 
as an officer with Australia’s Department of External Affairs when the ANZUS 
(Australia New Zealand United States) Treaty was signed in San Francisco on 1 
September 1951. 
One of her most avid interests pursued during a subsequent and distinguished 
career as an academic and think-tank adviser was assessing American leadership 
of its global alliance system and continually evaluating how Australia fared in 
and should respond to Washington’s strategic policies. Her book Dependent Ally: 
A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (three editions were published) remains a 
seminal work on how Australia—one of the United States’ smaller allies—was 
able to calibrate its security relationship with an American superpower in ways 
that facilitated its maturity as an independent security actor.2 During her later 
years, she became increasingly preoccupied with how the Australian–American 
alliance would function in a world undergoing rapid structural change and where 
global multipolarity and great power concerts would prevail. To what extent 
her viewpoints will be proven to be correct or misplaced is far less important 
than her success in initiating the debate about international order-building 
which had to take place within official policy circles, think-tanks, and academe. 
In commemorating her life and work soon after her passing, Owen Harries 
observed that ‘she always tackled the great central questions of international 
politics … major topics [such] as the central balance, the management of crises 
and of great alliances, the temptations and dangers of hegemony’.3
Three key dimensions of Bell’s work on alliance politics are discussed in this 
chapter. Initially, an assessment is offered on where her work fits within the 
evolution of alliance theory. The basic theme of this section is that she ranks 
among the very best of all those who have written on the subject. The second 
1 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, WW Norton, New York, 1969.
2 Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, 3rd edn, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, in 
association with Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1993.
3 Owen Harries, ‘A Tribute to Coral Bell’, The Spectator, 6 October 2012, www.spectator.co.uk/australia/
australia-features/8643341/a-tribute-to-coral-bell/ (accessed 18 August 2013).
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part of the chapter focuses on those dimensions of alliance management where 
her analysis was particularly incisive. Alliance leadership and power balancing 
were central concerns in this context. The chapter’s third section reviews her 
quest to reconcile traditional alliance postures with the politics of concert in the 
twenty-first century. She fused her remarkable grasp of diplomatic history with 
objective thinking about how historic changes in contemporary global security 
relations were affecting the Western alliance system and its Australian–American 
component. This discussion reveals the essence of Bell’s core intellectual identity 
and illustrates what may be her most enduring legacy.
Alliance Theory
Overcoming the challenges of managing security alliances has always represented 
a critical and often frustrating enterprise for policy-makers. Writing soon after 
the Peloponnesian War was fought over two millennia ago, Thucydides compared 
the advantages of states pooling their resources to deter or prevail in war against 
the option of pursuing or sustaining dominance over rival or rising powers.4 
The continued relevance of the analyses of this venerated Greek historian has 
been underscored by the American political scientist Graham Allison, who 
warned that China and the United States must avoid the ‘Thucydides trap’ of 
succumbing to fears about power transition if they wished to avoid destroying 
each other.5 Other ‘classical’ strategists concerned about modern alliance 
politics have complemented or built upon the work of Thucydides. China’s Sun 
Tzu, India’s Kautilya (also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta), Renaissance 
Italy’s Niccolo Machiavelli, Prussia’s Carl von Clausewitz, and Britain’s EH Carr 
are regarded as pantheons in the field. While their individual explanations 
regarding exercising political power may have differed, all believed that the 
state was the ultimate arbitrator of how power would be applied and viewed 
alliances as critical instruments to achieve political objectives.6 
In modern times, alliance formation and perpetuation have been linked to 
realist theories about international anarchy and power balancing. Realists have 
posited that in the absence of a preeminent actor to manage order, states will 
ally in a self-help world to either neutralise a rising threat or to ‘bandwagon’ 
4 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1972.
5 Graham Allison, ‘Thucydides’s Trap Has Been Sprung in the Pacific’, Financial Times, 21 August 2012. 
Critics of this perspective, however, note that Sparta was criticised by its own allies for being too risk averse! 
See Daniel Drezner, ‘The Limits of Thucydides in the 21st Century’, Foreign Policy, 29 May 2013, drezner.
foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/29/the_limits_of_thucydides_in_the_21st_century (accessed 18 August 
2013). The classic work on power transition theory remains AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980.
6 See, for example, Roger Boesche, ‘Moderate Machiavelli? Contrasting The Prince with the Arthashastra of 
Kautilya’, Critical Horizons, vol. 3, no. 2, 2002, pp. 253–76.
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with a benign or inexorable hegemon to avoid conquest or to accrue a share 
in geopolitical spoils. The writings of Hans Morgenthau, George Liska, Henry 
Kissinger, Robert Osgood, Glenn Snyder, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and 
John Mearsheimer have been particularly associated, since the Second World 
War, with the development of thinking about alliances. 
Writing prior to and during the 1960s, Morgenthau—the acknowledged 
don of modern realist thought—focused largely on why alliances form and 
how well they endure. A ‘second wave’ of alliance literature emerging in the 
1970s, and spearheaded by a landmark study authored by Ole Holsti, Terrence 
Hopmann, and John Sullivan, was more quantitative in nature and was mainly 
concerned with how alliances fit within the evolving post-war international 
system.7 A third wave of theoretical realist writing about alliances emerged in 
the 1980s, led by Kenneth Waltz, which again emphasised alliance formation 
but infused systemic analysis into its investigations.8 By this time, a clear divide 
was discernible between those who opted to use diplomatic history as their 
preferred means for evaluating alliance politics in the hope that policy-makers 
would listen to them, and those, usually located in academic institutions, who 
preferred to refine and build upon a growing body of alliance theory, and 
were less concerned about ‘real world’ responses to their work. As the notable 
alliance theorist Walt has since observed, ‘academic theory—including my 
own work—has had relatively little direct or indirect impact on actual state 
behaviour. Scholars may tell themselves they are ‘speaking truth to power’, but 
most of the time the powerful don’t listen.’9 
Bell was the exception to the rule that Walt posited. When addressing alliance 
politics, she demonstrated a remarkable capacity to assess the very hard 
problems of strategic choice for the US, Australia, and the West-at-large. She 
invariably conveyed her insights by elegantly referencing diplomatic history. 
Both the quintessential Australian Labor Party (ALP) policy practitioner (and 
later diplomat) Kim Beazley and the revered Australian international relations 
theorist James L Richardson recognised Bell’s exceptional talent for combining 
‘real-world’ analysis with highly sophisticated historical perspectives. Beazley 
observed that Bell’s work transcended the ‘mathematically quantifiable 
interactions’ that typified International Relations (IR) theory during her prime 
(as reflected in the second and third waves of alliance literature cited above). 
Noting that she ‘stood out’ as one of the two premier Australian IR scholars 
(Hedley Bull being the other) that captured the attention of policy practitioners, 
7 Ole R Holsti, P Terrence Hopmann, and John D Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 
Comparative Studies, Wiley, New York, 1973.
8 Kajsa Ji Noe Oest, ‘The End of Alliance Theory?’ Institut for Statskundskab, Copenhagen University, 
Copenhagen, 2007, p. 27, polsci.ku.dk/arbejdspapirer/2007/ap_2007_03.pdf/ (accessed 18 August 2013).
9 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections’, Yale Journal 
of International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2, 2012: pp. 33–43, at 35.
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Beazley ventured that ‘it is when scholars write in traditional, historically 
based terms that their influence is most felt outside the academy. I’ve never 
heard much game theory discussed by delegates to ALP National Conference 
but I heard, particularly in the 1980s, the more traditional writing of many 
here discussed ad nauseum’.10 Richardson insisted that Bell’s form of ‘classical 
realism’ stemmed from understanding of the ‘fixed beliefs of decision-makers’ 
and the constraints those individuals faced in dealing with perceived domestic 
political imperatives. Her approach, he concluded, constituted ‘a much-needed 
corrective to the systemic, structural emphases in the prevailing neorealist 
doctrine’.11
Richardson’s observation is particularly important in understanding the 
importance of Bell’s interpretation of why and how the ANZUS or tripartite 
alliance between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand was created. 
As a junior officer in Australia’s Ministry of External Affairs, she was actually 
‘present at creation’ when ANZUS was signed by its three adherents in San 
Francisco in September 1951.12 Her explanation of why the event she witnessed 
came about, and how ANZUS evolved, is offered in her much acclaimed book, 
Dependent Ally. The work remains arguably the preeminent study on Australia’s 
post-war alliance (the other widely acclaimed study of ANZUS creation was 
written by JG Starke, and, while technically proficient, was written primarily 
as an international law treatise).13 What separated Bell’s work from that of her 
contemporaries (and from that of those alliance historians who followed her) 
was her capacity to weave her narrative in ways that captured the drama and 
tensions that underlay the process of alliance formation and to relate the story 
10 Kim Beazley, ‘Thinking Security: Influencing National Strategy from the Academy; An Australian 
Experience’, Coral Bell Lecture 2008, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 19 March 2008, p. 5. 
www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Beazley,_Thinking_security,_Vote_of_thanks.pdf (accessed 25 August 
2013).
11 James L Richardson, ‘Coral Bell and the Classical Realist Tradition’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 59, no. 3, 2005, pp. 265–8, at 267–8.
12 Brendan Taylor, ‘Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher 
(eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on The Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Canberra: ANU E Press, 
2007, pp. 117–128, at p. 123.
13 JG Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne,1965. Other widely 
cited works on ANZUS formation include Percy C Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty 
and the Colombo Plan, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1969; Glenn St J Barclay and JM Siracusa (eds), 
Australian–American Relations Since 1945: A Documentary History, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Sydney, 1976; 
HC Gelber, The Australian American Alliance: Costs and Benefits, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1968; TR Reese, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 1941–1968, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs/Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1969; HS Albinski, ANZUS, the 
United States and Pacific Security, University Press of America, Lanham, 1987; A. Burnett (ed), The ANZUS 
Documents, Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1991; and 
Joseph M Siracusa, ‘The ANZUS Treaty Revisited’, Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pp. 89–104.
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she was telling to historical timeframes. As Beazley noted when delivering the 
first Lowy Institute lecture named in her honour, ‘Coral Bell’s work transits 
through contemporary writing like a permanently open time capsule’.14
Indeed, Bell was masterful in linking successive episodes of Western alliance 
behaviour to frame powerful cross-comparisons that facilitated a holistic 
understanding of the entire post-war order-building process. When writing 
about the differences between the relatively successful ANZUS and the ill-fated 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Bell illustratively pointed to the 
vital but inadequately understood dissimilarities between the two security 
arrangements. ANZUS was specifically designed to defend Australian sovereign 
territory against a direct military attack by a hostile party, initially thought to 
be a strategically resurgent Japan. SEATO was intended to underwrite a very 
different kind of policy—Australia’s pursuit of a ‘forward defence’ strategy 
in Southeast Asia directed against communist insurgency movements that, if 
successful, might topple pro-Western or neutral governments there and isolate 
Australia in the process.15 A US regional strategic presence was what Australia 
valued most, but Australian policy-makers often felt they were competing with 
their British counterparts—Britain was also a member of SEATO—for American 
attention and resources. This sense of competition, Bell presciently observed, 
may ultimately not have served either Australia or the US well. 
ANZUS provided Australia with a relatively exclusive forum (only shared with 
New Zealand) to convey security concerns to US officials. Australia might have 
been better off over the long-term ‘if US policy-makers had been forced to 
defend their Asian or Pacific policies in a forum where European voices had 
also to be heard, urging alternative priorities’ to forward defence.16 That such 
was not the case meant that the US could easily pressure Australia and New 
Zealand to make force contributions to an escalating conflict in Vietnam during 
the 1960s (without formally activating SEATO as a trigger for such involvement) 
even as Britain and France declined to extend material support to the Lyndon 
B Johnson administration for that struggle. In this context, Bell’s alliance 
narrative beautifully illustrated the ‘alliance security dilemma’ and its focus 
on entrapment and abandonment as it applied to Southeast Asia during the 
Cold War. Her work in this area, coincidentally, complements Victor Cha’s later 
application of that theoretical approach to understanding the dynamics of US 
alliance politics with Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia.17 
14 Beazley, ‘Thinking Security’, p. 1.
15 Bell, Dependent Ally, pp. 47–48, 68.
16 ibid., p. 46.
17 Victor D. Cha, ‘Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, 
and Korea’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 2, 2000, pp. 261–91. Cha develops a model in which 
Japan and South Korea are more at odds with each other when either Japan or South Korea fear that US resolve 
to stay committed to their own national security is weakening. In a similar vein, Bell’s characterisation of 
Australian fears that US strategic interest in Southeast Asia would be compromised by America’s apprehensions 
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Alliance Leadership and Power Balancing
What sets Bell’s commentary apart from the aforementioned ‘three waves’ of 
international relations literature is her shrewd appreciation of ‘elite identity’ 
and policy management as a key factor—perhaps the key factor—in alliance 
politics. In Australia’s case, she observed that while its national security interests 
have remained fairly constant, ‘the personality and assumptions of Australia’s 
chief decision-maker of any given time’ was absolutely critical.18 The dominant 
figure in Australian Cold War politics, Prime Minister Robert G Menzies, clearly 
exemplified this proposition. Initially reticent about Australia’s contribution of 
ground forces to the Korean War due to the British Labour government’s similar 
reticence, he learned about London’s subsequent decision to commit forces 
(after having been pressured by the US) to that conflict only after reaching New 
York on one of his long sea voyages to the US and Britain. Bell’s description 
of Menzies’ volte face was a classic illustration of her beautifully understated 
representations of historical policy benchmarks:
[Thus] confronted with a fait accompli … he took the news of this 
reversal of his original injunction [not to commit Australian ground 
troops to UN military operations in Korea] in his stride, acquiesced in 
it without objection, and blandly proceeded to enjoy a considerable 
personal success (including the raising of a loan for Australia) during 
his Washington visit on the strength of his involuntary redefinition as 
the readiest and staunchest of the USA’s friends.19
Bell noted that, earlier, Menzies’ original scepticism about entering into a 
regional security treaty with the United States sans Britain flowed from similar 
concerns. Excessive dependence on an American security alliance would corner 
Australia into signing a Japanese peace treaty that would be unpopular with 
his own electorate and could undermine the Commonwealth’s significance as 
an Asian security actor. The latter was especially true as the Emergency in the 
Malaya Peninsula was intensifying (a conflict in which Washington did not want 
its own forces to become involved) and British forces deployed there remained 
critical to defusing that threat. 
In further exposition of Bell’s appreciation of ‘elite identity’, she cited that 
negotiating ANZUS largely succeeded due to the single-minded quest of Percy 
Spender (who was appointed ambassador to the US when the Menzies government 
resumed power in mid-1951). Initial opposition by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that it would be embroiled in defending British interests there conforms to this model. Thinking on the 
alliance security dilemma was developed by Glenn H Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, 
World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, 1984, pp. 461–495.
18 Bell, Dependent Ally, p. 175.
19 ibid., p. 42.
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to the accord weakened when Spender ‘bluntly’ linked Australia’s willingness 
to support a peace treaty with Japan to ‘the nature of the security arrangements 
arrived at for Australia’. By this time, Menzies’ own position had softened as he 
realised that Britain was embarking on a long recessional from previous colonial 
responsibilities east of the Suez Canal and that Australia would be largely 
dependent on American power to contain Japanese remilitarisation and help 
underwrite Australia’s ‘forward defence’ strategy in Southeast Asia. Spender 
and US Special Envoy John Foster Dulles teamed up to push the Australian 
agenda through a series of complex negotiations and counter-negotiations 
orchestrated by Winston Churchill’s conservative British government which 
opposed an ANZUS without British membership.20 
Bell’s conclusion that Australia’s security relations with the US have evolved 
from it being a de facto ‘protectorate’ involved in a ‘one-way’ security guarantee 
from Washington into a more equal arrangement as the Cold War transpired 
is entirely valid. The United States became increasingly dependent on the 
US–Australia joint installations for generating credible deterrence policy and 
gathering critical intelligence. Bell then made the legitimate and important 
observation that both countries’ leaderships must be successful in ensuring 
that ANZUS was pursuing the ‘common interest in a stable balance-of-power 
in the world’ and that this ‘outweigh[ed] any prospective divergence between 
particular national interests’. She noted that original alliance asymmetry had 
morphed into something more equal as global strategic interdependence and 
multipolarity intensified:
It [ANZUS] had become considerably less unequal … in the sense that 
Australian dependence on the USA for protection had been narrowed 
to the relatively unlikely catastrophe of general war. … A one-sided 
dependence had in effect transmuted itself into interdependence of a 
relatively symmetrical sort.21 
Historians have most often pointed to Gough Whitlam’s government as the 
catalyst for Australia maturing into a more independent regional actor and for 
challenging what they viewed as the American predisposition to regard Australia 
as a reliably subservient ally.22 It is clear that successive Australian conservative 
20 ibid., pp. 43–45.
21 ibid., p. 183.
22 Among the many in-depth surveys of Australia–US relations which consider this point, two of the best 
are Glen St J. Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian–American Diplomatic Relations Since 1945, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne,1985; and TB Millar, ‘From Whitlam to Fraser’, Foreign Affairs vol. 55, no. 4, 
1977, pp. 854–872. Millar observed that ‘Labor’s view of the world was … very different from that of its 
predecessors. … It believed there was value in having the United States available for some unforeseeable and 
remote crisis, but that in the meantime the United States would understandably accept a public kick in the 
shins from time to time to establish Australia’s independent credentials’ (p. 859). An interesting dissenting 
piece was by James Curran, ‘Dear Mr President: How Whitlam Rattled the ANZUS Alliance’, The Monthly, 
vol. 81, August 2012, www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/august/1348618116/james-curran/dear-mr-
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governments viewed the US military involvement in Vietnam as fundamental 
to the defence of the Southeast Asian mainland; Australia contributed a 
modest Australian force component (up to 7,600 personnel at its peak strength 
and approximately 60,000 military personnel over the entire duration of that 
conflict) to support that campaign. By comparison, the US deployed nearly 
half a million military personnel to Vietnam in 1968 alone and over 2.7 million 
Americans served in the war.23 As David McLean has since observed, ‘[w]ith 
American power seen as overwhelming, a policy by which the US would bear 
most of the risks of military intervention had enormous appeal to the Australian 
government, which sought to commit America to the region’s defence at the 
lowest possible cost to Australia’.24 
Bell noted that while dissent against the war grew among the ‘articulate 
opinion-makers’ (journalists, academics, students, parliamentarians, and 
intellectuals) during the mid-to-late 1960s, the wider sectors of the Australian 
electorate were still supportive of forward defence and military intervention 
in Southeast Asia.25 This remained the case until the Americans themselves 
shifted away from confrontation and toward diplomacy following the January 
1968 Tet Offensive, President Johnson’s March 1968 resignation speech, and 
the announcement of the Guam Doctrine in August 1969. The growth of 
greater Australian independence within the alliance proved to be a gradual 
phenomenon because, Bell argued, Australian involvement in American wars 
have been largely diplomatic enterprises rather than military ones and have been 
predicated on the ‘conventional wisdom’ that American decision-making was 
naturally synonymous with Australia’s national interests.26 This presumption 
was, of course, tested during Whitlam’s three-year term of office. However, it 
was the relatively chaotic way such adjustments were introduced—with an 
emphasis on declaratory style over relatively steady operational foreign policy 
management—that made the challenge to alliance orthodoxy appear much more 
radical than it really was.27 Indeed, as Bell noted, key bilateral arrangements such 
as Washington’s control over operations at intelligence installations in Australia 
were largely unchanged. Others, such as relations between the Australian and 
president (accessed 2 September 2013). President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
diplomatically isolated Australia for months after receiving a letter from Whitlam threatening to make his 
government’s dissent to the US bombing of North Vietnam public. Also see David Martin Jones and Mike 
Lawrence Smith, ‘Misreading Menzies and Whitlam: Reassessing the Ideological Construction of Australian 
Foreign Policy’, The Round Table, vol. 89, no. 355, 2000, pp. 387–406.
23 David McLean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA During the Cold 
War’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 52, no. 1, 2006, pp. 64–79, at 77; and David L Anderson, 
‘Vietnam War (1960–1975): Military and Diplomatic Course’, in John Whiteclay Chambers (ed), The Oxford 
Companion to Military History, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 759–763.
24 McLean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite?’ p. 77.
25 Bell, Dependent Ally, pp. 77, 93–94.
26 ibid., p. 182. 
27 ibid., p. 113.
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American intelligence communities, were finessed at the public service level as 
first Nixon and later Whitlam became engrossed in their respective domestic 
political problems.28 
Another key analysis in Bell’s work on post-war alliance systems related to 
how effective they have been within the regional and global power balances 
within which they operate. She acknowledged that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was generally useful and effective in containing Soviet 
power during the Cold War.29 She argued, however, that ‘force goals’ of NATO 
such as credible defence burden-sharing, and the eventual development of a 
strong and quasi-independent European military component, were never quite 
realised—this was largely because American power ‘more than compensated 
for the local deficiencies’ of NATO Europe. She posited that under the rubric of 
‘containment strategy’, both NATO and the United States’ Asia-Pacific alliances 
were actually an effective balance of power coalition with forward defence 
lines.30
Bell became increasingly critical of NATO once global bipolarity had been 
relegated to history and a multipolar global power balance was beginning to 
emerge. US power, she argued, was sufficient to manage Cold War bipolarity 
(1945–91), but had failed to come to terms with the global redistribution of 
power that had evolved after the Soviet Union’s demise. She began promoting 
what many would view as radical ideas for alliance reform. Amongst the most 
prominent of these was to admit Russia as a full member of NATO. By doing so, 
the West could avoid Russia’s marginalisation from the rest of Europe. Such an 
initiative, Bell insisted, would also infuse a sense of European identity that had 
been largely abandoned after the Cold War.31 Indeed, NATO Europe had been 
exposed to a substantial dose of American nationalism during Ronald Reagan’s 
presidency (1981–88) when Washington’s then predominant neoconservative 
policy-makers regarded Europe as highly susceptible to ‘Finlandisation’—
overly subservient to intimidation by Soviet military power and too enamoured 
by the lure of détente.32
28 ibid., pp. 130–131.
29 When writing about European security in the late 1970s, Bell acknowledged that ‘[t]he survival of a 
military alliance for almost thirty years undoubtedly indicates that it is felt by the governments concerned 
to confer benefits. … On the whole the NATO relationship has been a comfortable enough one for the policy-
makers concerned’. Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era, Martin Robertson, London, 1977, 
p. 99.
30 Coral Bell, The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents, Adelphi Paper no. 44, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 1968, p. 4.
31 Coral Bell, ‘Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 
1994, pp. 27–41.
32 Coral Bell, ‘The Reagan Administration and the American Alliance-Structure’, Australian Outlook, vol. 
41, no. 3, 1987, pp. 151–5.
Power and International Relations
114
Alliances and Concert Politics
The 11  September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, 
signalled that a global redistribution of power was under way that would render 
Washington’s task of leading its alliances ever more difficult. Acknowledging 
that the ‘Jihadist’ challenge had introduced new factors of asymmetrical warfare 
into the calculations of US policy planners, Bell concluded in a widely acclaimed 
strategy paper written for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Living 
with Giants, that Washington’s responses to this new type of non state-centric 
threat ‘will put more strain on its alliances, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific, 
and further reduce US ability to induce “bandwagoning” by other powers’.33 
New forms of alignment would be required in a world increasingly shaped by 
complex multipolarity as the diffusion of American power intensified, especially 
following the ineffectual US invasion and occupation of Iraq. As she observed, 
‘[p]ower is being redistributed all the time because of economic, demographic 
and technological changes beyond the control of even the most Machiavellian 
policy maker in Washington’.34
Bell suggested two new pathways to order-building: the strengthening of 
regional and international security communities, and the formation of great 
power concerts. She viewed these two approaches as symbiotic and working 
in ways that would render other models such as Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash 
of civilizations’, Mearsheimer’s ‘hegemonic war’, or even more remote variants 
such as ‘Leagues of Democracies’ and ‘Anglospheres’ less relevant in the twenty-
first century.35 Regional and international security communities would provide 
space for middle and small powers to promote their own interests and to cultivate 
common norms in something other than the tightly woven asymmetrical 
framework which intermittently frustrated Australia and other US allies during 
the Cold War. Bell cited the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping 
or an expanded Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; the East Asia 
Summit emerged after Bell wrote this study although she predicted the forming 
of such an organisation) in the Asia-Pacific as illustrative typologies of regional 
community-building and potentially commensurate to the European Community 
and NATO that still appeared viable at the time of her writing. She theorised 
that the G8 and the burgeoning G20 economic groupings and other such 
arrangements could only expand and survive under an overarching framework 
33 Coral Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australia’s Place in a More Complex World, Strategy Report, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, April 2005, p. 14.
34 ibid., p. 31.
35 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 1996; John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York, 2001; Ivo 
Daalder and James Lindsay, ‘Democracies of the World, Unite’, The American Interest, vol. 2, no. 3, 2007, pp. 
5–15; and James C. Bennett, The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way 
in the Twenty-First Century, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2007.
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managed by the world’s five great powers—China, the European Union, India, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States—acting in concert to regulate and enforce 
systemic rules based on their collective interests, curbing defections from this 
framework, and constantly negotiating adjustments to such an architecture to 
preserve global stability. 
The key precondition for realising this construct would be to prevent the return 
to classic power balancing and particularly to avoid the emergence of any anti-
hegemonic alliance directed toward the United States. A new Sino–Russian 
arrangement directed toward checking American power would be illustrative 
of resurgent power balancing undermining global stability. Bell recognised that 
convincing the United States to enter into such a system would be the greatest 
barrier to its realisation. However, the logic of her proposed framework was so 
compelling from her perspective that she readily endorsed its creation. Citing 
the prospect of nuclear weapons states in the Asia-Pacific miscalculating each 
others’ intentions in future crises and thereby precipitating major wars no one 
wanted, she insisted that ‘every middle or minor power in the region ought to 
be interested in a security community’ nurtured by great power support. While 
not anticipating the global financial crisis which exploded on the scene five 
years after Living with Giants was published, she nevertheless anticipated US 
problems in holding the global economic and geopolitical orders together and 
recommended that Washington willingly relinquish its post-Cold War primacy: 
‘[a]ll that Washington has to do to reconcile its fellow giants of the central balance 
… is to administer a unipolar world as if it were a concert of powers, and it will 
become one’.36 In such a world, moreover, she believed that Australia could play 
a role in adjudicating American reconciliation of its post-war bilateral alliance 
system with Asia-Pacific institution-building similar to ‘that Britain has long 
played in relations between the US and continental Europe’.37 
Bell expanded on this thinking in what would be one of her last major pieces of 
work-a paper written for the Lowy Institute for International Policy entitled 
The End of the Vasco da Gama Era.38 The voyages of ‘that great [Portuguese] 
navigator’ and his success in discovering a maritime trading route from Europe 
to India at the end of the fifteenth century symbolised the beginning of the 
West’s commercial and strategic dominance which endured over the next five 
centuries. The beginning of the twenty-first century marks the rise of three 
great non-Western civilisations: Indian, Chinese, and Islamic. It also signals the 
36 Bell, Living with Giants, pp. 27, 41; emphasis in original.
37 ibid., p. 54.
38 Coral Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics, Lowy Institute Paper 
21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2007. Much of the thinking for this work emanated from 
Bell’s earlier work, A World Out of Balance: American Ascendancy and International Politics in the 21st Century, 
Longueville Books, Double Bay, 2003.
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beginning of the end of the nation-state’s monopoly on power distribution as 
non-state actors begin to play a more fundamental role in meeting a growing 
and diverse array of non-traditional security challenges. 
How would classical alliance politics fare in such a dynamically shifting 
environment? Bell was somewhat ambiguous on this point. As was argued 
in Living with Giants, a major precondition for successful concert politics is 
to preclude the formation of an anti-hegemonic alliance against one of the 
great powers by ensuring (via negotiation or coercion) that none of them 
would pursue global hegemony. In developing this pre-condition, Bell largely 
concurred with Mearsheimer’s view that hegemonic competition—complete 
with the alliance politics that would accompany it—would likely lead to 
general war. Unlike Mearsheimer, she did not regard such competition to be an 
inevitable feature of world politics if a viable great power concert materialised. 
Yet Bell acknowledged that using alliances to balance against threats remained 
a necessary policy component in certain circumstances, at least over the short-
term. Japan’s post-Cold War environment, for example, mandated a continued 
need for the US–Japan bilateral security alliance in the face of Chinese military 
modernisation and North Korean development of nuclear weapons.39 British 
resistance to a truly autonomous European security community operating 
independently from NATO was equally unlikely to dissipate any time soon, 
and Bell noted that such a community could only materialise if Russia joined 
or closely aligned with it. Odds of a stronger and more independent Europe 
emerging to facilitate a global concert were also undermined by that continent’s 
growing sense of vulnerability to Islamic power and a ‘Muslim diaspora’ growing 
within its boundaries.40 Writing in 2007, Bell could not have anticipated the 
global financial crisis wreaking such a degree of financial havoc in Europe, but 
this event seriously undermined the idea of a Europe acting as a unified great 
power, either autonomously or in concert with other global power centres. Nor 
could she have anticipated the Barack Obama administration’s endorsement of a 
‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ strategy for the Asia-Pacific in 2011 that is designed to 
reinforce the US bilateral alliance system in that region. Hence, her speculation 
that the ‘hub and spokes’ logic of post-war balancing in Asia may give way to a 
NATO-like multilateral framework more able to co-exist with a Sino–American 
deal to share power seems premature.41 Indeed, Bell could never quite let go 
her conviction that at the end of the day, Australia remains inextricably and 
beneficially tied to US power as the best means for ensuring its own national 
security and for pursuing global stability:
39 Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era, p. 23.
40 ibid., p. 28.
41 ibid., pp. 50–1. For definitive statements on the pivot strategy see Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific 
Century’, Foreign Policy, vol. 189, November 2011, pp. 56–63; and Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President 
Obama to the Australian Parliament’, Parliament House, Canberra, 17 November 2011, www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament (accessed 3 September 2013).
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As middle powers go, Australia is exceptionally well endowed with both 
economic and strategic assets: remote location, a defensible sea-air gap, 
good access to intelligence, an alliance with the paramount power and 
efficient, well trained and well equipped forces. … The United States 
will remain the paramount power of the society of states, only in a 
multipolar world instead of a unipolar or bipolar one.42 
Conclusion
Coral Bell’s major and continuing contribution to international security relations 
is the provision of nuanced and enduring judgements on how power balancing 
and the alliance politics that emanates from it relate to regional and global 
order-building. Her application of classical realism and historical analysis to 
explain why states coalesce to realise acceptable power equilibriums transcends 
the more abstract analysis represented by the second wave of alliance literature 
generated during the height of the Cold War. She did not view such behaviour 
(power balancing and alliance politics) as sufficiently mechanistic or repetitive 
to justifying surrendering to either the anarchical or systemic schools of thought 
that dominated academic thinking on alliances during that period. Interpreting 
history as the delicate art form that it is, and drawing up sophisticated portraits 
of how events unfolded the way they did, is seminal in understanding the 
security relations between those states and polities which matter the most to 
international stability. Bell never lost sight of this prerequisite when constructing 
her magisterial narratives of modern alliance politics.
As Hugh White has recently reminded us, Bell’s willingness to follow where an 
argument leads and her openness to new ideas were her distinct trademarks. 
She complemented these traits, however, with a steady and profound sense 
of optimism about the future of world order.43 This separates her from most 
other classical realists who too often limited their analyses to what they saw 
as the inevitabilities of strategic competition and war and neo-realists who 
surrendered to the all too easy temptation of viewing global structural changes 
as nothing more than a state’s preordained and mechanistic process of survival 
through balancing to gain power and wealth at each others’ expense.
Near the end of her life, Bell envisioned that the West could shape a complicated 
but practical hybrid approach to realising global stability, combining 
community-building and power-sharing in ways that would make the world 
42 Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era, p. 53.
43 Hugh White, ‘Vote of Thanks to Kim Beazley’, Coral Bell Lecture, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
19 March 2008, www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Beazley,_Thinking_security,_Vote_of_thanks.pdf 
(accessed 3 September 2013).
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and those inhabiting it more secure. She sensed that she could contribute to our 
understanding of how more effective order-building could be realised at a time 
when the post-Cold War world was undergoing immense structural change. 
This spurred her on to refine her already formidable arguments about alliances, 
concerts, and community-building, and to engage with both key policy-makers 
and with her valued colleagues in academic and think-tank settings. No policy 
practitioner or independent analyst could aspire to do more.
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13. Coral Bell and the Concert of 
Power: Avoiding Armageddon
Hugh White1
Coral Bell gave the title ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’ to the fragment of 
memoir found among her papers, and began it by recalling the moment she heard 
that the atom bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. ‘I can even remember the 
pattern of the hearth-rug on which I was standing when a colleague rushed 
in with the news’, she wrote. ‘Perhaps that moment is the reason why so 
much of my life has revolved around wars and crises; why I have had such a 
preoccupation with the possibility of Armageddon. Especially how to avoid it’.2
It is perfectly characteristic of Coral that this short and simple statement should 
so fully and precisely describe her life’s work. Coral Bell was one of the very 
last of those whose thinking about international relations was shaped by direct 
and personal experience of hegemonic war, and her life’s work was to explore 
the question about how such wars can be avoided. She looked for answers in 
the ways states interact with one another, both in the slowly-shifting patterns 
of their long-term relationships, and in sudden stresses of crisis. She believed 
the key to preserving peace was to be found in the nature and workings of 
the international system—the way states communicate with one another, 
understand one another, and reach and honour agreements with one another, 
and she devoted her long life and her formidable talents to studying the nature 
of those communications, understandings and agreements.
She explored how states could reach understandings and agreements which 
would forestall conflict, and as time passed she became convinced that one 
model of international understanding offered the best hope for doing that: the 
concert of power as exemplified by the European order of the century following 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In this essay I will try to trace the evolution of 
this conviction in her work, relate it to other ideas she developed, and explore 
her hopes that a concert of power would indeed prove to be the key to avoiding 
Armageddon in the twenty-first century. But we should start back on that 
hearth-rug on 6 August 1945. 
1 I would like to thank especially my old friends and colleagues, Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor, for 
stimulating discussions about the issues covered here.
2 Coral Bell ‘A Preoccupation with Armageddon’, unpublished memoir, Canberra, 2012, p. 1.
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Preoccupation with Armageddon
We can picture Coral at that moment: a young woman of twenty-two, serious, 
shy but confident of her formidable intellect and perhaps also of her charm, 
quietly but profoundly determined to have a part in shaping the new world 
that would follow the war, and absolutely sure that avoiding another such 
war—especially, after Hiroshima, a nuclear war—was more important and more 
urgent than anything else. She never lost that conviction; never for a moment 
doubted that contributing to this great task was the whole point of working in 
the field of international relations, whether as a practitioner or a scholar. She 
left government for scholarship because she decided that she could contribute 
more that way, but as a scholar she remained always and absolutely engaged 
in practical questions of policy. She was never interested in the construction 
of theories for their own sake, and probably thought that colleagues who 
found theory more interesting than contemporary questions of policy lacked 
seriousness, and imagination. Her vivid sense that major war was not just a 
theoretical possibility but an ever-present danger, and her ability to imagine 
what such a war would be like and what it would mean, were the mainsprings 
of her work. 
This made her a ‘realist’ in a specific and significant sense, though one far 
removed from the academic realism of people like Morgenthau. Hers was the 
realism of Machiavelli, whose cardinal insight, as Isaiah Berlin explained, was the 
incompatibility of our most treasured values—‘that ends, equally sacred, may 
contradict one another’.3 Although she was not much given to philosophising 
at this level of abstraction, Coral clearly understood and accepted this reality. 
Throughout her work it is clear that she sees that choices have to be made 
between the preservation of peace and other highly desirable objectives, and 
she was never in much doubt that peace should take priority. It would not be 
true to say that Coral believed in peace at any price, but she certainly believed 
that only something of truly exceptional value was worth a major war.
But unlike most realists Coral was also an optimist. She consistently and 
perhaps increasingly as time passed believed not just that states could reach 
and sustain agreements which minimised the risk of major war. She shared the 
English School’s recognition that order and peace could be achieved despite the 
anarchy of international politics by understandings and cooperation between 
states. Such agreements were the key to avoiding Armageddon, and hence the 
perennial focus of her work, and later in her career she saw a concert of power 
as the most promising form for such agreements to take. Moreover towards the 
3 Isaiah Berlin ‘The Question of Machiavelli’ New York Review of Books, 4 November 1971. www.nybooks.
com/50/Machiavelli (accessed 6 August 2013).
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end of her life she became increasingly convinced that an international order 
based on a ‘concert of power’ was in fact taking shape. But we have to go back 
much farther to see the beginnings of her thinking about it. 
London
Coral had an excellent education in history, and there can be little doubt that 
she knew a good deal about the Concert of Europe well before she began her 
career as a scholar when she arrived in London in 1951. Over the following years 
she came to know and be influenced by a remarkable group which included 
Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Alistair Buchan, whose approach to the study of 
international relations was, like Coral’s, strongly based on the careful application 
of historical analogues to current questions. This group were certainly interested 
in the idea of a ‘concert of power’, and they referred to it quite often, though 
not at much length or in much detail. Coral herself seems (from my reading) not 
to have taken much interest in the ‘concert of power’ idea herself at this stage, 
but it seems fair to assume that this is where here ideas about it first evolved.
Coral’s London colleagues were certainly struck by the fact that for a century 
after 1815 there was no hegemonic war between the great powers of Europe—
that is, no war to establish, or prevent the establishment of, hegemony by any 
one power. So while there were serious wars in Europe over this time, none 
approached the catastrophic scale of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
that preceded it, or the World Wars that followed it. They believed that Europe 
avoided hegemonic war because of the nature of the relationships between the 
great powers themselves, which constituted a distinctive kind of international 
order. Two things made that order distinctive. One was a matter of style: the 
way they dealt with one another. As Martin Wight put it: ‘the diplomatic system 
of the Concert maintained standards of good faith, mutual consideration and 
restraint higher perhaps than at any other time in international history’.4
The other was a matter of substance: the great power’s objectives in dealing 
with one another. Hedley Bull saw the Concert of Power as an agreement among 
great powers ‘that the maintenance of a general balance of power is a common 
objective’,5 while Herbert Butterfield wrote, ‘The Concert of Europe was in 
4 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (eds), 
Diplomatic Investigations, George, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, p. 30. 
5 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Politics, Macmillan, London, 1979 p. 114. Bull offers 
a much wider definition later in The Anarchical Society (p. 225), where he writes of a concert as an agreement 
between great powers ‘to join forces in promoting common policies throughout the international system as a 
whole.’ His purpose here seems to be to distinguish the agreement underlying a concert from an agreement to 
divide the system into separate spheres of influence. This seems mistaken: there is no reason why a Concert 
in the narrower and more useful sense could not be based on a mutually accepted division into spheres of 
influence.
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origin and essence a common agreement on the principle of the balance of 
power’.6 Of course these descriptions lead to questions about the notoriously 
slippery concept of the ‘balance of power’ itself, but it is clear that both 
writers meant in these contexts that the essence of the ‘concert of power’ was 
an agreement among the great powers that none of them would try to upset 
the balance of power by seeking hegemony for themselves. One can also see 
that there is a close connection between the style and substance of great-power 
diplomacy under a concert, because the ‘high standards’, especially of restraint, 
that Wight mentioned were clearly essential to sustain the mutual forbearance 
about seeking hegemony that the concert entailed.
These scholars—especially Wight—did not necessarily see the ‘concert of 
power’ as a good thing. Wight doubted that it contributed much to the peace of 
Europe, which he believed owed more to the opportunities for expansion for the 
great powers outside Europe,7 and likened the ‘concert’ to the later appeasement 
of fascism, which he said was, ‘in a sense a continuation of the old system of the 
Concert of Europe whereby the great powers settled matters by private bargains 
among themselves at the expense of small powers’.8 
Kissinger
The second big influence on Coral’s thinking about the ‘concert of power’ 
idea seems to have been Henry Kissinger. The first time Coral seems to have 
focused directly on the concert of power was in her 1977 book The Diplomacy of 
Détente: The Kissinger Era, which as the title suggests was very much a study of 
Kissinger’s approach to the diplomacy of order-building. Kissinger had of course 
begun his career with A World Restored about the Congress of Vienna at which 
the Concert of Europe was created, and the ‘concert’ idea remained central to 
his thinking.9 The first point to note is that Kissinger’s views of the ‘concert 
of power’ model were more positive than those of Coral’s London colleagues. 
She wrote of the way Kissinger’s policy of détente ‘crystallises within itself 
the central moral tension not only of international politics but of politics in 
general: the tension between order and justice’. And she quotes approvingly 
6 Herbert Butterfield, ‘The Balance of Power’, Diplomatic Investigations, p. 154. 
7 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Royal Institutue of International Affairs, London, 1978, p. 42. The opposite 
could just as easily be true: the great powers were free to expand around the globe because they were secure 
from hegemonic challenges in Europe. 
8 ibid., p. 214. Bull was also alive to the risks of great-power collusion at the expense of smaller powers, 
especially in the Cold War context between the US and the USSR. See The Anarchical Society, p. 297.
9 See Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace , 1812-22, 
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1973.
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of Kissinger’s resolution of this tension in favour of order, ‘The preservation 
of human life and human society are moral values too’—and for Coral, as for 
Kissinger, this is what is at stake in avoiding Armageddon.10
In exploring the link between Kissinger’s academic work and his policy practice 
Coral offered a very neat account of the ‘concert’ idea and its relationship to 
the concepts of balance of power and detente. It deserves to be quoted at some 
length:
A World Restored is often described as being about the balance of power, 
but in fact it is about the working of a concert of powers. The distinction 
between the two is important for an understanding of its relevance to 
détente. Obviously a balance of power underlay the nineteenth-century 
concert of powers, or it would not have proved viable, just as a balance 
of power is now necessary as a foundation of détente, which is not yet 
a concert of powers. As Castlereagh once said, in a concert system the 
powers feel a common duty as well as a common interest. A balance of 
power may be regarded [as] a sort of force of history that tends to assert 
itself almost automatically in any system of independent sovereignties. 
A concert of power, on the other hand, must always be a construction of 
conscious statecraft.11
This passage brings out two key aspects of the ‘concert of power’ idea. First, 
there is the central question of the relationship between a concert of powers 
and a balance of power. A balance of power is necessary but not sufficient 
for a concert. One cannot build a concert unless there is already a balance of 
power, but much more than that is needed to create a concert. A balance of 
power system emerges quite spontaneously from the independent calculations 
of individual states about the best way to preserve their autonomy, but it does 
not prevent hegemonic war. As Hedley Bull wrote, the balance of power is not 
a system to prevent war, but to preserve the system of states from hegemony, 
if necessary though the use of war.12 Thus a balance of power system was what 
remained when the Concert of Europe collapsed in 1914, and the European wars 
of the twentieth century—including the Cold War—were classic examples of a 
balance of power system at work to prevent hegemony through war. The point 
10 Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1977, pp. 32–33. 
There is a fascinating and important question here about the role of values in shaping and sustaining a concert 
of power. Must a concert be based on shared values? Indeed there are two questions; first, is it possible 
to build a concert without shared values? Second, is it right to do so? Castlereagh seems to suggest that a 
convergence of values is essential to a concert when he says that they are based on obligations not interests, 
and Hedley Bull in The Anarchical Society seems to argue that at least a measure of justice is required for a 
concert to work. I’m not so sure. See Robert Ayson, ‘Is Minimal Order Enough?’, Hugh White, ‘Strategic 
Parsimony’, and Hugh White, ‘Response to Commentary on The China Choice’, in Security Challenges, vol. 9, 
no. 1, 2013.
11 Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente, p. 25.
12 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 107.
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of a concert is to avoid hegemony without the need for such wars. To do that the 
balance of power must be maintained not by war but by agreement. This is why 
a concert ‘must always be a construction of conscious statecraft’. 
Second, there is the question of what is required to construct the agreements 
which convert a balance of power into a concert of power. The view attributed 
to Castlereagh in the passage quoted above suggests that it requires more than 
simply a shared interest in the prevention of war, but mutual acceptance of 
higher obligation going beyond that interest. The same idea is hinted at in the 
idea that the essence of a concert is a higher sense of good faith and obligation as 
expressed in the quote from Wight above. I’m not sure it’s right, and in the end I 
don’t think Coral did either. For her, and for me, the key difference in this respect 
between a balance of power and a concert of power is not that one is based on 
interest and the other on obligation, but the nature of the interest being served. 
The difference is that in a balance of power system the key interest being served 
for each party is to preserve its independence by avoiding hegemony, whereas 
in a concert of power each party is also driven by an interest in avoiding war 
at the same time. To so this they are willing to forgo any chance of achieving 
hegemony themselves, and undertake instead to respect the independence of 
all the other parties. A viable concert of power depends on the strength of that 
undertaking and its credibility with the other parties. The key to creating and 
sustaining a concert of power is to understand how these undertakings can be 
created and made credible.
Cold War—Negotiating from Strength
These insights take us back to some of Coral’s much earlier work, where we can 
see her intense interest in issues which are essential to the idea of a concert, long 
before she saw them specifically in that context. Her first monograph, Negotiation 
from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power,13 which was published in 1963, 
explores an idea that was prevalent in America throughout the 1950s. It was 
that the US should defer any serious negotiation on accommodation with the 
Soviet Union until its military position had improved to the point that it would 
be able to avoid making any substantial concessions to the Soviets in return for 
a reduction in tensions. Coral says that this is mistaken because US strength 
did not in fact increase relative to the Soviets over the 1950s, and also, more 
fundamentally, because America’s overriding interests in avoiding war with the 
Soviets justified substantial concessions to reach an accommodation. The whole 
book thus focuses on the circumstances under which the US and Soviets might 
13 Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962, 
and Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1963.
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be willing to make the kind of accommodation required to reach a concert-
like understanding with one another that would avoid the risk of war, and the 
imperative to do so.
Only a year or two later Coral saw signs of a more hopeful attitude emerging on 
both sides of the Cold War divide. In 1964 she wrote of the emergence between 
the US and the USSR of what she called a ‘shadow condominium’, the basic 
function of which is ‘their joint management of the central power balance’.14 
Coral saw this as essentially a crisis-management mechanism in which the central 
powers acted together to ensure that peace between them was maintained, if 
necessary at the expense of the interests if smaller powers, and she cited the 
Cuban Missile Crisis as an early example of the shadow condominium in action. 
Brendan Taylor is surely correct in seeing in this concept the seeds of a ‘concert 
of power’ idea, albeit one that incorporates a great deal of competition along 
with occasional bouts of cooperation.15 What is common between a concert of 
power and Coral’s shadow condominium is the willingness of both powers to 
sacrifice key interests in order to avoid war with one another. The difference 
is that in the shadow condominium this willingness only comes into play in 
times of crisis, whereas in a concert (or one might say, a condominium pure and 
simple) this willingness frames the management of relationships more or less 
continually. But it is striking that Coral saw signs of such willingness in 1964.16 
In the years that followed those signs became much clearer, as the US and USSR 
moved towards the kinds of mutual understandings that many believed at the 
time heralded the end of the Cold War. Coral’s intense interest in this process 
was shown in her book on détente in which, as we have seen, she looked very 
closely at the idea of a ‘concert of power’. She was clear that détente did not 
itself constitute a ‘concert’ system, but she clearly saw that as one direction 
in which it might evolve and the image she sketched of that possibility in this 
book strikingly resembled her ideas of a post Cold War concert of power which 
emerged in the 1990s. She wrote that an optimistic view of US–Soviet détente 
in the 1970s could see it as ‘a mode of attempting to transmute “a revolutionary 
order” (which the twentieth century clearly has been and remains) into 
a “legitimate order” by spinning a sort of web of common interests and 
arrangements between the revolutionary and status quo powers’.17 This, she 
implied, would be a kind of ‘concert’, but she cautioned that this was not to 
assume that such an order would be possible in the late twentieth century. She 
14 Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations, Chatham House Essays No. 3, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 111.
15 Brendan Taylor ‘A US-China “Shadow Condominium”?’ The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, 25 October 2012. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-us-china-shadow-condominium/ (accessed 6 
August 2013).
16 Others did too, as Robert Ayson has pointed out to me, including Thomas Schelling and Hedley Bull, who 
saw the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as evidence for this kind of cooperation.
17 Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente, p. 26.
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quoted Kissinger explaining that many things that made a concert of power 
possible in the nineteenth Century were not available in the twentieth. ‘The 
stable technology, the multiplicity of great powers, the limited domestic claims 
and the frontiers which permitted adjustment have gone forever.’18 That’s a 
fascinating list of the conditions required for a concert of power, but it may be 
too demanding, and not all of the conditions turned out to be ‘gone forever’. 
Interestingly for the way Coral’s thinking about the concert of power model 
evolved later, she emphasised that ‘any viable concert of power would … have 
to be in a world basis’. In a preceding passage she wrote:
Any workable concert system for the late twentieth century, as against the 
early nineteenth, would have to include some non-European members. 
One can perhaps see emerging in contemporary international relations 
what might be called the candidate-members of some prospective world 
concert of powers, in countries like Brazil or Nigeria or Iran.19
Coral dismissed all this as too optimistic for serious policy-making, and 
maintained her primary focus on the less ambitious and more urgent aim of 
using détente to make the Cold War safer. But this did not stop her setting 
down an eerily prescient sketch of how the conditions for her model of a global 
concert might evolve:
A really optimistic American view of Cold War would presumably hold 
that the Soviet Union could somehow be made to shrink as a power, 
allowing Eastern Europe to regain its autonomy and ending any serous 
military threat and any possibility of the expansion of Soviet influence 
overseas. But this is a very unrealistic expectation.20
After the Cold War
It is hardly surprising then that when this ‘very unrealistic expectation’ did 
nonetheless come to pass, Coral immediately began to argue that the form of 
international order most likely to replace the bipolar balance of the Cold War 
was a concert of power. She presented this case first in a short monograph, 
The Post-Soviet World: Geopolitics and Crises, published in 1992, in which she 
argued that ‘the emerging (or re-emerging) pattern of great power relationships 
18 ibid., p. 27.
19 ibid., p. 26.
20 ibid., p. 27.
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is that of a concert of powers, somewhat akin to that after 1815, though of course 
global rather than merely European, and based on six great powers rather than 
five’.21 
Coral had two reasons for thinking that a concert of powers was emerging at 
this time. The first was her belief—widely shared at the time—that with the 
end of the Cold War the US–Soviet bipolarity had given way to a multipolar 
distribution of power in which a number of great powers would all play more or 
less functionally equal roles. This was of course necessary for the emergence of 
a concert of power, but it was not sufficient, because a reversion to multipolarity 
might have produced only reversion to a classic balance of power system.22 Her 
second reason for thinking that a concert of power was then emerging was that 
she saw evidence that the understandings between great powers necessary for a 
concert of power were indeed emerging as bipolarity gave way to multipolarity. 
For this evidence she looked primarily to the functioning of the UN Security 
Council in the early 1990s, and especially the way the great powers behaved in 
the Gulf crisis of 1990–91 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The fact that the 
Security Council had begun to work as originally intended showed, she argued, 
that the concert of power which had underlain its original design had been 
revived, albeit with a different membership from that embodied in the Council 
itself.23 
In developing this argument Coral gave an interesting account of the idea of a 
concert of power and how it differs from a balance of power, and the nature of 
the understandings which make the difference. She wrote:
The difference between a workable concert of powers and an ordinary 
multilateral balance of power is that a concert system requires 
consciousness on the part of the central balance decision-makers that 
(at least for the time being) the common interests of their respective 
countries vis a vis the rest of the society of states are more important 
than their competitive interests vis a vis one another. That consciousness 
can only emerge when adversarial tensions between the central balance 
powers are at an unusually low ebb: that is, when the element of plausible 
challenge to the status quo of power distribution is either absent, as it is 
at the moment, or comes from outside the central balance.24
21 Coral Bell, The Post-Soviet World: Geopolitics and Crises, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.98, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1992, p. 2. 
22 Coral had explored how a reversion to multipolarity in Asia would lead to a classic balance of power in 
an Adephi Paper published in 1968 in which she acknowledged no prospect of a concert emerging. See Coral 
Bell, The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents, Adelphi Paper no. 44, International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 1968.
23 ibid., p. 6.
24 ibid., p. 4.
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There are several notable things about this passage. The first is that it very 
clearly sees the concert as involving great powers (or ‘central balance powers’ 
as she also calls them) alone. She identifies six great powers in the post-Soviet 
world: America, Russia, Europe, China, Japan and India.25 Second, when 
compared with the account in The Diplomacy of Détente, we can see a shift 
in Coral’s thinking about what drives the great powers to form a concert. 
The earlier account focuses on the interests they share in avoiding war with 
one another, whereas this later account instead on the interests they share in 
managing their relations with, and responding to pressures and threats from, 
countries outside the group of great powers. Third, she expresses confidence 
that the adversarial tensions among the great powers are indeed ‘at a low ebb’, 
though she acknowledges in a later passage that this might not last, especially as 
economic relativities shift, though she saw this working more in Europe’s favour 
than in, say, China’s.26 We will come back to each of these points as we explore 
how Coral’s thinking about the ‘concert of power’ idea evolved in the last phase 
of her work.
After 9/11
Most people, including I think Coral herself, would agree that she had been 
premature in seeing the emergence of a concert in the early 1990s, because the 
first requirement for a concert—a bipolar or multipolar distribution of power—
did not in fact eventuate. By the mid 1990s it had become commonplace to see 
the post-Cold War order not as multipolar but as unipolar, with the US emerging 
as the uncontested and incontestable leading power. Coral acknowledged this 
when she returned to exploring the future of the global order in 2005. In a 
paper for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute titled Living with Giants: 
Finding Australia’s Place in a More Complex World27 she acknowledged that 
America had become the leader in a unipolar global order, but then went on 
to explain why she thought this was coming to an end, to be replaced by a 
new multipolar order. ‘There is thus, to my mind, an emerging prospect of the 
transmutation of the present unipolar society of states back into a multipolar 
one in the foreseeable future …’, she wrote.28 And not surprisingly she again 
predicted that this new multipolar order would function as a concert of powers. 
25 ibid., pp. 4–5.
26 ibid., p. 5.
27 Coral Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australia’s Place in a More Complex World, Strategy Report, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, April 2005.
28 ibid., p. 14.
13 . Coral Bell and the Concert of Power: Avoiding Armageddon
129
Coral developed and elaborated this idea over the following years, most notably 
in one of her last major publications for the Lowy Institute called The End of the 
Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics.29
In these last works Coral saw two forces driving the global system from 
unipolarity to multipolarity. The less immediate of these, she believed, was 
the shift in the distribution of power itself, with the rise of a large number 
of powerful states including many from the developed world, to create what 
she called a ‘company of giants’. Members of her company were characterised 
primarily by size, and especially size of population, which Coral seems to have 
considered at this point as more significant than economic weight. 
The emerging set of polities for the next central balance range from 
‘super-size’ (China and India at more than a billion each), to those at 
several hundred million (the US at about 400 million, the EU at maybe 
500 million or more, depending on recruitment), with Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Brazil in the next league. At the lower end of the scale, 
with a mere 100 million or so, are Russia, Japan, Mexico and others. 
This would mean a central balance of power, or alternatively a concert 
of powers, running to twelve or so members, rather like the eighteenth 
century.30
However Coral saw the primary factor driving the replacement of unipolarity by 
a multipolar order over the next decade or two was the collapse in the legitimacy 
of US leadership thanks to the mistakes of the Bush Administration in its 
conduct of the War on Terror. She argued that thanks to follies like the invasion 
of Iraq, America risked facing the kind of classic anti-hegemonic coalition that 
had so often merged against leading powers in the past. This, rather than the 
shift in relate economic weight, was what would prevent America maintaining 
leadership of a unipolar global order over the next few decades.31 She correctly 
understood that unipolarity, while it lasted, always depended less on America’s 
preponderance of power than on others’ willingness to accept rather than 
contest US primacy. 
Of course a simple anti-hegemonic coalition against the US would have produced 
a multipolar order functioning though a balance of power. Coral however argued 
that there was good reason to hope that we would see instead the emergence of 
a global concert of power among this large group of ‘giants’. The factor that 
would drive them to form a concert rather than settle into a balance of power 
29 Coral Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of World Politics, Lowy Institute Paper 
21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2007.
30  Bell, Living with Giants, p.29. In her later Lowy paper Coral seemed to step back from this expansive 
view of the membership of a concert, and limit it to six great powers with a wider group of nine or so major 
players outside it. See Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era, p. 13.
31 ibid., p. 14.
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system was the threat posed to all of them by what Coral called the ‘Jihadist’ 
threat to the global order.32 This interesting idea harks back to Coral’s views on 
the nature of concert of power systems which she set out in her discussion of 
détente thirty years before. Then, as we have seen, she suggested that a concert 
could be created by the need of the ‘central powers’ to respond to pressures 
from outside their group, rather than to restrain rivalry and avoid conflict with 
one another. The ‘Jihadists’ would seem to fit this model perfectly, because 
Coral believed they posed a threat to global order comparable to that posed by 
the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War.33 She saw her ‘company 
of giants’ as united by a shared need to respond to this threat effectively, thus 
creating the conditions for a concert of power between them. Moreover she saw 
new forms and forums for global multilateral cooperation, like the G20, as both 
showing that the will existed among the great powers to create a concert, and as 
offering a path towards realising it.34 Her hopes for the G20 were strengthened 
during the global financial crisis when its meetings were raised to leaders’ level 
and it became, at least for a time, the premier global forum. The prospect that 
this enhanced G20 would become the basis for a global concert of power was the 
subject of one of her last, unpublished writings.35
There was obviously a lot of optimism in this analysis, but Coral was careful 
to point out that she was not assuming all would be easy between the great 
powers; she pointed out that things had hardly been rosy between Europe’s 
great powers in the nineteenth century, and she explained at some length why 
it would be in each power’s interests to support progress towards a concert.36 
She acknowledged moreover that the most difficult question among the great 
powers would be the management of relations between the US and China as 
China’s economic and strategic weight grew. She was however optimistic that 
certain strong opposition would deter China from any hegemonic ambitions, 
even in its own backyards,37 and that America was already well on the way to 
accommodating China’s more modest ambitions for greater regional influence.38 
This made her hopeful that relations between them could remain manageable, 
and above all peaceful.
32 ibid., p. 20. In her later Lowy paper Coral said that climate change and the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would also constitute challenges that would help unify the central powers and drive them to 
cooperate in a concert, though it seems clear that her main focus was on the ‘Jihadist’ threat. See Bell, The End 
of the Vasco da Gama Era, pp. 16–17.
33 ibid., p. 20, 40.
34 Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era, p. 19.
35 Coral Bell, ‘The G20 and Multipolarity’, unpublished paper, Canberra, 2012.
36 Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era, pp. 17–37.
37 ibid., p. 20.
38 ibid., pp. 33–4. Note there may be a certain tension here between Coral’s confidence that China would 
not be allowed to establish local hegemony, and her assertion that America was already inclined to allow this.
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Envoi
At the end of her long life, then, Coral remained focused on how the international 
system could best be managed to avoid Armageddon. It is hard not to be beguiled 
by the blend of determined optimism and hard reasoning which, from first to 
last, she brought to this task. But we must ask: how far was she right to see in 
the concert of power the best and perhaps only model for a stable, peaceful 
international order in the twenty-first century? I think she was much more 
right than wrong. I have argued elsewhere that a ‘Concert of Asia’ offers the 
best and perhaps only way to avoid escalating strategic rivalry between Asia’s 
great powers over coming decades, for reasons which have much in common 
with Coral’s and owe much to her analyses.39 But there are two ways in which I’d 
differ from her analysis and predictions.
First, it seems to me that an effective concert must be smaller than Coral sometimes 
envisaged—only the great powers are involved40—and that it is much more likely 
to be a regional than a global arrangement, because the redistribution of wealth 
and power now underway is dismantling the global strategic system of recent 
centuries. Second, and more fundamentally, I think Coral was too optimistic 
about what would be required for a concert of power to evolve, and what the 
chances are of that happening. I do not think the ‘Jihadist’ threat—or the other 
unifying external challenges—has or will prove big enough to overshadow the 
tensions inherent between the region’s major powers, and especially between 
the US and China.
That is, firstly, because I think the shift in relative economic and strategic weight 
between them is more fundamental and thus more disruptive to the established 
patterns of their relationship than Coral allows. By calling this shift ‘the end of 
the Vasco da Gama era’ Coral leaves us in no doubt that she sees how big this is. 
But even so her focus on demographics rather than economics does lead her to 
overlook just how much more important China’s rise is to the redistribution of 
power than the other trends she mentions. This also leads her to underestimate 
the scale of the challenge it poses to the United States’ power in Asia and its role 
in the Asian order. And secondly, this is because she overstates both the United 
States’ and China’s willingness to accommodate one another’s very different 
expectations about their future relationships. For both countries these weigh far 
more in their thinking than the ‘Jihadist’ threat, or the global financial crisis, 
or anything else. They go to deep questions of national self-identity. Coral is 
absolutely right to see a mutual accommodation of these differences as entirely 
39 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2012.
40 ibid., p. 141.
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possible, and as offering a robust foundation for a stable concert of power 
system if it can be achieved. But she underestimated how hard it will be, and 
how likely is failure. 
The challenge she has left us is to prove her optimism justified by seeing what 
can be done to improve the chances of building a concert of power in Asia. That 
means exploring what exactly would be required to achieve an accommodation 
between the US and China—and Asia’s other great powers—that would provide 
the basis for peace. One might say that the best way to honour Coral’s life and 
work is to throw ourselves into that task, because she was right: avoiding 
another hegemonic war—especially a nuclear war—remains more important 
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